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Abstract 
 Kenya was an unusual case within the larger narrative of decolonization in the British 
Empire. The presence of white settlers, the relative newness of the colony, and the particular way 
in which the British pursued the civilizing mission all combined to make the end of empire 
particularly violent for all parties involved. Independence in Kenya was precipitated by a bloody 
civil war, known as Mau Mau, and the imposition of martial law by the government for almost a 
decade. In the midst of this chaos, the Church of England’s missionary body, the Church 
Missionary Society worked to protect their converts while also proving to colonial authorities 
that they were a necessary part of the civilizing mission. This dissertation analyzes the methods 
and motivations of the CMS in the midst of civil war and rehabilitation efforts in Kenya, but it 
also seeks to place mission activities within a larger context of twentieth century empire. Mission 
activities did not emerge from the ether in 1952 after the declaration of Emergency in Kenya. 
Rather their work began with the declaration of war in 1914, as Europe fell into the Great War. 
As such, CMS activities in Kenya must be examined through the long lens of empire, from 1914 
to 1963. Missionary reaction to colonial policies throughout the time period are examined in 
hopes of better understanding the long history of decolonization. The CMS was chosen for this 
project because they provide special insight into the ways in which empire was formed and 
destroyed in the twentieth century. This is in due in part to ways in which they created their 
identity as the state missional body of the British Empire. If the Church of England was the 
official church of the English state, then so too was the CMS the official religious organization 
of empire. By examining how the self-identified state missional body of empire handled, or 
rather mishandled decolonization, we can begin to open new paths of analysis into the larger 
patterns and pictures for the end of empire. 
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A Divine History of Decolonization 
 “Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called children of God.” 
“Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner 
of evil against you falsely, for my sake.”1 
Introduction 
 “I address you as my friends; whether you are my friends or not, only God can tell.”2 The 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, spoke these words in 1955 to five thousand Kikuyu 
who had gathered in Fort Hall, Kenya to hear the senior bishop of the Church of England 
memorialize Kikuyu Loyalists who had died in the country’s recent civil war, known as the Mau 
Mau conflict. At the end of his short speech, Fisher blessed the foundational stone of the 
forthcoming Anglican Church and memorial hall. Labor for these projects was to be provided by 
inmates in the nearby British run detention camp as penance and rehabilitation for their dastardly 
deeds against good Christian men and women. Despite the seeming import of this moment—no 
less a figure than the head of the Anglican Church participating in forced labor schemes in the 
midst of a civil war—the ceremony has only been documented twice in the larger historical 
record. Its first appearance was as a small snippet in the larger documentary series The British 
Empire in Colour which focuses on the larger narratives and impacts of British decolonization 
throughout the empire. The incident also makes a brief appearance in the conclusion of Daniel 
Branch’s work Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya as one example of the use of detainee 
labor.3  
                                                           
1 Matthew 5:9; 5:11 KJV. 
2 The British Empire in Colour (Silver Spring, MD: Acorn Media, 2002).  
3 Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and 
Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 210. Branch is less interested in 
the ways in which Fisher’s visit spoke to the larger questions of decolonization, and more 
concerned with the ways in which Kenya’s collective memory has remembered, and forgotten, 
the horrors of war.  
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This story, and its relative lack of publicity, highlight many of the complications 
connected to the narratives of Anglicans in Kenya during the fading years of the British Empire. 
Historians have yet to fully grapple with the ways in which decolonization touched on every 
aspect of life in the British Empire, particularly in regards to the shrinking cords of power that 
bound the parts of the map colored pink to British led organizations. At its height the liberalizing 
bent of empire was a force to be reckoned with.4 Missionaries and reformers desired to lift up the 
downtrodden people of the world, those who Kipling called, “our new-caught, sullen peoples/ 
Half devil and half child.”5 In order to purify Asians and Africans—and sometimes even their 
own working class—of their childlike and pagan ways missionaries were needed to bring the 
                                                           
4 This liberalizing force was first felt in India in the early 19th century, and although the 1857 
Sepoy Mutiny quietened the rhetoric of improvement and Anglicization, it still continued. For a 
deeper investigation of these impulses see: Phillipa Levine, Prostitution, Race, and Politics: 
Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York: Routledge, 2003); Antoinette 
Burton, Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865—
1915 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Harald Fischer-Tine and Michael 
Mann, eds., Colonialism as Civilizing Missions: Cultural Ideology in British India (London: 
Anthem Press, 2004); Janice Boddy, Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
5 Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” in Chris Brooks and Peter Faulkner, eds., The 
White Man’s Burdens: An Anthology of British Poetry of the Empire (Exeter: University of 
Exeter Press, 1996), 307—8. The literature dealing with the importance of the idea White Man’s 
Burden is immense in scope and subject. The title has been used to discuss multiple empires 
across continents and centuries. Several of the most important works include: William Easterly, 
The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So 
Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), Gretchen Murphy, Shadowing the White Man’s 
Burden: U.S. Imperialism and the Problems of the Color Line (New York: New York University 
Press, 2010); David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel 
Writing, and Imperial Administration (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). There is an 
important counterpoints to the scholarly attention given to the White Man’s Burden, namely the 
idea of the Black Man’s Burden first publicized by H.T Johnson two months after Kipling’s 
poem was published in the United States. Johnson’s rejoinder also focused on American imperial 
efforts, but the phrase has been used widely since to denote British and American imperial 
actions. For more see: Michele Mitchell, “ “The Black Man’s Burden”: African Americans, 
Imperialism, and Notions of Racial Manhood 1890—1910,” in Eileen Boris and Angelique 
Janssens, eds., Complicating Categories: Gender, Class, Race, and Ethnicity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 97—8.   
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light Christianity.6 CMS missionaries, as the official arm of the Church of England, were more 
than happy to do their part for God and King but as the twentieth century progressed liberal 
empire became more difficult to define and thus more difficult to achieve. What had seemed 
simple in the nineteenth century, the provision of basic tenets of Christian theology within a 
British patriarchal framework, became increasingly ill-defined as the state’s vision of modernity 
changed. In the post Great War period, the state increasingly demanded technical, industrial, and 
agricultural skills from their purveyors of liberal empire, but missionaries were ill-equipped to 
provide such training. In the face of apathy on the home front, increasing independence from 
their converts, and decreasing funds from the state, the church struggled to find a way forward. 
Only when the white man’s burden became too heavy to carry did missionaries begin making 
true progress towards the creation of an independent Anglican church, one that could stand the 
test of time in independent Kenya. 
This transition brings us back to the Archbishop of Canterbury on that fateful spring day 
in Fort Hall, Kenya. On the one hand, Fisher’s presence and participation in the activities at Fort 
Hall during the height of the Mau Mau conflict strengthens those who see church and state as 
united in culpability for crimes and atrocities committed during the years of martial law.7 Fisher 
knew that the local population was largely pro Mau Mau, and that they were certainly not 
                                                           
6 The idea of the White Man’s Burden and race in the British Empire is an important field of 
historical study, but several scholars argue that in fact class was the deciding factor in the 
empire, not race. For more see: David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their 
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and Alison Twells, The Civilizing Mission and 
the English Middle Class, 1792—1850: The ‘Heathen’ at Home and Overseas (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
7 Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 2005), 94. The majority of narratives about the end of empire in 
Kenya spend very little time discussing CMS activities. These absences will be discussed in 
more depth in this introduction. 
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uniform in their desire for this new church. After his speech Fisher estimated that of those five 
thousand, ten percent were loyal to the British, twenty percent were more friendly to the British 
than Mau Mau, fifty percent were more loyal to Mau Mau and ten to twenty percent were “Mau 
Mau at heart.”8 This pessimistic notion contradicts the story presented in The Times as one of 
joyous rapture at the Archbishop’s presence.9 But this story can also be read a different way. Its 
very absence from every major narrative about the end of empire in Kenya would seem to signal 
the inconsequential nature of Church activities during these massive upheavals. Between these 
two extremes—conflation with the state or shuffled off to the dustbin of history there lies a third 
path—one which takes into account the long history of Anglican missionary work in Kenya and 
the CMS’ desperate attempts to maintain their relevance to the colonial state during the period of 
decolonization.  
 This third path provides a launching point for this dissertation. The CMS was not a 
superfluous player in the grand drama of British decolonization, nor were they the lackeys of the 
British state. I argue that they were a group trying desperately to cling to an increasingly narrow 
middle path; one which allowed them to maintain legitimacy with their African converts while 
also ensuring a continued supply of material and financial support from the colonial state. They 
wanted to be peacemakers and reconcilers, but their fiscal needs and heavy handed leadership 
left them with few options by 1955. Ironically by the time the Archbishop made the trip to Kenya 
to make a grand stand for the Church of England, its missional arm was already a post-colonial 
organization in all but name. The Bishop of Mombasa had been forced by lack of British 
personnel to appoint Africans as leaders in the church, and any dreams of glory via the state’s 
                                                           
8 British Empire in Colour.  
9 “Kenya Martyrs Memorial,” The Times 19 May 1955. The article describes the 4,000 Kikuyu 
present breaking into Christian song as a sort of praise for the Archbishop’s visit.  
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rehabilitation schemes had already melted away. Despite these losses, failure bred success for 
CMS missionaries by allowing for the creation of the Anglican Church of Kenya. Today the 
ACK is the largest Protestant church in the country with a vibrant and strong tradition of African 
leadership.10 The only way for the ACK to succeed in a post-British Empire world was to 
incorporate Africans into the leadership structure more fully. This dissertation contends that 
Anglican missionaries were both imperial actors and imperial subjects. During the Mau Mau 
conflict they tried desperately to balance both of these roles, but increasingly failed. The balance 
between subject and actor was lost, which revealed deep cracks between missionary society 
personnel in Britain and in Kenya. This combined with the loss of missionary zeal in the United 
Kingdom pushed forward the so-called decolonization of Christianity in Kenya. But here again, 
the failure of missionaries to maintain stability and zeal smoothed the path for an easier 
transition into a fully-fledged member church within the global Anglican community. They 
could not hold onto the missional Anglican church they created, therefore missionaries were 
forced to allow for the emergence of an African Anglican church, one that may have looked 
quite different from they had planned, but one that has stood the test of time in Kenya.  
 The transition of the CMS into the Anglican Church of Kenya is an important story, not 
just for those interested in the history of religion in Africa, but also to scholars of decolonization. 
We cannot begin to fully unravel the threads of the British Empire for analysis until we examine 
the full scope of the decolonization experience. In order to understand the actions of the CMS in 
the midst of civil war and independence, one must first examine their foundations in the colony 
and their decades of interaction with both Africans and the colonial state. Missionaries viewed 
                                                           
10“African Anglican Church Set to Expand in Kenya,” Christianity Today, accessed 2 November 
2015, 
http://www.christiantoday.com/article/africa.anglican.church.set.to.expand.in.kenya/3710.htm 
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themselves as a lynchpin of empire. They were the only bridge that connected the British 
populace to colonial peoples. For the colonial subjects they were the protectors and translators to 
the authorities. And finally they also viewed themselves as the disseminators of visions of liberal 
empire from the state to every population under the British flag, both at home and abroad. In 
order to understand how this vision fell apart in the 1950s we need to first trace its inception in 
the post Great War period in Kenya. These ideals are most clearly laid out in the correspondence 
that passed between metropole and mission field. Mission secretaries in London wrote daily to 
the far flung parts of their empire, and Kenya was a key component in this patchwork of mission 
stations. Unfortunately this correspondence was largely contained to the leadership within the 
CMS, which presents an excellent picture of the ways in British missionaries conceptualized of 
colonialism and independence, but leaves room for few African voices. Additionally, British 
Parliament debates and Colonial Office records present an outside view of missional work and 
liberal empire. It is important to trace the decreasing importance of missionaries in official 
documentation. In the 1920s and 1930s missionaries are all over the pages of colonial records, 
but by the time Kenya is plunged into civil war, missionaries were bystanders in the imperial 
game. Shuffled aside by the British population, African converts, and the colonial state, the CMS 
was left to pick up the pieces and try carve out a future for itself in newly independent Kenya. 
This was decolonization on a smaller scale, there were no new flags or anthems to create, and the 
Bishop of Mombasa only acquired a new title, Archbishop of Mombasa. The smallness of the act 
does not convey the importance of this change in the long term. While the first Archbishop of 
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Mombasa was Leonard Beecher, every Archbishop after him was a Kenyan. In the 1920s there 
were dozens of Anglican missionaries in Kenya, today there are only four.11 
  This narrative history of the CMS in Kenya will not only fill in important gaps in 
missional history, it will create a deeper understanding of decolonization as not only a political 
and military process, but one that was experienced at multiple levels of British society. In recent 
years, scholars have increasingly grappled with the impact that decolonization had on Britain, 
and this dissertation hopes to expand that conversation by highlighting the ways in which 
Anglican mission plans and projects were intertwined with the British imperial project, but 
dependent upon the engagement and support of the British people. Thus, decolonization is about 
more than a sense of managed decline or international politics—the process was, at least in part, 
shaped by the engagement of organizations such as the Church Missionary Society. As they 
became increasingly unable to participate fully in colonial programs and events they pushed 
forward a miniature decolonization of their own, one that led to the Anglican Church of Kenya. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
11 The CMS only lists two couples for their Kenya work currently, Caroline and Dick Seed and 
David and Liza Cooke. The Seeds provide religious education and training while the Cookes 
work on programs of reconciliation and restorative justice. For more see: http://www.cms-
uk.org/tabid/740/language/en-GB/Default.aspx, accessed 2 November 2015. 
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Mission Histories 
 In the nineteenth century the Anglican missionary Henry Venn called for a church of the 
three selves—self-governing, self-sustaining, self-propagating.12 For mission societies this meant 
that local churches should become financially self-sufficient. Once these churches became 
solvent, they could become self-governing, which meant that missionaries would no longer be 
needed.13 Another common, if unfortunate, term for this ideal was a call for the “euthanasia of 
mission.”14 This ideal became the motto but not the lived reality for many missionaries, 
particularly in the nineteenth century. This was true throughout the mission field, but particularly 
in Africa. Although Venn was a missionary in Africa, his vision of the church of three selves was 
primarily meant for churches in Southern and East Asia. Here were populations full of civilized 
people who needed Christianity, but had legitimate cultures and thus had to be handled 
delicately. Conversely, Africa was a pagan, civilization-free land where many second tier 
missionaries could find success.15 In fact, Brian Stanley argues that many mission organizations 
did not turn their full attention to the continent until the 1950s, after they had been expelled from 
China and realized how successful they had already been in African colonies.16 
                                                           
12 Mathinus L. Daneel, “African Initiated Churches in Southern Africa: Protest Movements or 
Mission Churches?” in Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the 
Twentieth Century Donald Lewis, eds. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 201. 
13 C. Peter Williams, The Ideal of the Self-Governing Church: A Study in Victorian Missionary 
Strategy (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 1—8.  
14 Jehu Hanciles, Euthanasia of a Mission: African Church Autonomy in a Colonial Context 
(Westport, CT: Preagar Publishers, 2002), 25—6. 
15 Robert W. Strayer, The Making of Mission Communities in East Africa: Anglicans and 
Africans in Colonial Kenya, 1875—1935 (London: Heinemann, 1978). 6. 
16 Brian Stanley, The World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910 (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 236—37, 307.  
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 While missionaries focused primarily on Asia at the expense of Africa, scholars have 
done quite the opposite. Most literature about missional activities can be divided into two 
primary camps—one group focuses on the long nineteenth century while the other examines the 
rise of African Christianities in the aftermath of political independence. Some scholars do 
include the interwar period, but generally as part of their conclusions or as a prelude to their 
larger narratives. It seems to be a tacit agreement among many scholars that the period covering 
the 1920s through independence was a lacuna.17 Trends that began in the late nineteenth reached 
their fulfillment in the birth of indigenous churches, but few have set out to trace those 
developments in detail. In many ways this seems to be a product of the wealth of material present 
for these two periods. Scholars have spent decades sifting through missional records to uncover 
social, political, cultural, and economic analyses of both British and African cultures. What has 
emerged is a complex, messy understanding of theologies and relationships that were constantly 
being negotiated and remade as both missionaries and their intended converts.  
 The first wave of British missional histories were largely completed by amateur 
historians who wanted to document the successes of their particular institutions. These works 
frequently are exacting in their detail, but lack scope and depth in regards to historical analysis.18 
                                                           
17 For instance in Timothy Yates’ general history of missionary expansion, Africa is given two 
sections, one dealing with the nineteenth century. The concluding section devotes only four 
pages to the first fifty years of the century before jumping to the post-colonial period. Timothy 
Yates, The Expansion of Christianity (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 68—87, 
166—83. Similarly Andrew Porter’s work on high imperialism and the scramble for Africa 
begins in 1880 and concludes in 1914, however, his narrative peters out at the turn of the 
century. Andrew Porter, The Imperial Horizons of British Protestant Missions, 1880—1914 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2003). Steven Maughan, Mighty England Do Good: 
Culture, Faith, Empire, and World in the Foreign Missions of the Church of England, 1850-1915 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014) suffers from a similar fate.  
18 Charles Hole, The Early History of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East 
(London, 1896). Richard Lovett, History of the London Missionary Society, 1795—1895, 2 vols. 
(London, 1895). E. Stock, History of the Church Missionary Society, 3 vols. (London, 1899).  
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However, beginning in the 1960s there was a nationalist backlash against these kinds of histories 
as scholars in both former colonies and imperial nations began pushing back against the narrative 
of the brave lonely missionary, sent only to proclaim the pure Gospel.19 In this revised narrative 
missionaries became the “handmaidens of colonialism,” no longer the protective heroes but part 
of the imperial problem.20 The most powerful articulators of this new type of thinking were the 
anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff, whose two-volume work, Of Revelation and Revolution 
radically altered the field of missional studies.21 They argued that not only were missionaries 
engaged in various political processes at every turn, but they were also the true conquerors of the 
African mind. For the Comaroff’s imperialism was imbricated in every facet of European life 
and while missionaries may have wanted to create what the Comaroff’s term liberal democracy, 
in fact they replicated a “racially-coded, class-ridden system of domination.”22   
                                                           
19 Thomas Spear, “Toward the History of African Christianity,” in East African Expressions of 
Christianity Thomas Spear and Isaria N. Kimambo eds., (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), 9; J.F.A 
Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841—1891: The Making of a New Elite (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1965); CP Groves, The Planting of Christianity in Africa, 4 vols. 
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1948—1958); Roland Oliver, Africa Since 1800 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967). 
20 Seth Quartey, Missionary Practices on the Gold Coast, 1832—1895: Discourse, Gaze, and 
Gender in the Basel Mission in Pre-Colonial West Africa (Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 
2007), i.  
21 Jean and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and 
Consciousness in South Africa, Volume I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). In South 
Asia Susan Bayly’s work performed a similar function. Susan Bayly, Saints, Goddesses, and 
Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society, 1700—1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
22 Of Revelation and Revolution, 254—55. For more on the connections between missionaries 
and democracy see: Robert Dowd, Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); C. Rosalee Ewell, “Closer to 
Christ, Closer to One Another: Evangelicals in Partnership,” in Called to Unity for the Sake of 
the Mission John Gibaut and Knud Jørgensen, eds., (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 90; Robert 
Woodbury, The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy (Washington D.C.: American Political 
Science Association, 2012).  
11 
 
 Of Revelation and Revolution created one of the primary divisions within the 
historiography of missions—were missionaries truly imperial expansionists? Furthermore, how 
much of an impact did these religious groups have on African societies?  Andrew Porter argues 
that in fact most missionaries were ambivalent at best towards imperialism; while they may have 
participated in colonial endeavors they were not in fact consistently pro-empire. In many cases 
they supported what they categorized as non-radical nationalist movements.23 Others contend 
that missionaries did not destroy indigenous cultures; rather they saw themselves as the 
guardians of those cultures from both other Africans and colonial authorities.24 However, 
scholars such as Martin Ballard contend that in fact missionaries could never escape their 
racialized notions of superior civilization, nor could they solely transmit Christianity, notions of 
cultural superiority always seeped through.25 These debates are complicated by the firewall that 
exists between historians of empire and historians of missions. As Norman Etherington argues, 
“Just as the history of the British Empire can be written without much attention to missions, the 
history of missions can be written without much attention to empire.”26 Both groups talk around 
                                                           
23 Andrew Porter, Religion Versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas 
Expansion, 1700-1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 322—3. 
24 Lamin Sanneh, Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1989), 8—9, 108; Walter Gam Nkwi, African Modernities and Mobilities: An 
Historical Ethnography of Kom, Cameroon, c. 1800—2008 (Bamenda: Langaa, 2015); David 
Maxwell, “Decolonization,” in Missions and Empire Norman Etherington, ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 287—88. For some scholars the middle path is most attractive—British 
missionaries debated empire, feared empire, or were simply not important enough to worry about 
in the expansion of the British state. For more see: Hilary Carey, God’s Empire: Religion and 
Colonialism in the British World, c. 1801—1908 (Cambridge University Press, 2011); A.P 
Thorton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London: Macmillan, 
1959); Brian Stanley, Bible and Flag: Protestant Missionaries and British Imperialism in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Leicester: Apollos, 1990). 
25 Martin Ballard, White Man’s God: The Extraordinary Story of Missionaries in Africa (Oxford: 
Greenwood World Publishers, 2008). 
26 Norman Etherington, “Introduction,” in Missions and Empire Norman Etherington, ed., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3. 
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each other, but rarely to each other. Part of the problem is the porous nature of missionary work; 
British missionaries worked all over the world, and missionaries from Europe and the United 
States worked freely in the empire. Added to these difficulties are complication of theological 
division, the unification, disappearance or modification of various missional societies, and of 
course the multitude of abbreviations and acronyms.  
Thus the two fields have carried on, utilizing each other at the margins of their narratives, 
but rarely integrating the two. The most fruitful fields of recent in recent missionary 
historiography include class, gender, and nationalism. Emily Manktelow’s work examines the 
ways in which many missionaries aspired to have middle class social lives, while inculcating 
working class ideals on the families they were trying to convert.27 Missionary work was 
aspirational in more than the theological sense for many who traveled to the colonies for 
religious work. Imperial scholars frequently document the ways in which class and race 
intertwined throughout the British Empire, as whiteness amidst the sea of colonial faces became 
a marker of civilization, and thus higher class of persons.28 This was particularly true for 
missionaries at the turn of the century. Few had university degrees, but their literacy, dress, and 
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28 Juliette Bridgette Milner-Thorton, The Long Shadow of the British Empire: The Ongoing 
Legacies of Race and Class in Zambia (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), 65—75; 
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British sense of culture placed them above those they hoped to convert.29 Women and gender 
studies have played an important part in the work of the above scholars in creating new ways to 
study missionary and imperial stories. Much as missionaries play on the fringes of the imperial 
narrative, women function in a similar manner for missional histories. The official record for 
most missionary societies focus almost entirely on male missionaries; single women were 
allowed to work in the field, but not to obtain that coveted title of missionary. Rather they were 
relegated to the “worker” position.30 Wives of male missionaries were also overlooked, despite 
the fact that their work was necessary to the functioning of mission stations. They were valuable 
but unpaid labor.31 This remained the case for many missionary societies right up to 
independence. Today women can be missionaries in their own right for the CMS, but in many 
African churches, including the ACK, men continue to control the high clerical positions. 
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For many missional scholars the nineteenth century is king.32 At the dawn of the short 
twentieth century, religious scholars turn their focus to indigenous Christianity, particularly the 
Revival movements that swept the continent.33  For the decolonization period specifically there 
are only a small collections of works; however they tend to be case studies presented as articles 
or chapters in edited works.34 These sketches of African missionary experience highlight the 
complex world of missionaries attempting to weather the transition from religious and political 
control to independence. In Kenya the Mau Mau uprising and the violent British response 
heightened these complexities. However, missionaries remain on the fringes of scholarship, 
always mentioned but never fully analyzed. Only John Stuart, a missionary historian, and 
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Caroline Elkins examine missionaries in any depth. Stuart’s work focuses on the actions in the 
highest levels of Anglican leadership, particularly the infighting between church leaders in Great 
Britain and the Bishop of Mombasa, Leonard Beecher.35 Conversely, Elkins highlights the 
complicity of missionaries in looking the other way or participating in British human rights 
abuses.36 
These two authors provide an important beginning for historians seeking to understand 
the connections between Mau Mau, missionaries, and the end of empire, but it is just that, a 
beginning. Stuart’s insistence on divorcing missionaries from the larger context of 
decolonization and his single-minded focus on the highest echelons of church leadership mean 
that the various responses of missionaries on the ground are overlooked. Because Stuart only 
devotes one chapter of his work to Kenya, he does not have adequate space to delve into the 
complexities of missionary activities during the late colonial period. Elkins may have more space 
to analyze missionaries in the pages of Imperial Reckoning, but her treatment of their work is 
equally myopic.37 She sees only ‘bad’ missionaries who used religion to buttress the colonial 
state or forsook their ethics in exchange for retaining colonial favor. This makes sense within her 
larger argument regarding the nature of the British Empire, but we must remember that the 
reality of missionary experience was multifaceted. In order to understand the diversity of 
missionary reactions one must analyze the church from top to bottom. Additionally, this 
dissertation will provide more research on the rehabilitation programs offered in detention camps 
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because those efforts will provide insight into a whole range of broader issues concerning Mau 
Mau, decolonization, and missionary experience in the twentieth century. 
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Stories of Decolonization  
 Historians who study the decolonization process in the British Empire generally fall into 
three opposing schools. Those in the first group, characterized by scholars such as John Darwin, 
argue that decolonization was a chaotic progression of British losses, pushed forward by lack of 
imperial will and indigenous nationalism.38  The second school, advocated by historians such as 
Ronald Hyam, contends that decolonization was a process of managed decline, ably handled by 
pragmatic politicians and civil servants.39  The third held by Wm. Roger Louis, maintains that 
international events were the decisive catalyst in decolonization.40 In this school, the Cold War, 
the United Nations, and the United States all push and pulled the United Kingdom towards 
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decolonization, particularly in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. For scholars of decolonization 
Kenya continues to be a major point of contention. The chaos and horror of both the Mau Mau 
conflict and British attempts to suppress it provide ample fodder for academics of all sides of the 
debate.  
In many ways Kenyan independence presents an anomaly within the decolonization 
process. White settlers dominated the colony and thus more traditional decolonization plans 
would not work in the region. When a civil war broke out that threatened multiple ethnic groups, 
white settlers, and the colonial administration, the British were pushed to the limit. Although the 
British had dealt with armed insurgency before, the combination of the shadowy faces of Mau 
Mau and inter-ethnic violence proved especially difficult. Whereas earlier violent uprisings were 
sustained by more traditional nationalist rhetoric, Mau Mau presented a new dilemma. The 
British attempted to follow many of the same procedures that proved successful in Malaya, but in 
their African context, these procedures took on increasingly dark overtones.41  
 For British historians the complexities of Mau Mau and the Kenyan independence 
provide ample opportunities to support diverse theories concerning decolonization. Historians 
are united in their presentation of the horrors that occurred in Kenya, but they do so within very 
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different analytical frameworks. On one hand historians such as Caroline Elkins contend that the 
Kenyan Emergency is a perfect example of the dastardly devious nature of British rule.42 
Imperial Reckoning claims that the British administration undertook plans to imprison the 
entirety of the Kikuyu population.43 In order to suppress the civil war and imprison thousands of 
Kikuyu people, the British relied heavily on their military and police forces. Scholars disagree on 
the use and abuse of force in the colony. Huw Bennett argues that, contrary to the myth of 
minimal force, the British armed forces regularly went knowingly out of bounds regarding legal 
uses of force.44 Until the Special Branch arrived in Kenya, responsibility for Mau Mau fell on the 
shoulders of the police force. Despite its many problems throughout the Emergency, David 
Throupe contends that by independence it had successfully transitioned and reformed into a 
reliable Kenyan agency.45  On the other hand scholars such as David Anderson and David Percox 
argue that Mau Mau is an example of British shortsightedness, but they focus more heavily on 
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the internecine violence and African agency in creating and sustaining that brutality.46 
 Despite Elkins’ inflammatory rhetoric, within her narrative a murkier picture emerges. 
Those who were imprisoned on suspicion of Mau Mau activities were frequently forced to take 
the group oath once they were imprisoned or other detainees killed them.47  This part of Elkin’s 
narrative dovetails nicely with both Percox and Anderson who present a picture of a Kenya that 
was already on the brink of ethnic violence before the Emergency. In the end, Mau Mau was a 
violent movement, part of a larger movement of ethnic violence in Kenya, but that does not 
absolve the British of their own human rights violations. The presence of white settlers and the 
characterization of Mau Mau as a demonic, atavistic group, intently seeking to kill all whites and 
worship the devil complicated the British response. Most recently, Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon 
argues that Kenya is a prime example of the overall success of British policy to pursue the goals 
of liberal empire, despite the fact that they frequently required “illiberal dirty wars” before 
independence could be granted.48 Myles Osbourne presents a picture of what exactly this liberal 
empire entailed in his examination of the largest development scheme ever developed for Kenya, 
Swynnerton Plan. Osborne contends that even British attempts to establish liberal ideas of 
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development created new challenges for the British state as local chiefs continually thwarted 
British attempts to control populations through the use of funds.49 Indeed defeat always nipped at 
British heels, as David Percox argues in his examination of the cooperation of British officials 
with the ‘moderate’ faction of Kenyan nationalists. British imperial strategy called for the 
continuation of British military forces even after independence, but Kenyatta refused to consider 
the notion. For Percox independence was a method of escape for British officials who were left 
with increasingly few tenable options in the colony.50 
 Kenya has proved fertile ground for British scholars, but historians of Africa also turn to 
the former colony to analyze a host of issues, including collective memory and state formation. 
In the aftermath of independence Jomo Kenyatta and a small group of political elites focused on 
rebuilding Kenyan society and maintaining their hold on power. Kenyatta wanted a non-tribally 
based society, and his treatment of Mau Mau reflected those priorities.51 The official government 
slogan regarding the war years was, “Forgive and Forget,” but forgetting proved harder than 
expected.52 Today Kenya’s president is Uhuru Kenyatta, Jomo’s son, and the same cadre of elite 
families still control the country’s political future.53 If the state wanted to forget Mau Mau, 
scholars did not. Robert Edgerton calls the story of Mau Mau, “a lesson for us all.”54 In 2013 the 
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British High Court awarded £19.9 million in costs and compensations for victims of British 
human rights abuses.55 Several high profile scholars participated in the legal case calling for 
reparations to Mau Mau victims, and their activities created a furor in the academic world. The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History devoted a special section to the case.56 Of 
particular interest was the discovery of ‘lost’ archives of Mau Mau material in the British 
National Archives at Kew. David Anderson claimed that “London’s response to this inquiry 
[about the lost files] was as cynical as it was deceitful.”57 Their work has not been without 
controversy however, as historians such as Pascal Imperato and Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon urge 
for a different kind of historical engagement with Mau Mau and its attendant horrors. In a dual 
book review of Elkins’ Imperial Reckoning and Anderson’s Histories of the Hanged, Imperato 
castigates Elkins for  
attempt[ing] to drape herself in a uniquely academic mantle, namely her assistant 
professorship in Harvard’s history department. There is obvious subterfuge here: In 
failing to inform readers of her primary role as a political activist, she has attempted to 
camouflage the bias this clearly imparts to her historical narrative.58 
Anderson is let off more lightly, with a nod to his “scholarly gravitas,” rather than an accusation 
against his legal activities.59 Grob-Fitzgibbon also gives a nod to this debate with his conclusion 
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to Imperial Endgame, claiming that judging the morality of British decolonization is, “a question 
best left to philosophers and kings.”60 
 In many parts of the British Empire former colonies slipped away with little international 
fanfare. In Ghana Kwame Nkrumah and Sir Charles Arden-Clarke worked together to usher in 
Ghanaian independence. It was considered the model of peaceful transition by many.61 In the 
Persian Gulf, the British withdrew over the protests of local sheikhs.62 The story in Kenya was 
quite different. The presence of white settlers, Britain’s shrinking resources, and the desire to 
impose one last dose of British civilization on the unwilling Kikuyu led to a catastrophic battle 
for control over the future of Kenya. In this grand drama, missionaries played a small but 
important role, one that is frequently overlooked by scholars. Currently the vast majority of 
decolonization historians are political specialists and the narratives they create, however 
excellent, are also heavily devoted to politics. In the end, this means that decolonization persists 
in being seen only a process of political disengagement as opposed to one of imperial 
separation.63 The British Empire was certainly a political entity, but it was more than that. The 
empire fostered social, cultural, and economic institutions as well. How should historians of 
decolonization begin to account for what Fanon called imperialism of the mind? Post-colonial 
scholars such as Richard Werbner and Laura Chrisman have begun to examine the ways in 
which imperialism still infuses many parts of African cultures, politics, and identities, but actual 
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examinations of the decolonization process remain largely unexplored.64 Analyses of empire and 
postcolonial studies can shed light on the ways in which society, state, and faith are created and 
modified in newly independent countries, but without decolonization to act as a bridge key 
pieces of information will be left out of the narratives created.  
It is perhaps only natural that for historians of decolonization life after independence is a 
subject best left to others. For instance John Darwin’s only foray into neo-colonialism is to 
denounce it as solely economic and therefore not applicable to the heterogeneous British 
Empire.65 For those who study the end of empire in Kenya the narrative tends to end on 
December 12, 1963 as the Union Jack was lowered for the last time. For missionaries that end 
date is even earlier, the spring of 1955. The Anglican Church of Kenya was not created until 
1963, but the missionary field operated as an independent organization in all for the remaining 
years of British rule. Life for Anglicans in Kenya after independence is subject ably covered by 
Galia Sabar’s work, Church, State, and Society in Kenya: From Mediation to Opposition, 1963—
1993.66 This dissertation cannot speak directly to the ways in which church and state function in 
contemporary Kenyan society, but it can expose the foundational stones on which that 
relationship was built in the formative years of the twentieth century.  
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A New Story: Divine Decolonization  
Although the development of historiographical narratives of missions have become 
increasingly complicated and sophisticated in recent years, scholars remain fixated on the 
introduction and implementation of Christianity during imperialism, rather than the time frame 
during which imperial governments were beginning to leave their colonies. In addition to a 
heavy focus on the introduction of missionaries, historical studies also emphasize the transition 
from European to African leadership within missional churches. However, for various reasons 
scholars have generally overlooked the key period of decolonization within their studies. Despite 
the paucity of research for this period, scholars of multiple fields could attain greater insight into 
the process of decolonization, the growth of nationalism, race relations, the so-called Special 
Relationship between the US and the UK, the Cold War, power structures within societies, and 
the practice of Christianity by multiple denominations if only the period were given a deeper, 
fuller historical examination. Unfortunately the majority of works which consider these issues in 
relation to each other are quite short; articles, chapters, and paper presentations make up the bulk 
of the historical research thus far.67 Despite this progress Jacob Dharmaraj successfully argues 
that the histories of Christian missions still need to be decolonized.68 It is beyond the scope and 
ambition of this dissertation to decolonize two centuries of missional history. However by 
analyzing overlooked aspects of both missionary activity and decolonization, this dissertation 
hopes to provide fresh insight into both schools of study. 
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 The story of CMS work in Kenya in the twentieth century is one of small successes, 
many setbacks, and ultimately the creation of the Anglican church of Kenya. This dissertation 
will not tell a full narrative history of those stories, but will instead focus on key pressure points. 
These incidents and events highlight the importance of the CMS as both colonial subject and 
actor. Where did missions use the support of colonial authorities? Were there limits on the level 
of interference church officials would allow from their financial backers in both Nairobi and the 
local African councils? How and when did the CMS choose to speak out against injustices 
perpetrated by the state? In order to answer these questions this work will be divided into five 
chapters. 
 The first chapter examines the implementation of Christianity in Kenya in its early 
colonial days, as various missional groups attempted to stake their claim to African lands and 
peoples. In these heady early days of empire, missionaries struggled to find converts and it was 
only the disruptive force of the Great War that pushed Africans to join CMS churches. In the 
midst of conflict the CMS found its first role as lynchpin of empire in Kenya. While earlier 
British imperial efforts in Africa focused on the ideal of indirect rule and a soft touch, the 
demands of war pushed them into new territory. In 1915 authorities passed the Native Followers 
Recruitment Ordinance which conscripted hundreds of thousands of Africans into the Carrier 
Corps.69 Pay was terrible, rations were abominable, and death was likely in these newly formed 
porter corps. Only missionaries seemed to be able to provide protection and an alternative to 
conscription. The Volunteer Carrier Corps a joint effort among various missionary groups, and 
each reaped the benefits of African gratitude.70 It was here that missionaries in Kenya first 
                                                           
69 Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 115—
16. 
70 Mary Bowman-Kruhm, The Leakeys: A Biography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 7. 
27 
 
developed the patterns that would characterize their relationship between Africans and the 
colonial state. They wanted to prove their utility to the British state, in this case by participating 
in the formation of the Volunteer Carrier Corps, while also using that same mechanism to protect 
African converts.  
 As we will see in chapter two that premise immediately proved unworkable in the 
aftermath of the war. The CMS hoped to be prosperous peacemakers in Kenya, using their 
special state relationships to shield converts from the continued demands of the state for African 
labor and land. Unfortunately they could not maintain that balance, which damaged their work 
and identity in the 1920s. Rather than focus on the female circumcision crisis that rocked the 
colony the post-war decade, chapter two analyzes the Society’s focus on education. By 
sidestepping the divisive circumcision question, missionaries hoped to provide protection to 
Africans and service to the state, but that dream was ultimately futile. The independent schools 
movement undercut them at every turn, which left the CMS with an identity crisis, one 
exacerbated by the Great Depression and the advent of World War II. Both of these events will 
be examined in chapter three, with an eye towards understanding the dawning of a new hope for 
the organization in the post-war period.  
 The final two chapters explore the ways in which the emergence of the Mau Mau conflict 
and the declaration of martial law in the colony affected the CMS. Initially many missionaries 
saw the colony’s civil war as an opportunity similar to the Great War. If the CMS could again 
prove to be a protective force over Africans, while also proving their utility to the state, they 
could gain access to financial support which would allow them to continue their work. Even the 
violence of Mau Mau cheered missionaries, because they saw it as a chance to live out the 
dictums of their faith. True African converts would be willing to stand strong against evil and 
28 
 
thus receive the blessings promised in the New Testament, “blessed are ye, when men shall 
revile you, and persecute you.” For missionaries, civil war was a chance to determine once and 
for all who the ‘real’ African Christians were, while also demonstrating to the colonial state how 
necessary missionaries really were. Unfortunately Mau Mau proved to be no Great War, and 
civil war did not deliver the same opportunities to missionaries. Added to these troubles were the 
increasing reports of human rights abuses in the colony, which perplexed and distressed the 
CMS. They needed access to the colonial state in order to maintain their presence in the colony, 
but they also needed to maintain the appearance of legitimacy for Africans. Again and again they 
attempted to play peacemaker by privately airing their concerns to colonial officials in Nairobi 
and London, but that was not enough to shield them from criticism in the metropole or colony.  
By 1955 they were a society on the brink, pushed into created a pamphlet, Time for Action which 
hearkened back to their glory days of missional glory, while also lambasting the state for 
enacting a “double Mau Mau” on the Kikuyu.71 Alas for the CMS the pamphlet had little effect 
on the British population; it did not bring in additional funds or missionaries to carry on the 
society’s work. The strongest reaction to Time for Action came from the Archbishop of 
Mombasa, Leonard Beecher. Missionaries and church officials in Kenya felt betrayed by the 
pamphlet and the fallout of its publication was felt for the eight years. In 1963 the Church 
Missionary Society in Kenya officially transitioned into the Anglican Church of Kenya, but 
independence in all but name was achieved in 1955. The story of the CMS in the twentieth 
century features more than its fair share of failures and setbacks, however each of these defeats 
paved the way for greater African leadership into the church. If Time for Action failed its 
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objectives of serving as a clarion call for new missionaries, it did push CMS leadership on the 
ground in Kenya to look more actively for Africans to take up church positions. In turn, this 
secured their future in independent Kenya.  
Failure bred success for the CMS in the twentieth story, and their stories of 
disappointment give us much insight into the varied nature of decolonization in the British 
Empire. Brian Stanley argues in the introduction to Missions, Nationalism, and the End of 
Empire, missionaries have generally been forgotten within the narratives of decolonization.72 
Conversely, missional historians have overlooked the larger process of decolonization. As John 
Stuart writes, “whatever the causes of empire’s formal end in Africa they were too many and 
varied, and too complex to go into in a book concerned primarily with missions and 
missionaries.”73 However, to separate these narratives only creates fractured historical theses—
missionaries were intimately intertwined with the process of decolonization, whether or not they 
wanted to be, and decolonization, particularly in Kenya, was similarly enmeshed with missionary 
activities. By bringing these two stories together, one can create a better understanding of Mau 
Mau, the Emergency, and the process of decolonization. All too frequently decolonization is 
studied as a military and/or political process, but it was much more than killing insurgents or 
raising a new flag. Missionaries, by dint of their multiple connections across societal boundaries, 
lived and worked in a space that not only dealt with the politics of decolonization but also the 
lived reality of that process.  
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Chapter One: The Advent of Success for the CMS in Kenya 
“It was brought out at that time that there were three great instincts that had 
charactcrised our British relation to races, African and Asiatic, with whom we had had to 
do—I will not say as rulers, but as those who were in a position of responsibility and, in 
some sense, of authority—the instinct of freedom, the instinct of Empire, the instinct of 
philanthropy.”74 
Early Struggles  
 In 1836 a secretary from the Anglican Church visited the Basel Mission Institute in 
Switzerland. There he hoped to find new recruits to work in the far flung mission fields currently 
staffed by the missionary arm of the Church of England, the Church Missionary Society or CMS. 
While there, this secretary recruited a young man named Johann Ludwig Krapf to work in 
Ethiopia.75 Krapf dutifully toiled in Ethiopia for the next year, albeit with very little to show for 
it. In 1837 he took a short furlough to Europe where he married a widow, sight unseen, and then 
traveled back to Africa. While away Ethiopia forbade any further European presence, but Krapf 
continued in his attempts to return to his ‘home’ mission field. It was only after his boat sank 
while trying to cross the Gulf of Aden that Krapf turned his attention further south to Zanzibar.76 
Thus begins the strange history of CMS work in Kenya.  
 Krapf first landed in Mombasa in 1844 and quickly lost his wife and child to a fever. 77 
Consequently Krapf’s first act as missionary in Kenya was to bury his family outside the city 
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limits as a sign that he was “claiming Africa for Christ.”78 He then ventured into the interior of 
the country and set up the first mission station at Rabai. The missionaries that followed were all 
Germans who were equally attached to the idea of conversion and linguistics. Each traveled 
widely throughout the interior, however their rate of success remained relatively small.79 In 1853 
Krapf returned to Europe on account of his failing health and the mission stations he left behind 
were slowly abandoned by Krapf’s fellow German missionaries.80 While in Rabai, Krapf focused 
primarily on translating the Bible and discounting indigenous belief systems.81 There were no 
development projects or schools, although the men did have some material gifts to dispense at 
their discretion. 
After Krapf’s departure, CMS work essentially ceased to function until 1875, when a 
joint effort by the British government combined with an upsurge in public support for missionary 
efforts to establish a new mission station in East Africa. This station would be located at 
Freretown and its primary purpose would be to take in freed slaves to provide them with housing 
and training for future employment.82 In many ways this station was a success, almost one 
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thousand former slaves lived and worked on the thousand acre settlement between 1875 and 
1890; however social tensions frequently curtailed any progress the missionaries might have 
made. Robert Stayer argues that Freretown laid the foundation for the social stratification and 
strict colonized-colonizer dichotomy present in colonial Kenya. These early missionaries had no 
interest in African leadership or participation within the larger Christian community. Rather they 
were there to be subjects—taught how to follow the rules or suffer corporal punishment.83 By 
1910 Freretown had ceased to be a rehoming station for freed slaves, but hundreds of Africans 
remained living on the property. Missionaries provided education to the children at Freretown, 
but it was heavily focused on re-created an idyllic pre-industrialization lifestyle. They wanted 
students to become artisans and farmers, not church leaders, teachers, or clerical employees. 
Missionaries at Freretown frequently claimed Africans did not have the capacity to adopt 
western style civilization or culture.84  
Despite the limitations placed on educational and vocational training placed on Africans 
at Freretown, the advent of British colonial rule in Kenya changed missionary objectives and 
outcomes. British colonial intervention began in Kenya with the bankruptcy of the Imperial East 
Africa Company in 1895. William Mackinnon first received a charter for the business in 1888, 
but the lack of developed economic and trade interests seriously hampered its ability to survive.85 
Mackinnon banked his hopes for prosperity and empire on two things—plans to build a railroad 
to the interior of Africa and his connections within the larger context of Indian Ocean trade. 
Particularly important for this second plan was Mackinnon’s close friendship with Sir Bartle 
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Frere.86 In the aftermath of the company’s collapse the British government would carry on with 
the first of Mackinnon’s goals—the building of a railroad that would connect the East African 
coastline with the interior.  
This railroad was meant to protect Uganda from invasion, and more importantly the 
headwaters of the Nile. Additionally it would allow for greater ease in the penetration of the 
interior of Britain’s new holding, the East Africa Protectorate. Labor needs were high due to the 
hundreds of miles of track needed to traverse the land between the Mombasa port and Lake 
Victoria. For this the British turned to Indian migrants; over 30,000 came to work on 
construction of railroad.87 One British official even termed East Africa, “an America for the 
Hindu.”88  However, before East Africa could become a new India, colonial officials made two 
decisions. The first was that land found in the interior Highlands could only be successfully 
cultivated and civilized through white settlement.89 The second decision was that in order to 
make the railroad profitable and to recoup the £6.5 million spent on construction this new line 
would need regular commercial usage.90 Unfortunately for officials, throughout the 1890s very 
few white settlers came to East Africa. Even in 1903 there were only approximately thirty white 
settlers in the Protectorate. To counteract this lackluster response various settlement schemes and 
advertisements cropped up, promising fertile and profitable futures for British farmers who were 
brave enough to make the journey to East Africa. The first wave of white settlers to arrive in the 
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protectorate after the completion of the rail line were Boer and British settlers looking to escape 
the aftermath of the Boer War. However, a relatively small group of British aristocrats and 
financiers also bought land and settled in the area. Naturally, the British were more enthusiastic 
about this second group, however the great expanses of seemingly available land and need for 
financial returns to pay for the railroad meant that all were more or less welcomed with open 
arms.91 
These open arms were less generous to the last group who moved into the area—white 
missionaries. While Caroline Elkins states that one purpose of the railroad was to facilitate the 
spreading of Christianity, G.H. Mungeam contends that in reality the head of the protectorate, 
Arthur Hardinge, did not support all missional work. Hardinge claimed that the aggressive tactics 
of missionaries created antagonism between the British and Arab populations. He was certainly 
not the only colonial official to see British missionary work as counter-productive to the overall 
good of the colony. Another official, Francis Hall, declared that CMS missionaries in Mombasa 
were more interested in the ‘flesh-pots’ of the city and female missionaries were more interested 
in marriage than conversion.92 Despite these conflicting visions of missionary relationships with 
the Protectorate, one thing is certain—missionaries did come by the droves to East Africa, and 
not just CMS missionaries. 
By the time the Ugandan railway was completed there were no fewer than four major 
missionary groups in the protectorate. Although the largest group was the CMS, they were joined 
by the equally ambitious Church of Scotland Mission (CSM), Africa Inland Missions (AIM), 
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Evangelical Lutheran Mission, and the Gospel Missionary Society (GMS).93 Each mission group 
competed fiercely to establish and maintain their holdings in various spots across the 
Protectorate. Many mission groups had more half a dozen stations, each with only a few 
missionaries responsible for the station and the CMS followed this plan, albeit to a larger scale. 
Their main area of focus became the Fort Hall district, where they had two larger stations, Karuri 
and Kahuhia. However, Scottish missionaries established three primary mission stations of their 
own at Thogoto, Tumu Tumu, and Chogoria with Thogoto becoming its main headquarters. They 
kept their focus and influence quite centralized in comparison to other missionary 
organizations.94 Despite the overall unity of purpose presented by these various missionaries—
namely conversion to Christianity, each denomination fought tooth and nail for the right to 
access various ethnic groups and villages throughout the Protectorate. For while the missionaries 
were plentiful, converts were not. Thus missional competition was not just about finding enough 
space to build a station, it was primarily a conflict over who would have access to amenable 
groups. In this the Uganda railway was quite helpful. Not only did it solve the logistical 
problems of travel into the interior, it provided greater contact with the Kikuyu people, who 
seemed to welcome the new faith, or at least seemed more welcoming than many of their African 
counterparts such as the Maasai.  
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Once the railway was completed, the CMS made a beeline for the interior, but Scottish 
Presbyterians were already on the ground. The two denominations co-existed unhappily until 
1902 when they signed a spheres of influence agreement which carved out their own individual 
areas for missionary activities. Over the next decade as more and more missionaries arrived, 
additional spheres of influence agreements were created among the various Protestant groups.95 
They were not always friendly relations, but each faction managed to maintain détente. In part 
these agreements worked because Protestants feared Catholic influence over potential converts. 
Thus, although Catholics had an established a presence in the protectorate, they worked 
completely independently of the Protestant groups.96 This separation was largely due to 
Protestant antipathy towards the Catholic faith. Many missionaries felt that belief in Islam was 
preferable to the taint of Catholicism on the pristine nature of Christianity.97 Indeed one 
missionary, A.W. McGregor wrote: 
To me it seems a serious matter that such a district [Murang’a] should be overrun with an 
influence so distinctly un-English… I ask what must be the effect on the loyalty of these 
people as part of the British Empire to have the country so overrun with an alien 
influence, if we, who stand for all that is true, straight-forward and loyal to God and 
country, do so little.98 
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Catholic influence was a serious threat to many Protestant missionaries, on both theological and 
patriotic grounds, thus many of their maneuvers in the early part of the twentieth century were 
designed to keep Catholics away from precious potential converts. However, their desires were 
thwarted as Catholics were allowed entry into many of the interior regions south of the Tana 
River. 
 In addition to problems with their Catholic brethren, the particular form of ‘pious 
imperialism’ practiced by missionaries in the Kenya colony faced an even bigger hurdle, namely 
lack of converts.99 As described in the annual CMS report for 1907-08, African Christians were a 
difficult commodity—women hindered missionaries in their work as did alcohol and illegal 
activities. Tellingly this section is entitled, “unworthy converts.”100 Thus, even when Africans 
professed the Christian faith, there were always fears that this conversion was not soul deep. 
Rather it was a momentary choice, made for personal or social gain rather than for deep seeded 
beliefs.  There was always be a tension for missionaries in their attempts to woo people to the 
faith, while also guarding that faith from what they saw as easy-day converts who did not truly 
believe. 
 Initially many mission societies were unsuccessful in their attempts to bring people to 
their respective mission stations, but changes from the protectorate authorities began to push 
them closer to church doors. Although unwitting the introduction of the hut tax in 1902 and the 
land alienation schemes of 1903 and 1907 meant that young Africans, particularly men would be 
forced to seek employment and missionary owned land was mainly attractive to the ahoi, 
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landless men in Kikuyu society. In fact most early converts in CMS areas emerged from this 
class. Slowly the reach of missionaries expanded as people came for medical care and religious 
teaching. However, it must be emphasized that the numbers of converts remained relatively 
small and were primarily those who had little power or agency within Kikuyu society.101 
In addition to their small number of converts, missionaries also struggled with theological 
conflicts which usually emanated in the home country, but frequently traveled to the mission 
fields of Africa and Asia. At the turn of the twentieth century many Christian denominations 
attempted to form closer working unions, particularly for missionary endeavors, but that proved 
more difficult than expected.102 Missionaries on the ground remained wary of each other, despite 
their shared Protestant backgrounds. In stark contrast to the antipathy found in Kenya amongst 
various missionary groups, many back in the metropole wanted to focus more heavily on 
working together despite any theological differences. In 1910, the World Missionary Conference 
met under the leadership of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson. This conference 
was meant to herald a new world order of sorts—one in which the colonized people of the world, 
now under the authority of Christian governments, was ripe for mass conversion, if only 
cooperation could be achieved.103 Unfortunately the optimism of Edinburgh would be shattered 
by two things: the increasing conflict between High Churchmen and Evangelicals within the 
Anglican Church and World War I.  
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Intra-church quarrels between Anglicans was certainly not new but in the twentieth 
century the scope of these disagreements would be wider than ever before due to the spirit of 
cooperation created by the 1910 meeting in Edinburgh. In 1913 four major denominations 
conferenced at the Church of the Torch in Kenya. Members present included the CMS, CSM, 
Methodists, and AIM and the goal was to create a federation of sorts as opposed to the previous 
spheres of influence agreement. Here the differences between Anglican factions created schism 
instead of cooperation. The Bishop of Zanzibar, Frank Weston, was an Anglo-Catholic while the 
Bishops of Mombasa and Uganda were Evangelicals. Weston wrote to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury in the aftermath of the conference to decry what he saw as a slight against Anglican 
theology and an all too eager embrace of modernity.104 Weston wanted his bishop compatriots to 
be put on trial for promoting heresy and schism, but after almost two years of debate among 
Anglican leaders in Britain, the Archbishop published a statement throwing his full support 
behind the Bishops of Mombasa and Uganda.105 The Kikuyu Controversy pushed back any hope 
of greater cooperation between the denominations until after the war. It also made it even more 
difficult to procure African converts. Thus the first seventy years of Anglican missionary activity 
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in Kenya were anything but successful—rather they were marred by intra-missional conflicts, 
power struggles with other missionary groups, and only a few success stories.  
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The Advent of War and Success at Last 
Despite these lackluster beginnings, the fortunes of the CMS were on the verge of a 
windfall. Two things would turn missionary activity in Kenya into a success—the increasing 
number of schools available to educate young Kikuyu and the advent of World War I. Education 
will be analyzed in depth in the next chapter, but it is important at this juncture to highlight the 
importance of World War I in providing an impetus for Kikuyus turn to the churches as a buffer 
between themselves and the British state, or more particularly the British armed forces. It is only 
in 1914 that missionaries are able to provide large scale advantages to Kikuyus across multiple 
social classes and men sought to escape the forced labor polices of the state.106 Therefore 
although for many the East Africa campaign was a mere sideshow to the ‘real’ war in the 
trenches of Europe, it is an incredibly important turning point both for missionaries and Kenyans. 
 The Great War began with a string of international incidents, miscues, and misdirects that 
still confound historians and it was no different for British and German settlers living in East 
Africa.107 They had coexisted happily enough for the previous decade and neither empire was 
prepared for war, much less one with such murky beginnings. Nevertheless the two sides 
bungled into few naval skirmishes culminating with the bombardment of the German held Dar-
es-Salaam.108 Thus began the East Africa Campaign, which would cost 45,000 Africans their 
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lives and the British Treasury more than 70 million pounds.109 Initially this conflict affected 
primarily the white populations in each colony, although 10,000 Africans were recruited and sent 
to Mombasa in the fall of 1914 where they were attached to two Indian Expeditionary Forces. A 
few thousand were also sent to work on railway projects to aid in the transportation of troops and 
war materials. This first wave of African workers were relatively well paid and looked after. But 
in 1915 the demands of the state increased exponentially with the arrival of thousands of new 
troops to continent. This influx of new men required thousands of new laborers, particularly 
porters. In order to meet this demand the Carrier Corps was formed. Under the leadership of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Oscar Watkins the Corps quickly swelled to more than 45,000 men but still 
Watkins needed more. In response to these requirements, Protectorate authorities passed the 
1915 Native Followers Recruitment Ordinance. This act allowed the authorities to conscript 
Africans into the Corps with a monthly stipend of only 5 Kenyan shillings per month.110 
Additionally, chiefs and headmen were given quotas to fill and they used their newfound 
authority to send away males from troublesome families and rivals.111 Despite the combined 
forces of indigenous and British efforts, these quotas were usually unfulfilled in most cases. The 
combination of low wages, the previous campaigns of heavy recruitment, and the horror stories 
filtering back to individual villages meant that African workers were still quite difficult to find 
and in order to make up the difference the state turned to harsher tactics including rounding up 
men in their homes at night, essentially kidnapping them for the needs of the state.112   
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In the midst of wartime chaos and forced recruitment, missionaries offered a safer and 
less coercive alternative. Initially mission students were exempt from recruitment attempts, 
forced or otherwise, but as the needs of the war machine intensified that became an increasingly 
unreliable method of evading service.113 Because mission stations offered some means of 
protection they became popular amongst the various ethnic groups in Kenya, but especially 
groups suffering under heavy conscription such as the Kikuyu. In keeping with missionary 
distress over the idea of ‘true conversion’ some stations actually began turning able-bodied men 
away due to fears that they were seeking a way to escape from the war as opposed to escape 
from sin.114 By 1917 it was clear to the missions that they could no longer provide shelter for 
African men, no matter their religious faith, and one missionary, a Rev. Dr. Arthur of the CSM 
decided to formulate a new solution. He, along with backers from the CMS and AIM, went to the 
authorities and proposed the creation of a Volunteer Carrier Corps, with Arthur as the captain. 
Arthur led his merry band of 1,800 men to Mombasa, and then on to Dar-es-Salaam where they 
served until January of 1918 when they were disbanded.115 Although this unit was relatively 
small, especially compared to the numbers of men who served in the Carrier Corps at large, it 
was a watershed moment for missionary and Kikuyu relations. For the first time they were able 
to provide concrete benefits to a wide array of men from a variety of social backgrounds. 
Additionally, because the casualty numbers—and rations—for the Volunteer Corps were more 
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amenable to Africans, the missionaries—and their God—were seen to be effective for the first 
time. As one African quoted in an AIM magazine in December of 1917 stated, “Surely your God 
is a God [of] power, and he has cared for you and returned you to us safely.”116  
Missionaries were also important in the care of porters who had been drafted into the 
regular Carrier Corps service. The army considered porters necessary due to the dangers 
presented by the tsetse fly, a carrier of trypanosomaisis. These perils rendered pack animals 
useless and thus men became beasts of burden in the eyes of the British army. Porters were used 
in a wide variety of tasks, including road building, stretcher ferrying, and munitions supplying 
but their own needs were generally overlooked. While soldiers were given rations of over 4,000 
calories, while the carrier corps were supplied with less than 3,000.117 Some historians argue that 
in fact their daily rations frequently dipped below 1,000.118 Although they were not fighting on 
the front lines, casualty rates were incredibly high for the Carrier Corps. Officially 45,000 
Africans died in service during the Great War, but unofficially over 100,000 carriers perished 
during the four years of conflict. Even British officials at the time acknowledged that poor 
accounting meant that “the full tale of the mortality among native carriers will never be told.’119 
For porters who did not die on the front, authorities created convalescence centers which were 
frequently staffed by missionaries. Colonial authorities and missionaries also banded together to 
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form the East Africa War Relief Fund to provide succor to wounded porters in field hospitals, 
usually in the form of tobacco and fruit.120 
The cumulative effect of missionary efforts in wartime meant that they emerged as a true 
force to be reckoned with in Kenyan society. They had provided spiritual and physical protection 
through their schools and later the Volunteer Carrier Corps. Additionally the Bibles they passed 
out to their carriers were seen as a strong defensive shield from opposing fire and the rampant 
diseases which spread through porter camps. However, missionaries would still be faced with a 
new series of hurdles as they worked to solidify their newfound popularity and prestige. During 
this period they will be drawn into—and create—new alliances, controversies, and problems. 
They will also be forced to reckon with changing British policies on a whole range of issues, 
beginning with land usage in the Highlands. As CMS missionaries moved into a new decade they 
began to formulate their own imperial plans and would unwittingly initiate a series of actions 
that set them on the path towards the formation of the Anglican Church of East Africa. 
Thus the decolonization of the Anglican Church in Kenya can be traced back to these 
formative post-war years. By re-framing the missional timeline to focus less on the traditional 
nineteenth century narrative, especially important here given the truncated nature of missionary 
involvement in the colony, we can begin to see new fracture lines within the missionary society 
relationships and policies. The remainder of this section will discuss missionary activity in three 
realms—politics, education, and health in order to highlight how missionary reactions laid the 
groundwork for future failures and successes. Analyzing these topics in greater detail provides 
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much needed insight into the ways in which missionary societies and colonial authorities sought 
to extend their control over African bodies and minds in the twentieth century. In the end, the 
1920s proved a challenging decade for missionary groups of all stripes, and the CMS was 
particularly well situated to allow for greater exploration and analysis of how the events and 
controversies of the inter-war period bled over into the era of decolonization.  
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Protectorate to Colony  
Much has been made of the African collaborators needed to make the British Empire 
function—this is true throughout the entirety of the continent, not just in Kenya. However it is 
also important to highlight the importance of missionaries in providing suitable men to liaison 
with the colonial authorities. In Kenya there were no more than eighty men in the colonial 
government and they were tasked with governing over five million Africans. As scholars such as 
Caroline Elkins highlight, cooperative Africans were necessary to allow the colony to function, 
but many overlook the importance of missionaries at all stages of this process.121They were in 
many ways a fulcrum to the continuation of colonial rule, as evidenced by their myriad roles in 
societies. They were teachers, political leaders, doctors, and pastors for the Kikuyu and provided 
much needed manpower at a reduced rate for the British, but their position always felt insecure. 
They were a lynchpin but one that could easily be overridden by the expanding arm of the 
colonial state or the increasing demands placed upon them by their African converts. Thus 
missionary collaborators worked to push forward the goals of both parties, often leaving 
everyone unhappy. Missionaries could not meet the demands of the state and the populations 
they served, leaving them vulnerable to a host of issues in the post-war period.  
 The most pressing of these topics was the use of land in Kenya. In the aftermath of the 
war, colonial authorities continued their wartime policies of increasing their control over the 
movement and labor of Africans living in the Protectorate and their first target was land usage. 
The colony was used as a suitable attraction to lure demobilizing soldiers away from the 
economic pressures back in the United Kingdom. The authorities provided plots of land to 
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soldiers with sufficient capital. Thanks to these stringent financial demands the type of settler 
coming to Kenya would vary widely from the early pioneer days of white relocation in the 
Highlands. Post-war Europeans who migrated to the colony were largely from the officer class in 
the army, and had a modicum of social standing.122 
 Initially missionaries welcomed the presence of more Europeans, especially European 
Christians, to the land, but the nature of settlement pushed many of them away.123 Instead of the 
missionary model which relied heavily on middle and lower class men with little training but 
much heart, Kenya received men with public school educations and while they may have had 
little training, they also had little heart for missionary work. In fact, many settlers were openly 
hostile to mission work because they argued that it made young men lazy, or worse, it 
encouraged Africans to think they could achieve equality with the white population.124 
Missionaries created separate worship spaces and services for the white populations, but they 
rarely mixed socially. For these populations class remained an important marker of distinction—
missionaries rarely had the right background, education, or sporting skill to build deep 
friendships in the colony.125  
The introduction of a second wave of white immigration to the protectorate was not the 
only change made by the authorities in the aftermath of the war. First, Sir Edward Northey was 
shipped out to take over leadership of the Protectorate. Northey was a war hero, renowned for his 
exploits in the Nyasaland campaign. Additionally his background and bearing, “dapper, 
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monocle, and autocratic,” seemed to bode well for the settler community.126 Indeed Northey’s 
inauguration into the role of Governor coincided with a reshuffle at the Colonial Office that 
promised a resurrection of high imperial ideals.127 This resurgence corresponded with Northey’s 
plan to reward settlers for their hard work during with war with greater political involvement as 
well as promotion to colony from protectorate. For settlers this new status was seen as but a step 
on the road to self-governance.128 They now had elected representation, albeit with delegates 
who could always be outvoted by officials and limits on their legislative powers, but for whites it 
was an important first step, especially since Africans and Indians were largely shut out of the 
legislative process.129 While white settlers saw this as a stamp of approval for their prominence 
in the region, Northey was more practical. The East Africa Protectorate needed loans and it was 
much less complicated to get those loans as a colony. Therefore in conjunction with the Colonial 
Office Northey made the Protectorate an official colony and changed its name to Kenya.130 
Missionaries focused less on the new colonial status of Kenya and more on the labor and 
land practices that evolved in the aftermath of this new political reality.  In the wake of 
Northey’s appointment several important trends were highlighted and accelerated, particularly in 
terms of African labor and land usage. During the war the Registration of Natives Ordinance was 
passed but was not put into full practice until 1919. As part of the Ordinance the state required 
every Kikuyu adult male to wear a metal box around his neck. This box contained his 
employment papers, including his occupation and wage, as well as personal information. 
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Collectively the box and papers were known as a kipande and by 1930 almost every adult male 
had been registered with the state and needed to have the kipande on his person every time he 
left the reservation.131 If an African male proved unwilling to register for a kipande or to work 
outside the boundaries of the land reserves, colonial authorities utilized higher taxation rates to 
force Africans out of what was presumed to be their natural state of laziness. Both the authorities 
and white settlers assumed that the only way to push forward the economic success of the colony 
was to coerce labor out of an unwilling population and the best methods to do so were 
registration cards which would highlight and punish labor ‘deserters’ and high rates of taxation 
that would push Africans into wage labor.132  
In addition to the kipande and new taxes, the colonial state also worked to control land 
usage in ways that benefited white settlers and ‘modernized’ the Kenyan economy. Throughout 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, authorities passed multiple native land ordinances 
all designed reify the notion of land ownership. Essentially authorities declared through a series 
of regulations that all land not visibly occupied was free and ready to be redistributed to private 
ownership via land grants. The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance expanded this process and created 
new legal categories for those living in the Protectorate—citizens and subjects. White settlers 
were given the rights of citizens, while Africans were considered subjects. Citizens received land 
grants from the government with leases for nine hundred and ninety nine years, while subjects 
access to land was granted through customary tenure which involved complicated channels and 
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the authority of British appointed chiefs. This Ordinance also created land reserves for various 
ethnic groups that would not be open to white settlement.133  
In 1919 the government released a new labor circular linked together the authorities’ 
desire to control African land and labor. This document called upon local headmen to 
‘encourage’ African males under their patronage to find employment outside the reserves. The 
effectiveness of these efforts became part of a tally kept by colonial authorities in order to 
measure how accommodating and efficient these headmen were in pushing men towards 
‘legitimate’ labor. In addition to African encouragement, district officers were to hold public 
meetings to highlight employment opportunities. In many ways this circular merely built upon 
ongoing practices utilized by the authorities. They already encouraged labor and they certainly 
kept records on the usefulness of headmen, but codifying these practices in a public document 
provided new opportunity for critics to publicize their dissatisfaction with the looming specter of 
forced labor.134 Additionally, the circular included a small section promising that other “special” 
measure would be introduced to promote wage labor if the endeavors of chiefs and district 
officers were unsuccessful.135  
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Northey’s labor circular was immediately controversial. Numerous humanitarian groups 
in the UK voiced their displeasure over the coercive elements, but the most powerful 
organization to take a stand came from Kenya in form of the Alliance of Protestant Missions. In 
1913 missionaries had attempted to join into a loose sort of organization but the Kikuyu 
Controversy torpedoed those efforts. However in the summer of 1918 the four major missionary 
denominations joined the Alliance, which called for various theological compromises and 
relationships. However the alliance evolved to become primarily an organ through which 
missionaries could communicate with the government on matters.136 Their first major test would 
be the labor circular of 1919 and their response was a public letter, the Bishop’s Memorandum. 
This notice was signed by the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa as well as the CSM leader J.W. 
Arthur. Despite it criticism of the government, the authors of the Memorandum included several 
members of the colonial authorities, including the Chief Secretary. Rather than denounce all 
labor coercive labor policies, the Memorandum focused on the potential abuses perpetrated by 
chiefs in their attempts to corral labor. Missionaries also condemned the inclusion of women and 
children in the circular and pushed for only able bodied men to be subject to its regulations.137 
It is important to note that missionaries and colonial authorities were still seen as part and 
parcel of the same system, despite their criticism of the government. In the House of Lords 
debate, Viscount Milner described the situation as such: 
As to the importance—not primarily in the interests of the white settlers, but in the 
interests of the natives themselves—of encouraging them in the habits of steady industry, 
there is, I venture to say, absolutely no difference of opinion between any persons who 
have practical acquaintance with native conditions and native life in South Africa. There 
is no difference really between the administrators and those who have lived long in the 
country, and above all the missionaries, who may be regarded as the chief advocates and 
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defenders of native rights. I say there is absolutely no difference of opinion between all 
these classes as to the vital importance to the natives themselves of encouraging them to 
more steady and continuous industry.138 
Thus the Bishops Memorandum performed its function quite well. It was widely and publicly 
discussed in both Kenya and the United Kingdom and it reinforced the notion that missionaries 
were the “chief advocates and defenders” of Africans. In fact throughout the discussion in the 
House of Lords missionaries were repeatedly referenced as protectors of not only Africans but 
also the moral imperative of empire. In the Archbishop of Canterbury’s speech he lays out 
imperatives of the British Empire on a whole as, “the instinct of freedom, the instinct of empire, 
and the instinct of philanthropy.”139 Within this trifecta of imperial ideals, missionaries are the 
lynchpin for two of them and it is clear that both the Archbishop and the Memorandum 
attempted to strike a balance between their two primary roles—trustees over the fortunes and 
futures of their African subjects and important cogs in the imperial machine. Throughout the 
twentieth century missionaries would struggle to maintain a balance between the two and when 
they contravened each other, usually the Empire emerged as the victor. This is clear even in 1919 
with the Memorandum and its opening line, “The Missions welcome His Excellency’s general 
policy.”140 Historians debate the motivations of the Memorandum and its effectiveness at 
manifesting change in imperial policy. For Opolot Okia the Memorandum was “half-hearted” in 
its criticism but surprisingly successful in bringing to light in the metropole the plight of those 
forced to participate in labor schemes throughout the empire.141 Others, such as David Clayton 
and Anthony Savage contend that while the Memorandum unfortunately still supported coercive 
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labor for Africans, it did stir deeper feelings in some individual missionaries which pushed them 
to take stronger stances against these types of regulations. In particular, Clayton and Savage 
highlight the work of the Bishop of Zanzibar and his pamphlet, The Serfs of Great Britain.142 
This pamphlet, combined with the Memorandum and several embarrassing House of Commons 
debates forced the publication of a modified circular, one that preached encouragement of 
African labor rather than compulsion.143 
 An important component in the eventual partial victory of the Alliance was the work of 
J.H. Oldham in London. Oldham was the secretary of the Conference of Missionary Societies 
and a child of empire, born in India to Scottish parents. Despite his status as an Anglican 
layperson, Oldham worked tirelessly throughout his life on various ecumenical movements, 
including the 1910 Edinburgh Conference.144 Oldham presents an important strain in missional 
work—one that focuses wholeheartedly, if paternally, on the importance of protecting Africans. 
He is also became an important model for later CMS missionaries to use when dealing with 
unfavorable government policies—private deputations to the Colonial Office or the Governor of 
a specific colony. While Oldham blasted both the labor circular and the Bishop’s Memorandum 
in private, publicly he was moderate and spoke little.145 Oldham wanted to persuade the Colonial 
Office to employ his vision of trusteeship over their African populations, and in order to do so he 
spoke quite softly indeed, using meetings Lord Milner and Leo Amery to push for a change to 
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Northey’s circular.146 As we have seen, ultimately missionaries were successful to a point in 
forcing some key changes to Northey’s circular, although communal labor would continue 
unabated. 
 Theoretically the ultimate victory for missionaries came not with the modified labor 
circular, but rather with the Devonshire Declaration of 1923. This document laid out the premise 
of ‘native paramountcy,’ or in simpler terms—Africa would be a colony for Africans, with their 
welfare being the highest priority for colonial authorities.147 Ironically this proclamation of 
African primacy was in fact targeted towards the Indian population in Kenya, a population 
clamoring loudly for their own political voice in the colony. In addition to their desires for 
greater political action, they also wanted access to the coveted lands of the Highlands, which 
Devonshire absolutely forbade. However, he did ensure that the white settlers would not be able 
to push forward a South African style of white dominated rule.148 Thus Africans were largely 
reduced to pawns in a larger political game in the colony, however, missionaries considered this 
a victory. Or at least Oldham considered this a missional victory. He wrote in a letter to Dr. 
Norman Leys, a British doctor working in Kenya, that he “had a hand in the preparation of the 
document.”149 Despite Oldham’s boast, historian Robert Maxon definitively proved that the 
Devonshire Declaration was less about Oldham’s power of persuasion and more about cold 
blooded political realities, namely that Kenya could not survive economically without Indians.150 
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In the end, Indians were unhappy with the compromise, but missionaries were pleased by the 
idea that they effectively protected their African trustees.151 At the time it seemed another notch 
in the belt for that particular style of missionary activism that promoted private conferences and 
personal relationships over more outspoken forms of protest. 
 In addition to the work of the new Alliance and JH Oldham, individual missionary 
leaders in Kenya also proved formidable foes to the colonial authorities at various points during 
the hectic post-war years. The most important of these was W.E. Owen, an Anglican missionary 
originally stationed in Uganda.152 Owen had been appointed the archdeacon of Kavirondo in 
1918 and he quickly drew the ire of white settlers in Kenya who often referred to him as the 
Archdemon.  For some in the government Owen was worse than the Archdemon, he was a full 
on Bolshevist.153 Unlike Oldham’s policies of utilizing private persuasion, Owen pursued a 
policy of public denunciation and passionate writings. Frequently his reports and letters to the 
Manchester Guardian raised eyebrows and drew the indignation of his fellow missionaries.154 
Despite his unpopularity in missional circles in Kenya, he is an important figure to study as an 
example of alternate methods of engagement with the problems of increasing government control 
of a colonial society.  
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 Owen’s work is particularly notable in regards to the question of forced labor; he saw 
himself as the father-protector over his African children and he would defend them as vigorously 
as any parent who saw his children under threat. This paternalism sits awkwardly within our 
modern understandings of activism, but both sides of Owen must be understood in order to 
square the circle of his complicated personality and work. In the early 1920s Owen began his 
campaigns upon realizing that in fact the modified form of Northey’s Circular had done little to 
curb the abuses in forced or child labor. Owen himself had witnessed several suspect situations 
and took his concerns to the local district officers. On multiple occasions the district officer upon 
investigation would find that no coercion had been used and upon interviewing them the children 
maintained they were simply standing near the workers. While the authorities took these 
testimonies at face value, Owen did not. He repeatedly sent information to the Manchester 
Guardian and the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, and it did raise debate in 
England concerning the appropriateness of this labor.155 Successive Secretaries of State for the 
Colonies were forced to answer questions in Parliament about this very topic. 
 One of Owen’s major concerns was the printing of labor ordinances and regulations only 
in English. He expounded on the topic frequently in the public press and here he was more 
successful, to a certain extent. In a Parliamentary debate in 1927 Leo Amery, then Secretary of 
State of the Colonies, promised to speak to the Governor, Edward Grigg about the situation.156 
However, the first actual labor ordinance translated in Kenya was the work of the Presbyterian 
missionary, Arthur Barlow who rendered a Native Authority Ordinance into Gikuyu in 1940. 
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Due to cost concerns regarding printing it was never disseminated in the colony.157 Owen’s 
tireless work on behalf Africans made him few friends and in the end he was less than successful 
in his attempts to change the working conditions and regulations for African laborers. After his 
death in 1945, the Times obituary tried to reconcile the many facets and contradictions of his 
character, calling him a “crusading champion of African causes, and a caustic critic of 
administrative policies.” The article took pains to point out that despite his condemnation of 
many imperial schemes he “supported the principles of British settlement as good for native 
peoples.” In the end, even the Times seemed relieved that “of late years the fire of his 
controversial spirit died down and he turned enthusiastically and successfully to archaeology.”158  
 The Church Missionary Society was no less relieved than the Times that Owen’s fierce 
personality turned away from judging colonial regulations and towards ancient history. Owen’s 
methods, at least in their eyes, proved untenable and it was clear to them that the less 
controversial, more personal communications with those in power were equally effective. In the 
eyes of many of Owen’s contemporaries the work of Oldham proved a prime example of how 
affect change in imperial and metropole settings, never mind that Oldham was only marginally 
more successful. Thus for many succeeding generations of missionaries and missional officials 
public declarations against colonial activities threatened to draw only ire and disdain from those 
in power. This would only be highlighted and enhanced by the increasing dependence upon 
government funds throughout the twentieth century. By 1930 missionaries not only had to worry 
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about harsh obituaries, they also had to be concerned with the loss of funds to continue their 
work or even loss of their salaries. This would be a lesson that many within the CMS would 
learn too well, as evidenced by the relative lack of outcry during the Mau Mau conflict.  
 Owen’s work, and its antagonistic reception within many CMS circles also highlights 
another important distinction within the context of missionary history. Nineteenth century 
missionaries frequently characterized themselves as rebels and individualists in the extreme. The 
most famous missionary in all of Africa, arguably in the world, David Livingstone disagreed so 
vehemently with his parent organization, the London Missionary Society, that they parted ways 
before his famous Zambezi River expedition. While Livingstone still saw himself very much as a 
missionary, technically he was an explorer with government funding when he traveled to the 
interior of the continent.159 Conventional wisdom would seem to indicate that in the twentieth 
century such rebels would be brought to heel as communication and technology made it much 
easier to keep tabs on missionaries in far flung imperial locales. However, Owen is a prime 
example of the danger of assuming a correlation between control and communication for 
missionary organizations. In conjunction with colonial authorities, the home office of the CMS 
would certainly attempt to exert policies and practices in Kenya, but those efforts could be 
stymied by strong personalities like Archdeacon Owen. Additionally change in the CMS was a 
slow moving animal and in many cases nineteenth century office practices carried over well into 
the 1950s. As we move deeper in the 1920s it will become apparent that the separation between 
home office and missionary was a distance measured in more than miles, it could be calculated 
in attitude, personality, power, and future outlook.  
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Conclusion 
 The first two decades of missionary work in Kenya seemed to portend a bright future. 
Despite their initial failures, the advent of World War I pushed missionaries into a position of 
power and prominence, one that they seemed well situated to consolidate and develop in the 
post-war years. However, there were also signs of trouble. Although the CMS had provided 
protection during the war, they proved less able to do so in the postwar years.160 Labor 
ordinances and land regulations challenged missionaries’ abilities to walk the fine line between 
protecting Africans in their care while also not unduly upsetting the balance of power in their 
relationships with colonial authorities. During the war missionaries were able to do both—
protect and support, but the new world of the Kenya Colony proved more difficult to navigate. 
Additionally the spread of education and Christian social mores meant that many in both 
missional and colonial circles worried that Africans were becoming ‘detribalized’ too quickly. 
For missionaries the goal was not only to prove their worth to potential converts, colonial 
authorities, and white settlers, but also shepherd Africans into some sort of understanding with 
the modern world. In order to do this they created various plans and processes to deal with both 
the mundane and significant conflicts they encountered. They also created patterns of practice 
and thought that extended into the period of full scale decolonization. It is important that we 
examine them here in order to see their full fruition in the 1950s.  
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Chapter Two: The Problems of Success: Politics, Health, and Education in Kenya161 
Whatever we do, I am sure that we need to cultivate our friendship with those who are 
administering the country; that is, the officials directly concerned with native welfare. To 
secure the progress of that welfare, it is not sufficient to be good Protestants; we must 
cultivate the co-operation of the D.Cs. and A.D.Cs.  I think you are really of the same 
way of thinking, and I do beg you to exercise great discretion in all future sections.162 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an overview of early missionary activity in Kenya, 
including its initial period of success during the Great War. In the aftermath of war, missionaries 
struggled with their transition into a powerful group, however they did score some minor 
successes with the creation of Alliance of Protestant Missions and the individual work of men 
like J.H. Oldham. In the 1920s the CMS found itself embroiled in new issues, beginning with 
African political organizations. For many missionaries the future of education became the 
paramount issue of the day, particularly in regards to their own status with the colonial 
authorities and their African converts. This is especially true for the CMS. Because of its 
importance to missionaries on the ground, as well as the home office in London, education 
became the key that held the proverbial kingdom together. It provided a natural bridge between 
Africans and their colonial rulers while also giving missionaries essential work in the colony. 
This chapter will analyze a host of issues, culminating with education, in hopes of examining in 
greater detail how the actions of missionaries and the government set in place patterns that would 
inform how both groups responded to the decolonization period.  
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Missionaries used their newfound popularity in the post-war period in many ways, but 
their relationship to the colonial state was always integral to their actions and decisions. This was 
especially true for their two largest issues—education and public health. One cannot understand 
the ways in which decolonization unfolded without tracing its origins in the inter-war period. 
Although scholars have analyzed the rise of African nationalism and the role of controversies 
such as female circumcision in fueling the civil war that beset Kenya in the 1950s, missionaries 
have remained on the fringes of these narratives. However if we are to understand the full picture 
of decolonization religious organizations should be included. The CMS, more than any other 
missionary group, saw itself as the bridge between whites and Africans; in fact in many ways it 
considered itself the only qualified group to transmit imperial ideas while also protecting ‘its’ 
African populations. Concomitantly, colonial authorities looked to missionary groups, 
particularly the CMS, as the largest and usually most agreeable, to implement many of the 
policies of development in twentieth century empire. However, official circles created patterns of 
communication in the aftermath of World War I that would prove quite difficult to overcome in 
the midst of Mau Mau and Kenyan independence. These precedents are important to analyze as 
part of a larger study of decolonization because they provide a fuller analysis of how the British 
saw the end of empire. Although decolonization is largely the study of politics and military 
maneuvers, the British presence in the empire was not just represented by the official mind and 
military. There were a whole host of British organizations and groups living and working in the 
empire who considered themselves vital parts of the British Empire and as that imperial age drew 
to a close they too had to navigate a whole new world. In order to understand how that process 
works, we must begin here in the 1920s as missionary groups such as the CMS were increasingly 
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caught between African and official demands. How the CMS handled those tensions is the 
subject of this chapter. 
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Politics  
 Missionaries saw themselves as harbingers of modernity in Kenya. With that power came 
great responsibility—the great fear for many Europeans in both official and private circles was 
that introduction to modern life would be too destabilizing for Africans. Therefore missionaries 
worked hard to provide controlled access to all things ‘modern.’ They began with education, 
largely in Swahili, and by 1920 they had a small cohort of educated African men. As John 
Lonsdale has argued repeatedly, this first generation of converts, or athomi—a Kikuyu word 
meaning reader—wrestling with modern life largely revolved around the idea of 
reconciliation.163 In the aftermath of World War I, the athomi had joined their generational 
cohorts in a ceremony honoring elders and marking the passage of time.164 Namely the athomi 
were now men and presented themselves as the ‘saviors’ of Kikuyuness.165 Missionaries 
certainly played a part in the creation of this identity, and they sought to use it to introduce the 
chosen few to the next stage of modernity—politics. 
 The first Kikuyu led political organization was the Kikuyu Association, which formed in 
1921. There is some debate about who deserves the responsibility for the organization. One 
school of thought led by John Lonsdale and David Anderson argues that this was a mission led 
endeavor, one that was always supposed to be under their supervision or least very friendly to 
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their interests and desires for the Kikuyu.166 Conversely, Robert Tignor contends that the 
formation of the Kikuyu Association had more to do with chiefly politics and missionary 
attempts to contain local politics, rather than creating political involvement.167 Thus rather than 
introduce modern politics into the colony, missionaries were participants in hybrid political 
systems which combined longstanding local politics with the British invention of tribal chief. 
What is clear is that despite the best missionary intentions their involvement with Kikuyu politics 
would quickly spiral out of control and they would be scrambling to maintain their position as 
partners of the athomi, contrary to their original intention to be the paternalistic trustees of both 
politics and modernity. 
At the end of the Great War, missionaries pushed several converts into the office of chief 
and four of these men would eventually be the leaders of the Kikuyu Association (KA). Two of 
the men came from CMS mission stations, Mbiu Koinange and Josiah Njonjo, while the others 
came the Presbyterian and Gospel Missionary Society. Despite the divided theological 
backgrounds of the men, the CMS was by far the most powerful of the missionary groups 
involved, as evidenced by the work of missionary Harry Leakey. He personally sponsored the 
two of the delegates.168 The most pressing issue for the KA was land—namely African rights to 
the titles for land. Despite their repeated lobbying efforts, the government continually ruled 
against them, stating that the right of customary occupation was the ‘traditional’ and therefore 
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correct view for African property.169 Essentially the Kikuyu did not own land on which they 
lived on because their traditional customs did not recognize private property rights. This allowed 
the government to redistribute land to European settlers and provide them with deeds to land 
while simultaneously denying the Kikuyu that same privilege.  
Although the land question was certainly an important one for many Kikuyu it was of 
primary importance to those elites who made up the leadership of the KA. These men wanted to 
prove to the British that they were spokesmen for the Kikuyu people, despite their ‘detribalized’ 
status.170 These efforts, however, proved less than successful for the KA thanks in part to the 
emergence of a new, more broadly based rival organization, the East African Association (EAA). 
The EAA was led by Henry Thuku and was an independently minded, urban counterpoint to the 
KA.171 While the Kikuyu Association focused on the rural issues of the elite—land ownership 
and control, Thuku focused on issues such as the kipande and heavy taxation.172 Soon his 
popularity, and his speaking engagements, spread to the countryside. These new tactics made 
African leaders nervous, but initially missionaries welcomed the work of the Methodist educated 
Thuku. His first supporters were the young athomi and Thuku used biblical analogies and 
imagery liberally in his speeches to the various ethnic groups. It was not until the EAA moved 
into Murang’a that problems cropped up. Thuku used increasingly aggressive tactics and 
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language and his popularity soared while his relationships with the KA and missionaries began to 
sour.173 
For the CMS, the man in charge of combatting Thuku’s popularity was H.D. Hooper who 
worked out of the Khuhia station in Murang’a. Hooper was Cambridge educated and socially 
well connected, unusual for a missionary in Kenya. He was generally sympathetic to Kikuyu 
grievances, even those highlighted by the EAA, however he had a firm vision of African society 
as one in flux, released from tribalism but not yet equal to the “finished product” of European 
society.174 In the absence of a true understanding of what civilization means, Hooper believed 
that Africans would be swayed by any number of factors, most notably the Indian press that was 
currently booming in the colony.175 Even more worrisome was that the athomi who followed 
Thuku seemed to become less malleable in terms of religion—missionaries frequently 
complained that those who joined the EAA saw Thuku as their savior. The EAA not only 
threatened the conservative social policies of many within the CMS, but it also strongly critiqued 
mission education, which was of primary importance to missionary relations with the 
government.176 Thus missionaries’ distress ran along two fronts—they worried that the political 
organizations they helped create were spiraling out of control and that their relationship with the 
authorities might suffer due to the widening breach within African politics.  
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Hooper attempted to heal these cracks by meeting privately with Thuku, but his heavy-
handed, paternalistic approach did not persuade the EAA leader to tone down his rhetoric or 
tactics.177 The conflict between the KA, EAA, missionaries, and the government came to a head 
in the spring of 1922. Thuku’s popularity continued to rise and government officials and some in 
missionary circles worried about the deepening rifts in Kikuyu society. One CMS missionary, 
A.W. McGregor, even warned of “another India or Ireland.”178 On March 14th, Thuku was 
arrested and deported under the Removal of Natives Ordinance of 1909.179 In response many 
Africans in Nairobi marched in general protest and sat vigil outside the Thuku’s prison. Two 
days later women called for these protesters to rescue Thuku or be branded cowards.180 In the 
aftermath of the violence the EAA went underground and re-emerged in 1925 as the Kikuyu 
Central Association (KCA). Much like the EAA before it, the KCA primarily appealed to young 
mission educated Kikuyu and initially had the support of at least one missionary, HD Hooper. He 
was set to be their European supporter and President, a necessary condition for government 
support and recognition, but he was recalled to England before taking up this position. Other 
CMS missionaries would prove less amenable to this new body and a piecemeal effect would 
soon emerge. More conservative missionaries refused any cooperation, and in response local 
KCA chapters became quite hostile to missionary leadership and political involvement. Only in 
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Kahuhia where Hooper worked did the KCA and CMS achieve unity of purpose.181 However 
even this unity would be shattered with the coming of the most volatile controversy of Kenya in 
the 1920s, the female circumcision crisis.  
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The Crisis182 
 Historians generally point to three general issues when tracing the evolution of Kikuyu 
nationalism and the eventual rise of Mau Mau—the loss of land rights, the rise of political 
parties, and the female circumcision crisis. Each of these conflicts peaked at different points 
during the post-war period and each played a different role in the evolution of the relationships 
between Africans, missionaries, and the state. Despite the importance of each of these issues in 
the overall analysis of Kenyan independence, scholars tend to provide in-depth focus on 
missionaries only when discussing the female circumcision crisis. These analyses tend to blend 
together all missionary groups into one religious mass, thus missing the important differences 
between groups such as the CMS and CSM.183 Despite the blurring of denominational lines in 
many works, it is important to highlight the distinctions between missional groups as they 
handled this crisis. While the Church of Scotland mission took the aggressive route, the CMS 
wanted to preserve their primary objectives; the maintenance of their relationship with both 
Africans and the colonial state. In order to do this they needed to provide education, and they 
were willing to take a soft stance on female circumcision in hopes of persuading students to 
remain in school. By keeping schools in session and full of students, the CMS could better prove 
their utility to the state, which was more important than any ritual performed by the Kikuyu as 
part of their coming of age ceremonies. Thus although scholars highlight the actions of CSM 
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missionaries, they miss the diversity of responses to this issue. Historians who study 
decolonization focus on two separate relationships that of the colonial government and 
burgeoning African nationalists, while missional scholars concentrate on groups such as the 
CSM and CMS with Africans but we need to see how the work of each group was deeply 
intertwined with the other two. By highlighting the CMS response to the crisis we can see how 
the patterns of response within the group maintain the same procedures they developed in the 
midst of the Great War. These same processes would carry over into the Mau Mau conflict and 
independence. For CMS missionaries female circumcision would always be secondary to 
education, and the crisis would provide them further opportunities to push for private deputations 
and conversations with those in power, as opposed to the more public demonstrations of groups 
such as the CSM.  
 For young Kikuyu men and women, circumcision was an important marker that signified 
marriage availability and adulthood. Peer groups went through the coming-of-age ceremony 
together and the process knit kin and age groups together in ways that impacted the community 
for the rest of their lives. For those who were not circumcised they were doomed to a life of 
childhood, never marrying or joining adult society.184 They were also subject to a series of 
dances which mocked their perpetual adolescence called muthirgiu. These dances and 
accompanying songs called young women who were uncircumcised ill-mannered and incapable 
of bearing human offspring. The songs also accused missionaries and government officials of 
corruption and the seduction of young African women.185 In addition to the important cultural 
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and generational symbolism presented by female circumcision, the ritual also provided avenues 
through which Africans of both genders were able to push forward their own agendas and 
independence. For women, the ceremony was rife with power and a very specific culture that 
was theirs and theirs alone. Men’s responses to the ceremony are more difficult to pin down; 
some men supported the abolishment of the practice as a way to consolidate control over their 
households, while also reinforcing their support for religious and political authorities while 
others used their support of the practice as a way to highlight their own nationalist urges.186 
Thus, female circumcision was not only a cultural conflict but a political one as well. For the 
colonial authorities this was not only a political issue but also one of labor. They wanted to 
ensure that future generations of African laborers would be available for state labor schemes and 
white owned farms. Their response to the crisis was predicated upon keeping these various 
priorities balanced in the face of the most significant conflict to face the colony before Mau 
Mau.187 Because the issue of labor was so important to colonial officials, particularly at the level 
of district officer, they actually undertook their own circumcision campaigns, called Kigwarie in 
parts of Kenya. During Kigwarie medical professionals performed what they called the minor 
operation. Lynn Thomas argues that despite the tacit acceptance of the practice by many in the 
colonial administration in Kenya, they never included news of Kigwarie in their official 
correspondence to London or Nairobi because it was a flagrant contravention of regulations.188  
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Despite the lack of official correspondence about Kigwarie, it is clear that even at the 
highest levels ideas about medicine and modernity were changing. As early as 1924 Colonial 
Office administrators set out new syllabi and regulations for African, Indian, and European 
medical officers. These modifications were meant to provide greater training and incentives for 
those working at the lowest level in the medical field. Overwhelmingly this lowest class was 
staffed by African men who worked as dressers, but officials hoped that by the next decade they 
could begin more complex work.189 Although these new regulations said nothing specifically 
about female circumcision, they highlighted the importance of labor for the authorities. Within a 
memorandum from the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services in Kenya, the need to provide 
healthy labor was repeatedly emphasized. In fact the new job responsibilities for future African 
dressers was to be medically examining every laborer before he left the reserve for work.190 Thus 
female circumcision amalgamated a whole host of issues and relationships. It became an 
important labor and humanitarian issue for some British officials; it was a touchstone for African 
nationalists and large segments of Kikuyu women; and finally it provided missionaries, 
particularly the CMS, with an opportunity to prove their usefulness and discretion to the colonial 
authorities. It also provided a valuable, if dangerous, litmus test for Africans who claimed 
Christian conversion.  
Officially, the female circumcision crisis began in 1929 with the publication of 
“Memorandum on the Circumcision of Kikuyu Native Girls,” written by the leader of the CSM, 
Dr. John Arthur. The memo focused on a recent court case involving two elderly women who 
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carried out the circumcision ceremony and the long term ramifications of the procedure.191 
Despite the attention Dr. Arthur’s publication drew to the issue it is important to remember that 
missionaries had objected to the practice from their earliest days in the protectorate.192  They 
decried both forms of female circumcision—the so called minor version which was a ‘simple’ 
clitoridectomy and the major excision which called for both a clitoridectomy and labiaectomy. 
For Dr. Arthur, both forms of the circumcision were unacceptable and subject to major church 
discipline, up to and including excommunication. Several older members of the Presbyterian 
churches went along with this dictum, but many young converts resisted and resented this 
intrusion into their claims for adulthood.193  Arthur was unwilling to compromise but faced 
backlash from colonial authorities and other missionaries for his hard line stance. By 1929, 
Africans were not confined by the older spheres of influence and they voted with their feet—they 
rejected the CSM standard and moved to other Christian groups in Kenya. In order to combat 
this, Arthur pushed for a joint resolution in the inter-denominational Kenya Missionary Council, 
but Anglicans refused to agree. Arthur wanted every church to make rejection of circumcision a 
condition of church membership, but other churches were not willing to take such a risky step.194 
Colonial authorities tended to agree, arguing that full scale abolition was impossible because of 
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the backwardness of the Kikuyu. As G.V Maxwell, Chief Native Commissioner stated in a 1929 
circular, the government “merely [had] a desire, in the interest of humanity, native eugenics, and 
increase of population, to revert to the milder form of the operation, which is indeed more in 
keeping with ancient tribal usage.”195 
Unfortunately for the Colonial Office two things hampered their desire to find 
compromise—the Duchess of Atholl and the Kikuyu Central Association. In the United 
Kingdom, the Duchess sparked a public outcry about officials’ toleration of the practice in the 
minor form. Despite her conservative and anti-feminist background, the Duchess worked 
tirelessly for an end to the practice. Unfortunately it was more effective as a tool to make fellow 
MPs blush than a successful campaign in its own right.196 In the dozens of letters she sent to the 
Colonial Office and the Governor of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, the Duchess repeatedly pushed 
for the government to take a stronger stance against the practice and highlighted the medical 
consequences of the procedure.197 On behalf of the Committee for the Protection of Coloured 
Women in the Colonies, the Duchess also stressed the need to ensure that “girls” who were 
circumcised gave their full and informed consent to the procedure.198 In response to these pleas, 
Colonial Office officials relied on two defenses—the ancient tribal nature of Africans and the 
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intractability of certain mission groups.199 Although they do not specify which mission group 
shoulders most of the blame, it is clear that the CSM was their primary target. As the Directory 
of Medical and Sanitary Services, Frederick Johnstone stated,  
The attitude of certain of the Churches in making the question of circumcision a 
religious test during the last few months has undoubtedly raised the resentment of 
the Kikuyu and it is unquestionable that the action of these Churches in [the] 
excommunication [of] some of their members (who have for years been 
acceptable members of the Church) because they declined to accept a newly 
imposed test is having exactly the opposite effect to that which the Missionaries 
desire. The actual result unquestionably is that the practice of female circumcision 
holds a stronger place among the Kikuyu today than it did six months ago. These 
missionaries have lost sight of the fundamental principle in dealing with native 
development, and that is that progress must be slow and gradual. 
In the end, the Committee for the Protection of Coloured Women in the Colonies and Duchess of 
Atholl were less than successful in changing official minds concerning the practice of female 
circumcision.  
 The combined efforts of the public crusade led by the Duchess of Atholl in the UK and 
Dr. Arthur’s efforts in Kenya were unable to stem the practice of female circumcision in the 
colony. The issue did provide new avenues for Kikuyu nationalists to advocate for continued 
traditions and greater autonomy within the colony. Their fight was not about gaining complete 
independence, but it was decidedly anti-colonial, and it was significant on multiple levels. The 
main thrust for the pro-circumcision camp was the Kikuyu Central Association, a political 
organization that emerged from Harry Thuku’s EAA. The KCA’s relationship with missionaries 
was spotty, depending on the individual missionary, but thanks to the circumcision crisis their 
rapport with colonial authorities was almost uniformly tense and unhappy. The leader of the 
KCA during this period was Jomo Kenyatta, a young athomi living and working in Nairobi. 
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Kenyatta rose through the ranks of the organization was known for his writings in the KCA press 
organ, Muigwithania.200 Kenyatta argued that female circumcision was not a medical problem, as 
presented by the British, but rather one of ethnic nationalism. For the Kikuyu to continue to 
survive as a people, they must be allowed to perform the rituals that made them who they were. 
He frequently compared the ritual to that of Jewish circumcision and highlighted its symbolic 
importance and negligible long term physical impact.201 
 When Dr. Arthur released his memorandum in the summer of 1929, the KCA took 
immediate action, sending around circulars of their own, warning local chiefs that circumcision 
could be completely outlawed in the near future if they did not take action. They also solicited 
funds to continue fighting against banning the practice. The organization encouraged the spread 
of the muthirgiu and the targeted of specific men and women who had not complied with the 
customary requirements.202 In addition to lobbying colonial authorities, the KCA also urged its 
supporters to leave mission churches and schools to join independent, African led schools. In an 
attempt to broker compromise, the Colonial Office invited Kenyatta to London to discuss the 
issue. While in the UK, Kenyatta met with various parliamentary committees, the Colonial 
Office, and Church of Scotland officials. Essentially Kenyatta attempted to circumvent church 
leaders, white settlers, and district officers by appealing directly to those in charge in the 
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metropole.203 His efforts were unsuccessful in the short term; the KCA petition he presented to 
the British government was unfulfilled and during his meeting with Scottish Presbyterians they 
refused to comply with his plan for a slow and gradual reduction in the practice of female 
circumcision.204 Despite his failures, the trip did play a key role in shaping the future of 
Kenyatta’s nationalism and political aspirations. All told Kenyatta would spend sixteen years 
living and traveling throughout the UK and Europe, spending time in the Soviet Union and 
graduating from the London School of Economics with a post-graduate degree in social 
anthropology.205  
 Kenyatta’s work in the UK did bear one significant fruit in Kenya; he was successful in 
pushing Dr. Arthur off the government’s Executive Council. As a member of the board Dr. 
Arthur was seen as an advocate and spokesman for African interests, but in the aftermath of 
Kenyatta’s visit and the continuing debate concerning the crisis the government wanted to 
distance itself from Arthur’s inflammatory rhetoric.206 Despite this setback, the CSM continued 
to work against female circumcision, submitting a lengthy report on the matter to the Colonial 
Office in December of 1931.207 This commentary provided a history of the CSM’s work against 
female circumcision, but it also strove to paint a full picture of each missionary group’s work 
against the issue. As evidenced above, one mission group’s name was conspicuous in its near 
absence—the CMS. Initially Arthur had hoped that the CMS would provide a strong ally, and in 
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fact the lack of CMS support created a rift between the two mission groups that would take years 
to heal.208 In their Colonial Office file, the CSM claimed that the Anglicans did not have the 
proper medical facilities and the subsequent lack of first-hand knowledge for the devastation 
created by the forcible circumcision of unwilling young girls meant that the CMS chose to 
remain silent.209 
 While Arthur counted on the CMS’s status as state church to strengthen his cause, 
missionaries used the same reasoning to recuse themselves from the very public campaigns 
waged by the CSM. They wanted to maintain and protect their relationship with the colonial and 
domestic state, not to publicly push agendas about indiscreet matters concerning female biology. 
In fact the CMS is almost entirely absent from the record on the crisis until after most considered 
it finished. In late 1930 an African Inland Mission worker, Hilda Stumpf, was murdered in her 
bed. Stumpf had recently been embroiled in a case involving a young girl claiming she did not 
want the circumcision but had the rite forced upon her despite these protestations. In the 
aftermath of Stumpf’s murder there were rumors that she too had been forcibly circumcised 
before death, but those whispers were largely unfounded.210 In the aftermath of the grisly murder 
the controversy slowed died—Arthur was no longer a political force to be reckoned with, 
Kenyatta had relocated to London, and the government was more than happy to allow the status 
quo to continue with little interference so long as birthrates and infant mortality remained 
stable.211  
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 In their report of 1931 the Church of Scotland mission claimed that the CMS did not have 
adequate medical personnel or facilities to truly understand the female circumcision crisis, 
however a more accurate assessment would have been that CMS priorities were different. While 
the CSM focused on female circumcision, even at the cost of attendance in their churches and 
schools, the CMS felt that its educational efforts were more important than debates about Kikuyu 
rites and traditions.212 In the long term this strategic plan seemed to work well for the CMS. 
They argued from the beginning that female circumcision and membership in the KCA was a 
“political” issue not a spiritual one, and thus not under their purview as messengers of the 
Gospel.213 Despite this bit of verbal sleight of hand, the CMS did find plenty of ‘political’ issues 
worth their attention in the inter-war period. The most important of these was education and it is 
schooling to which they primarily focused their attentions because it was here that they felt could 
provide the biggest impact, both on potential converts and for the state.  
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Education in the Inter-war Period 
 Scholars frequently link the growth of independent African educational efforts, 
frequently called out schools to the female circumcision crisis. Derek Peterson argues that the 
issue of education is more complicated than that. Although it shared many advocates and was a 
clearly connected conflict by many within Kenya, those who pushed for out schools had to forge 
a common agenda and identity in the midst of political infighting within their social circles and 
in the face government antipathy.214  Thus while schools in Kenya were certainly part of the 
larger cultural nationalist conflict, they must be studied separately in order to fully understand 
their importance in the development of anti-colonial, and often anti-missional, feeling in the 
colony. While for many scholars of decolonization out schools were a footnote to the larger 
female circumcision crisis, it did not feel that way to CMS missionaries at the time.215 For the 
CMS education was the key issue of the day, and one in which they were willing to stake their 
claims for legitimacy in the colony. We can see these prerogatives in their dealings with the 
colonial authorities, as they strove to prove that they were useful members of colonial society. 
As we have seen the CMS developed their patterns of action regarding their place and function in 
colonial society in the midst of World War I and those prototypes would not change throughout 
the twentieth century.  
 The action plans developed by the CMS during World War I revolved around the idea 
that supporting the colonial state in order to fix a problematic aspect of imperialism was a more 
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effective, gentler method than publicly decrying the dark side of empire. For the most part they 
were true believers in the liberal mission of empire and saw themselves as important cogs in the 
imperial machine. As one author describes it, they believed they were the “moral conscience of 
empire.”216 Missionaries may have truly imagined themselves as such, but one of the important 
questions we must answer here is if the official apparatus of empire agreed with the CMS’ vision 
of itself. Again and again we will see the answer to that question was a resounding no. If the 
‘official mind’ of empire truly prioritized a vision of community development and liberal empire, 
missionaries only played a part in that vision in fits and starts. Colonial officials relied upon 
missionaries, particularly the CMS to provide development and modernity ‘on the cheap’ but 
frequently excluded them from larger strategic planning and goals for those development 
schemes. Throughout the twentieth century the CMS desperately worked to convince officials 
that they were necessary to empire, but they were never able to properly procure security which 
meant they focused on trying to walk softly and carry a very small stick. These same ideals can 
be traced from 1916 to 1963 and the most important spike in this timeline is the fight over 
education in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
 African out schools began as early as 1924 as local elders agreed to start the process and 
residents provided land, building supplies, and salaries. In this first phase of African led 
schooling, missionaries acquiesced to provide training and supervision of teachers for these 
schools.217 Despite these copasetic origins many missionaries began to feel that they were losing 
control over these out schools. Some groups, such as the Africa Inland Mission, attempted to 
                                                           
216 John L. Comaroff, “Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience: Models of Colonial 
Dominations in South Africa,” American Ethnologist 16:4 (Nov. 1989), 661.  
217 J.K. Karanja, Founding an African Faith: Kikuyu Anglican Christianity, 1900—1945 
(Nairobi: Uzima Press, 1999), 92—93. 
83 
 
press the issue regarding female circumcision in order to regain the upper hand.218  At the same 
time the colonial state attempted to establish greater control over the type of education provided 
in Kenya with the passage of the 1924 Educational Ordinance.219 This new ordinance emerged 
from the Phelps-Stokes Commission’s visit to East Africa that same year. The Commission 
recommended an education that focused heavily on “adaptation,” or schooling that would push 
Africans to be useful contributors to society. In order to do this there would be two separate 
tracks for education—one for the masses and one for those who were destined to inherit 
leadership roles within tribal societies.220 The result of these new educational efforts would be a 
mixed bag: the new regulations meant that they would possibly have access to greater state 
funding for their schools, but it also signaled in a shift in the types of education they could 
provide. No longer would literacy via religious theology and an introduction to a modern, 
English country style life be the main thrust of education. No longer would teaching Africans to 
be good Christians via biographies and religious tracts be enough for the colonial government.221 
However for those missions who could successfully make the transition, there seemed to a 
promise of long term financial stability and government support.  
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 The CMS was more than willing to make such modifications part of their educational 
policies, and indeed despite these new ordinances and initially they were given a relatively free 
hand to shape that education in a manner befitting their religious ideals. Indeed, so long as a 
school was not solely providing religious teaching, as was frequently rumored to occur in 
Catholic schools, private enterprise in education was considered the best, most British form of 
instruction.222 Thus a delicate balance was achieved, whereby mission groups might be on less 
stable footing, but with more assistance than they had previously enjoyed. However the arrival of 
H.S. Scott as the new Director of Education in Kenya in 1928 imperiled that delicate balance.  
Scott was an Oxbridge educated modernist who focused heavily on science. 223 While in Kenya 
he presented several scientific, racially based papers concerning the positive intellectual aptitude 
of Africans.224 In order to fully capitalize on these capabilities, Scott focused on what he saw as 
the neglect of teacher training in the colony. Naturally this focus brought him into heavy conflict 
with missionary groups, particularly the CMS.  
 The question of teacher training had dogged the CMS since 1925 when the annual 
education report presented by the colony argued that the group had not used their government 
funds to provide said training and employment of a European teacher for the CMS run Buxton 
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High School. Instead it appeared that the CMS had used that money to pay for their headmaster’s 
yearly salary.225 The report went a step further by declaring: 
Government should no longer be regarded as assisting the Missions: the missions should 
be regarded as lightening the task of Government in the work of education, and the major 
portion of the cost of education should be borne by the Government, provided the fullest 
supervision is exercised by Government over the education given in Mission schools. 
The Kenyan Department of Education claimed that this new manifesto had proved quite effective 
in pushing all missionaries to proffer their services to the government.226 Despite this optimistic 
statement, it was clear that much work remained to be done, and the introduction of Scott as the 
new director in 1928 would push relationships to their breaking point, particularly once it 
combined with the demands of Local Native Councils for greater control over their own schools. 
 In the same year Scott came to the colony, the Special Committee on the Organization of 
Agriculture Education also presented a report calling for a greater attention to agricultural 
education. This commentary highlighted many of the new issues the government wanted to 
prioritize, namely a return to agricultural education as a way of reversing or slowing the trend of 
‘de-tribalization.’ The committee argued that these new educational guidelines should focus on 
farming and animal husbandry for small self-sustaining plots of land as opposed to the current 
models which focused on creating graduates trained for white collar jobs. 227 Unfortunately 
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missionaries were already struggling with their previous directives for more academic style 
training. Their problem was twofold; they could not find enough recruits with the proper 
educational background and training, a problem that would only worsen as they attempted to find 
missionaries who could provide agricultural and industrial training.228 Missionaries also 
struggled to find enough donors to keep their various endeavors afloat. This was particularly true 
for schools. As the CMS financial officer in London stated in February of 1928,  
the Mission cannot maintain all its Institutions on their present basis for more than a short 
space of time; and it is absolutely necessary to appeal to the [Parent Committee] to assist 
it material either by increasing the number of Missionaries payable by Salisbury Square; 
or by increasing the A.O.H. specifically for Educational work…otherwise some schools 
must be closed.229 
Although missionaries on the ground disagreed with this dire prediction, they were forced to 
admit that not only were educational standards still quite low, but that finances had indeed been 
dropping precipitously through the decade. Indeed one missionary, Mr. Cribb, was forced to 
resign because he felt he could not successfully carry out both his mission work and teaching 
responsibilities. He claimed that the only possible solution was, “It must be either [government] 
or CMS. As you are doubtless aware the Government’s attitude towards Missionary Societies is 
no longer so friendly as before.”230 For poor Mr. Cribb the only successful future he could 
envision was one working as a missionary to Europeans in the colony.231 
 In 1929 this state of affairs was further exposed by Director Scott’s first annual report, 
which called for sweeping changes, not only for school curriculum but to the categories and 
types of school available to Africans. By the 1920s school classification in Kenya ran along three 
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types. The first of these were A schools, or bush schools which were entirely under missionary 
auspices. These schools focused on the basics of education and only those deemed worthy would 
receive governmental financial support, known as grants-in-aid. One step up from A schools 
were B schools, which were akin to grammar schools and focused on students until 
approximately age 12.232 Finally, C schools most closely resembled high schools, and ran 
through Standard VII. Scott was most interested in the B and C schools; he felt the Education 
Department had already wasted too much time, energy, and money on A schools despite their 
low standards and outcomes. Essentially A schools were to become “a real force in the campaign 
against illiteracy” but little more.233 Scott argued, and the Governor of the colony agreed, that in 
many cases these schools were little more rudimentary theological training centers. Catholics 
schools seemed to be a particular target for the authorities, although they frequently lumped all 
missionaries under the Christian umbrella. This characterization of bush schools naturally 
angered Catholics, but the CMS was also quite upset, in part because they were being grouped 
with said Catholics.234  
The CMS reaction to these recommendations for bush schools was two fold: they wrote 
private letters to both the Colonial Office in London and Governor Grigg but they also joined 
with the Kenya Missionary Council to publicly dispute Director Scott and his plans. The KMC’s 
memorandum to Grigg tried to highlight the importance of mission education in Kenya, and they 
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agree with Scott that higher standards of education need to be reached in the A schools, however 
they worry that Scott’s proposals would place too much of a financial burden on the mission 
bodies themselves. In the end, they attempted to reach a consensus with the government by 
subtly disavowing the work of Catholic mission schools. They concede that catechetical schools, 
or those that only teach theology should be closed and not given government support.235 The 
only schools that would fall under this umbrella, at least for Protestants, would be those that were 
led by Catholics. Despite the conciliatory nature of this memorandum, Scott was unmoved. He 
argued that the combination of low-quality teachers and suspect financial management meant 
that it was time for the government to take a stronger stance in the development of the African 
intellect. Equally important, Scott maintained that Africans did not want mission education 
anymore, at least not along the old independent lines set out by the government. As he wrote to 
the Colonial Office, “he [the African] does not know what he wants, but he feels dimly that there 
is something above the mission schools. He is not antagonistic, but dissatisfied.”236 Not only 
were Africans unhappy with the quality of education they received, Scott’s distress over the 
financial management of government funds was palpable in each of his memos over the subject. 
He argued that it was difficult to tell where the money to missions went, and he implied that 
because of the close connections between schools and mission stations frequently that money 
went to support direct evangelical work as opposed to funding teacher salaries.237 
Scott was a dangerous figure to missionaries, not only because he seemed to impinge on 
their financial relationship with the government, but also because he seemed eager to usurp the 
individual missionary’s role as protector over their African ‘children.’ Mission groups saw 
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themselves as the only force that could hold together a unified vision of a Kikuyu identity in the 
modern world—the only group who could aid Africans in their attempts to confront the problems 
of modernity and its offshoot, detribalization. Scott’s plan to erode missionary control over 
education seemed to threaten CMS missionaries on every front in a way that the female 
circumcision crisis did not. Education was how the CMS made itself feel useful, but Scott’s 
dismissal of their training, standards, and oversight undercut the mission group at every turn. 
Additionally, Scott positioned himself as the primary interlocutor with Africans, he frequently 
referenced his conversations with them and indicated that he was the one who truly understood 
what they wanted and needed from British colonial society and culture. However, in the first 
years of the education debate they preferred to utilize the inter-alliance Kenya Missionary 
Council to strike back against these claims. The KMC’s first defense, as we have seen, was to 
focus on how they could provide conciliation with Scott’s proposal, pushing out Catholics in 
favor of their own work, however this first plan was less than successful, which is why the CMS 
Home Office would take up the charge in 1931.  
Part of the problem for the CMS was the all-inclusiveness of these plans. Not only did 
Scott and the Department of Education want to change the funding for A schools, they also 
planned on implementing reforms in B and C schools. While missions could maintain control 
over B schools, they had to reassure the government that all children would be taught basic 
subjects as prescribed by the government, in the required language, Swahili.238 The government 
would no longer allow for the idea that only converts, or potential converts were worthy of 
education, all children deserved the basics of literacy and some agriculture training. Additionally 
these B schools, both old and new were to be staffed with Africans; European teachers would be 
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subject to the same pay rates as African educators. Additionally, the government wanted new 
schools to be built, approximately two hundred in total, one for every 15,000 inhabitants in the 
colony.239 The reason for such an aggressive building scheme was the increased demands from 
Local Native Councils to build and operate their own schools within their communities. Indeed 
the LNCs were so eager for new schools they taken up their own tax collections to raise funds, 
but the government wanted to make sure that they only gained a foothold on power in A and B 
schools.240 Although these demands upset the missions, Scott realized that Africans had to be 
given some agency within formal education parameters or they might make a total break for 
educational independence, therefore support and financial buy-in should be concentrated at the A 
and B school level.241 By 1929 the financial support provided by LNCs was vital to the 
continuation and expansion of education in the colony. The Colonial Office frankly stated that 
“Mr. Scott’s proposals as a whole depend financially to a large extent on their winning the 
financial support of Local Native Councils.”242 It is important to note at this juncture that no 
mention is made of the financial necessity of missionary support. It is clear that missionaries 
were necessarily, if only for the presence of teachers and the upkeep of physical buildings, but 
they would not be allowed to maintain a vice grip on education for the foreseeable future. This 
did not mean that missionaries were largely useless by 1929. Their religious teachings were still 
a priority for the authorities, but they were one priority amongst many. Missionaries had to 
navigate the new waters of colonial development in the twentieth century. 
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Despite these ominous tidings missionaries, still had a place of prime importance for C 
schools. Although only a few C schools existed in Kenya, they were to be left almost entirely in 
the hands of missionary groups. The Colonial Office’s proposal was to support these mission 
schools, as opposed to building their own schools and attaching denominational hostels.243 There 
were a few reasons for this. First, there were not many C schools in Kenya, and it was assumed 
that very few Africans would ever be educated there. The main thrust of these educational 
proposals was meant to prepare the vast majority of African schoolboys for work on farms, either 
their own or European owned estates.244 C schools were for those select few elites who would 
take up white collar jobs in the colony and as such a religious foundation would be a benefit to 
their incorporation into larger colonial society.  
The initial debate concerning the future of education in Kenya began in 1925 with the 
creation of a sub-committee for education in East Africa and culminated with Grigg’s 
presentation to the Colonial Office of Director Scott’s 1929 Annual Report. The Colonial Office 
debated these proposals for two full years before submitting their final recommendations. During 
the two years of debate a flurry of letters passed between the Colonial Office and Governors 
Grigg and Byrne. The rapid growth of the female circumcision crisis complicated the debate, and 
it is clear that both sides were trying to find a compromise to suit every side in the conflict. In 
1929 the semi-retired Labourite socialist stalwart Baron Passfield was a surprise appointment as 
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Colonial Secretary, and it would be his task to bring some sort of resolution to the education 
situation in Kenya. 245 In the spring of 1930, as the Colonial Office and its Advisory Committee 
on Education in the Colonies continued to debate Scott’s proposals, Governor Grigg wrote to 
Passfield in an attempt to shed more light on the tangled web of mission, government, and LNC 
in the colony. Grigg gently pushed for greater LNC involvement in C schools, allowing them to 
build schools with denominational hostels. He argued that if they were denied this type of school 
they would distrust the government and push back educational progress of the colony.246 This 
plan went far beyond even Scott’s proposals, as he had argued that LNCs authority should extend 
only to A and B schools.  
One reason for Grigg’s malleability may have been the stark realization that colonial 
development schemes required African money to survive. As the Great Depression sank its teeth 
into every colony with deepening ferocity, indigenous tax collection became an integral part of 
colonial budgets. By September 1930 it was clear that schools would not remain open without 
African support, and Africans demanded a share in the prestigious C schools. Despite the 
importance of this source of funds, Passfield’s belief in the paternalistic vision of the empire 
would not allow him to give Africans too much power. He understood that with every voluntary 
taxation scheme African demands for authority would increase, thus he forbade Grigg from 
allowing LNCs to call for special taxes to pay for educational needs unless absolutely necessary. 
Indeed the Advisory Committee fortified their previous support of Scott’s decision that 
government C schools with religious hostels was an inferior product to mission run C schools.247  
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At this juncture missionary displeasure seemed out of line. They wanted more funding 
and support with no increase in oversight, and essentially their plan was endorsed. Although 
Scott’s plan slightly increased A and B school requirements, and Swahili was encouraged, 
missionaries still had plenty of room to provide theological training. Despite these positives 
missionary protest was only beginning in both Kenya and the UK. The disconnect between 
government and missionaries only deepened throughout the debate. Just as the CMS had 
developed patterns of behavior and communication, so too had the colonial government. They 
accepted missionary aid in their endeavors and received the private deputations from 
missionaries, but in return they provided little in the way of communication. In their attempts to 
placate LNCs, the government soft-pedaled their support for missionary schools, and they did 
not effectively share information with missionary groups to alleviate their fears. For instance, the 
Advisory Committee for Education stated,  
the greatest importance must be attached in all areas, where contact with civilization 
tends to weaken tribal authority and the sanctions of existing beliefs and moral 
instruction, to religious beliefs and moral instruction. It is recognition of this need that 
impels governments to desire to assist forms of education which rest on the basis of 
religious beliefs.248 
 Kenya seemed to be a perfect example of this type erosion of ‘traditional’ culture, as evidenced 
by the female circumcision crisis and thus, missionaries were arguably in a better position in 
1930 than they had been in 1928, at least in terms of government support. Yet missionaries did 
not understand their own security, in part because the government did not publicize or 
communicate these priorities very well and missionaries failed to decipher winks and nods from 
the government regarding their place in the colony. This is obvious in a letter from Passfield to 
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Grigg in September of 1930 as he highlighted the angry feelings of the Kenya Missionary 
Council about these proposals.249 
  One reason for this lack of clear understanding was the distress created by the Great 
Depression. As the economy of Great Britain fell so too did the coffers of the CMS, and by the 
summer of 1930 they were desperate. If the colonial government’s development plans could not 
run without African taxes, missionary groups could not perform their work without government 
support. Success and failure were tied up in increasingly difficult and intricate knots in Kenya 
and for many missionaries any threat to funding, no matter how miniscule was a threat to the 
entire endeavor. The Home Office in the UK only fueled this anxiety as the Finance Committee 
agreed to a plan created by the Executive Committee in Kenya to pool all the funds given by the 
government for teachers’ salaries and dole it out individually in an attempt to pay everyone at 
least part of their salary.250 Not all missionaries were happy with this new plan, as evidenced by 
a set of letters from a CMS missionary and secretary of the Kenya Missionary Council, W.A. 
Pitt-Pitts to H.D. Hooper, the Africa secretary of the CMS. One missionary in Kenya objected to 
the Education Pool plan, and in response Hooper wrote to Pitt-Pitts decrying the plan. In 
response Pitt-Pitts lambasted Hooper and the missionary in question for their “unconstitutional” 
actions.251 The Education Pool helped matters in Kenya, but the problem of lesser pay, lack of 
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recruits, and furlough pay continued to plague the CMS throughout the remainder of their time in 
the colony.252 
 In November of 1931, the KMC proactively decided to appoint a special Educational 
Adviser to serve missions in Kenya and Uganda. This adviser was to be “a leader of policy, not 
merely a servant of the Government. It is quite essential that he should be a “missionary” first.” 
It was no accident that the KMC’s plan of attack felt very similar to previous efforts by the CMS. 
The secretary of the council was a CMS missionary and CMS finances kept the organization 
afloat. For this position the CMS paid £300 while all the other Protestant missionary bodies paid 
in a combined £300. The Kenyan and Ugandan governments each chipped in £100.253 Eventually 
the missionary chosen was J.W.C Dougall who, despite his Scottish Presbyterian background, 
had a quiet and diplomatic personality. He had been a member of the Phelps-Stokes Commission 
and principal of the Jeanes School in Kenya and many considered him to the perfect candidate 
for the appointment. Dougall served in this position until 1936 when he returned to Scotland to 
take up the position of secretary to the Conference of British Missionary Societies. 254 
 It is difficult to evaluate Dougall’s record as educational adviser in Kenya, but in the 
larger imperial context miscommunication remained the order of the day. Despite the private 
support of missionary led education in the various sub-committees and writings of the Colonial 
Office, Director Scott continued to make anxiety inducing public statements. In a speech given 
just one week after Dougall’s appointment he stated, 
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In connection with African education, I have been asked by the Government to make one 
thing clear in regard to policy in connection with native education as present 
administered. The general policy in regard to native education is that Government 
welcomes and will encourage all voluntary educational effort which conforms to the 
general policy of Government…During the last few years there has been a tendency 
undoubtedly to emphasise, [sic] and possibly over-emphasise [sic] the importance of 
mission schools.255 
Scott’s phrasing passively aggressively accentuated his own feelings concerning missionary 
educational efforts and while it nominally sought to placate missions, his conclusion was far 
from reassuring. The tensions in Scott’s speech were equally apparently in his annual reports as 
sections blatantly contradicted each other. Within the 1929 Annual Report page seven stated that 
education must be carried out through missionaries, while the next page claimed that Africans no 
longer wanted missionary education.256 Governor Grigg sent the text of Scott’s speech to 
Passfield and indicated in the accompanying letter that Scott was amenable to the Colonial 
Office’s interpretation of these contradictory passages.  
 The debate concerning the future of Kenyan education continued to rage into 1931 and 
the local press in Kenya began to play a larger role in shaping the debate. In January the East 
Africa Standard published an article detailing Scott’s proposal and accepted his characterization 
of African discontent with the “inadequate” education currently provided by missionaries. The 
article concluded with a forewarning that if the debate were not brought to a hasty conclusion 
African might begin running their own schools free of government and missionary influence.257 
Pitt-Pitts enclosed the article in a letter to HD Hooper without comment, but the dire warnings of 
the piece were all too evident. Additionally, Pitt-Pitts was upset because Dr. Scott had not 
forwarded the 1929 Annual Report for Education to him, which he claimed was a deliberate 
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oversight, meant to highlight Scott’s refusal to work with missionaries. Rather than draw 
attention to this slight publicly, Pitt-Pitts wanted Hooper to liaison with J.H. Oldham in hopes of 
preventing such lapses in the future.258 It is interesting that Pitt-Pitts chose to use London 
connections, rather than go through Scott himself or the Department of Education in Nairobi. 
Clearly Pitt-Pitts wanted to flex the power of his connections to the larger political world within 
the empire and going over Scott’s head, but using Oldham had other advantages. Namely 
Oldham worked extensively with the Colonial Office, and had a reputation as a discreet and 
effective diplomat. Thus Pitt-Pitts could make his displeasure known without public 
consequences to the CMS or authorities. Again, the patterns of communication continue.  
 While the CMS relied on privacy and personal relationships to convey their discontent, 
Catholic missions did not have the same avenues of communication; therefore they relied on the 
public option. In early February a Catholic representative penned an editorial for the East Africa 
Standard which claimed that Scott had “pursued a definite anti-mission policy, and has taken 
advantage of his privileged position to discredit missions, [while] hurling insults from behind the 
official barricades.” In addition to deceiving the public, the author claims that Scott was 
manipulating and using LNC naivety for his own advantage. Contrary to Scott’s claim that he 
was merely publicizing African unhappiness over the quality of their education, the article 
claimed that he created their dissatisfaction by telling Africans that their education was too 
meager.259 The article concluded that Scott was able to perform these nefarious feats by using the 
female circumcision crisis to discredit all missionary activity in the colony.  
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 The combination of public and private remonstrance brought Scott to heel by March. 
Early in the month Pitt-Pitts and the Bishop of Mombasa, Richard Heywood, met with Scott. The 
summit was quite contentious, but Pitt-Pitts claimed that “I think the row has done good, because 
really while Mr. Scott does support us, he has a habit of making these unfortunate statement 
which are not true.” 260  The next day all three men, including a Catholic delegation, met with 
Governor Grigg, and at this meeting the Governor pressed home how important cooperation with 
the missions was to the authorities, both in Kenya and London.261 In the end both denominations 
received the assurances they so craved, but the delay of a year and half between the outbreak of 
debate and resolution did not help either side. However it is important to note that in this instance 
the patterns of communication for both the government and missionaries eventually did work. 
Private complaints in London led to meetings with the Governor in Kenya which satisfied CMS 
needs, while government recalcitrance upset the CMS, but not enough to push them to the 
Catholic style public reproach.  
 Despite the restoration of good feeling on behalf of both parties, the education debate was 
far from over. The CMS felt secure in government backing, but they still had to make ends meet, 
an increasingly difficult task in the midst of the Great Depression. Funding for mission fields had 
begun dropping off in 1927 and reached a critical stage by 1931. Committees in both colony and 
metropole worked to stretch economies so that every school could stay open. They grouped 
various schools together to create more pools to maximize their money from the government. 
The Nairobi boys school was of particular importance, not because of its significance 
educationally. As the CMS Educational Finance Committee admitted, the schools was “really 
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more an evangelistic agency than an educational institution.”262 Despite its shortcomings the fact 
that the school was in Nairobi automatically made it worthwhile. For many in official and 
religious circles large cities, which Nairobi was on the verge of becoming, were the ultimate 
danger for young African men.263 Thus they felt the school had to remain in order to create 
young men who were “true servants of Christ.” Despite the school’s supposedly vital role and 
high priority within official circles of the CMS, the school was only solvent through the generous 
donations given by its main teacher, Canon Burns. 264 Because individual missionaries could not 
be relied on to maintain their own schools via their salaries, the impetus to find more creation 
solutions, particularly for institutions such as the Nairobi Boys School, were paramount. The 
CMS included less educationally based schools in with their more productive offerings, in hopes 
of blending them all together and receiving government funds for each. In the case of the NBS, 
the CMS knew that it did not meet the government requirements but felt that its evangelical 
importance outweighed any lack of academic rigor.265  
 It is clear from the internal debates within the CMS that despite their protestations, 
Director Scott’s claims that missional education was in some cases lacking in basic academic 
preparation were true. However, attempts to focus more heavily on the scholastic side of mission 
education came with its own backlash. In late 1931 the CMS attempted to fill an educational post 
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in the Kabete Girls’ School. Their ad for this opening focused mainly on the educational 
requirements needed to be considered as well as the teaching duties the young woman would be 
required to fulfill. Despite the attempts to craft a position that would provide both spiritual and 
intellectual guidance, i.e. one that would attract a person with missionary desires combined with 
academic qualifications that would satisfy government officials, not everyone was happy with 
the new tack taken by the home office. The first response out of Kenya came from the 
Cambridge educated missionary W.A. Pitt-Pitts and he railed,  
Never have I read in any C.M.S. paper or anything that the C.M.S. has ever issued such a 
travesty. We might be a Government department looking for employees. There is not a 
word of spirituality in it and if the arrival of this secondary school genius is going to 
introduce this element into our recruitment, then I consider it extremely serious for the 
out-look of the Mission… We unitedly feel that we would rather be without missionaries 
than have people who are coming out on these terms. We do not want people who are out 
for what they can get, but we want men and women filled with the Holy Ghost and 
simply do not count the cost.266 
Unfortunately for Pitt-Pitts, the difficulties in staffing could not be solved simply by wishing for 
good Christian servants. Missionary numbers throughout the empire began to fall off in the 
aftermath of World War I, and the emergence of the Great Depression only hastened the 
decline.267 There were new questions from both colonized and colonizer about the assumptions 
of superiority and civility and these inquiries were not useful selling points for those in the UK 
attempting to recruit new missionaries for far-flung colonial mission fields. Even for those who 
did feel the call to mission work, placing them in teaching posts became more complicated 
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because of the need to maintain government funds for those posts. Pitt-Pitts may have dreamed 
of finding missionaries who “simply do not count the cost,” but in the reality of 1930s Kenya the 
CMS itself could no longer afford to ignore economic realities. 
 While the CMS struggled to keep its educational operations afloat, the Colonial Office 
concluded its two-year debate concerning the future of education in Kenya. The resulting 1931 
Education Ordinance dealt with schools for whites, Indians, and Africans. Settlers had separate 
demands and requirements for their children, and thus were considered separate from Arab and 
African needs.268 The new education policy that took shape with the ordinance focused on 
placating African demands for education by allowing for their creation in locales without 
mission schools already in operation. However, these schools were not to compete with mission 
schools for locations or schoolchildren because mission schools remained the government 
ideal.269 In some ways the 1931 Ordinance was a signal of defeat for missionaries—the scores of 
Africans calling for independent education would not be denied, but nor would they be in direct 
competition for the souls and minds of Africans. Additionally, the government placed extra 
safeguards to ensure that LNCs did not have much authority over the ways their collected monies 
aided schools. The Ordinance called for the creation of School Area Committees that serviced 
each community. These committees would be chaired by the appropriate Provincial 
Commissioner and members would be nominated by LNCs, but approved by the Commissioner. 
Basic committees had at least six members, depending on the size of the area served by the 
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committee. Three were LNC nominees and the reminder came from the Commissioner’s direct 
nomination. The Governor also had the power to appoint and expel any committee member he 
wanted to.270 The stated purpose of the SAC was to provide guidance concerning school 
management and finances to the Director of Education, but the Director retained direct control to 
spend money in the manner of his choosing. Additionally the Governor held a de facto veto 
power with his power to force resignations with no show cause. In the end, the 1931 Ordinance 
attempted to appease every faction in the education debate. The colonial authorities wanted 
school attendance to return to normal levels and the concurrent female circumcision crisis had 
devastated attendance in some denominational schools. The Ordinance was meant to provide an 
outlet for Africans to express their educational priorities while also limiting their ability to effect 
real change within that educational system. The creation of the SACs also ensure government 
access to LNC funds without which they could not have funded mission schools.  
 This compromise worked well in the short term but overall the Ordinance did little to 
assuage missionary fears or mollify Africans. The trends in education towards more scientific 
and “practical” knowledge still befuddled and vexed missionaries as they struggled to reconcile 
their theological desires and official requirements. In spite of the new regulations, they struggled 
to maintain schools with the proper content and pupils. The government wanted to focus more 
heavily on female education schemes, but the CMS did not feel ready to provide wide scale 
education for women. Part of their problem stemmed from the traditional focus on male 
missionaries as the heart of missionary work.271 Women were part of all missionary endeavors, 
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but primarily worked as ‘help-meets’ to their husbands. For single women the mission field was 
a possible career, but one that frequently ended in death or marriage. Women were essential to 
mission work, but the CMS remained concerned about directing their resources away from their 
traditional focus in order to find trained women for girls’ schools.272 The CMS continued to rely 
primarily on missionary wives to provide domestic education to African women, particularly 
those married to students at the higher level schools in Kenya such as the Jeanes School. The 
idea was to provide a trickle down approach where informally African wives would learn proper 
domesticity from missionary wives and then provide the same training to local women when 
their husbands graduated from Jeanes School and became teachers.273 
 In addition to their problems with female schooling, the education crisis of 1929 also 
spurred on an identity crisis revolving around missionary purpose in Africa. Were they primarily 
evangelists or educationalists? As the educational advisor, J.W.C. Dougall wrote in 1933, 
“Supposing for instances, that a Mission School could be maintained entirely by Government 
Grants, would it be any longer a Mission School?”274 Furthermore, if there were no differences 
between mission and government schools would there be any distinction between mission and 
secular teachers other than a lower salary?275 Dougall argued that the CMS needed to provide 
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some support, even if largely symbolic, so that make missionaries would feel like real 
evangelists, despite the fact they would receive the vast majority of their salary from the 
government.276 Unfortunately the CMS could not see their way clear to provide even a modicum 
of support if government grants were available. As Pitt-Pitts contended in a letter to the Africa 
Secretary, HD Hooper, the CMS needed to put all of their available funds towards evangelical 
work. Despite the fact that Pitt-Pitts claimed he saw no difference between education and more 
direct faith based outreach, his own argument implicitly reaffirms those distinctions. 
‘Traditional’ missionary work involved direct attempts to create conversion opportunities, which 
could still find some support in the United Kingdom, even in the midst of financial difficulties. 
Conversely education was in the process of transforming into an official colonial project, one 
that the Church could and should participate in, but primarily as a method through which they 
could prove their necessity to the colonial state.  
 The sacrifices missionaries were willing to make in order to preserve their educational 
position were evident in the shifting curriculum of the early 1930s. J.W.C. Dougall attempted to 
recast the set of courses currently undertaken in missionary schools to more closely adhere to the 
official standards while not offending religious sensibilities. Thus the primary purpose of school 
remained “the enrichment of life through the encouragement of love for the right things and 
through close personal relationship. For the Christian teacher this means bringing boys and girls 
                                                           
a pension. Missionary principals received £480, although that salary decreased as the Depression 
wore on to £364, with a varied amount for passage and pension. For more see 
UBL/CMS/B/OMS/A5/1929/134. 
276 UBL CMS/B/OMS/A5/1933/65. 
105 
 
into fellowship with God through Christ.”277 Despite this primary goal, Dougall argued within 
the same memo that the one way to ‘fix’ education in Kenya is to make it more secular. He stated  
We might say that education is a secular affair, (though religious teaching on a non-
sectarian character might be permitted) that it is really the function of the State, its 
purpose the imparting of knowledge and the acquisition of skills, its goal the economic 
and social improvement of the people in a sense that in no way concerns the essentials of 
the religious life.278 
Dougall’s understanding of the government’s policy seemed unnecessarily grim in regards to 
education. Frequently within Colonial Office memos it is clear that for the administration wanted 
to maintain the religious foundation of education, however those reassurances never trickled 
down through the ranks to missionaries or the home office. At this juncture Dougall could not 
bring himself to advocate for the type of education he thought the government wanted, but 
despite his explicit denials of a purely secular education it was clear that mission schools moved 
away from their heavy emphasis on theological and denominational teaching at the behest of the 
government, or more accurately at the behest of the money the government provided.   
 Even with the modifications made by missionaries to placate the government and LNCs it 
was not enough. African demands for particular types of education would not be denied and the 
furor over the female circumcision crisis only added fuel to the fire. The creation of the Kikuyu 
Independent Schools Association, or KISA, threatened to destroy the co-dependent relationship 
between church and state in Kenya. The KISA and its rival independent organization, the Kikuyu 
Karinga both worked to build and operate schools independent of mission control. KISA first 
organized in 1933 and focused on education in English so that upon graduation students would 
be eligible for white collar clerical jobs.279 But as Derek Peterson argues, these early education 
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efforts were about more than potential employment opportunities; the leaders of KISA saw 
themselves as the leader of a moral project that aimed to teach the Kikuyu the value of wiathi or 
self-mastery.280 As part of their wiathi teachings, KISA also focused on strengthening Kikuyu 
culture and heritage; students learned songs that created a bridge between these customs and the 
future of Kenya.281 
 Not surprisingly, missionaries were deeply unhappy about the creation of KISA. They 
believed themselves to be the only moderator of modernity in the colony. Scholars are correct to 
link the rise of the independent schooling movement to the female circumcision crisis, but in 
doing so they fail to see the importance of language. In the infamous 1929 Annual Report, Scott 
called for the primary language of instruction to be Swahili as opposed to English. Missionaries 
welcomed this instruction, in part because they thought Africans could not grasp both the 
academic subject and language simultaneously.282 The CMS’ strong desire to retain Swahili 
helps explain why KISA schools dominated in CMS areas, such as Fort Hall, despite the fact that 
they did not partake in the female circumcision crisis in any meaningful way. All attempts to 
compromise proved useless for missionaries as the 1930s faded into the 1940s. Independent 
schools proved to be of wildly varying quality in terms of academic rigor, but they were entirely 
successful in relation to student enrollment. By World War II these schools existed alongside 
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mission schools in many areas and they flourished until the outbreak of Mau Mau and 
subsequent closure by the authorities. 
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Conclusion 
 It was increasingly clear why missionary groups struggled so mightily to retain and 
recruit employees in the decade following the Great War. Their purpose, work, and finances 
shifted rapidly as the increased push for autonomy by Africans, coupled with the expansion of 
colonial development projects into their traditional spheres of influence created a crisis of 
identity. What remained for missionaries in the aftermath of these abrupt changes was a 
Sisyphean desire to provide protection and oversight for their African populations united with a 
need to prove their necessity to the Empire as a whole. These warring priorities came to a head 
with the advent of rehabilitation programs during the Mau Mau conflict as missionaries 
attempted to reconcile their conflicting purposes and concerns. Both missionaries and colonial 
officials created the foundation for the patterns of engagement and communication that proved 
so disastrous in the 1950s here, in the post war decade and early days of the Great Depression.  
Politics, ethnic customs, and education all combined to create a perfect storm for the 
missionaries of Kenya. Each denomination handled the various conflicts differently. The CSM 
focused heavily on circumcision, and argued that the practice was incompatible with true 
Christianity. They publicly pushed for the state to entirely outlaw female circumcision and 
attempted to excommunicate African members who were unwilling to comply with their dictates. 
Conversely Anglicans attempted to divorce themselves of the issue in order to focus of what they 
saw as their primary purpose in the colony, education. They claimed that female circumcision 
was a political issue, and thus out of their purview. This stance directly contradicted their 
involvement with the creation of political organizations in Kenya, nevertheless it allowed the 
CMS to maintain a public stance which supported the government’s moderate efforts in regards 
to the crisis. In exchange for their backing in regards to the circumcision crisis, the CMS hoped 
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that their discretion would be rewarded with renewed educational support. Despite these 
aspirations, the reality seemed much less optimistic. Director Scott’s 1929 Annual Report 
seemed to cut missionaries off at the knees by highlighting their intellectual inadequacies. The 
resulting debate over the report eventually led to a missionary triumph but it was a hollow 
victory. The very fact that the 1931 Education Ordinance took two years to craft meant that 
missionaries had lost valuable ground to the independent schools movement. In the end, the 
Colonial Office reaffirmed their belief in the necessity of mission led education and it is clear 
from their internal dialogues that missionary education was preferable to LNC or KISA schools. 
Unfortunately this in-house transparency did not translate into a public affirmation for missions 
and they were left bewildered and anxious about their place in the colony. This pattern remained 
in place right through to independence as the CMS made repeated efforts to prove their 
worthiness through discretion and compliance and while the government appreciated their 
efforts, their own communication efforts remained entirely lackluster. In the education debate of 
1929—1931, missionaries ultimately received the support necessary to carry out their 
educational efforts, but that would not always be the case. The Gordian knot of education, female 
circumcision, language, politics, and finances remained a difficult one for missionaries to 
untangle in the interwar years. Their efforts would achieve moderate success, however their 
failures proved to be the most important in shaping the future of religion in independent Kenya.  
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Chapter 3: Global and Local Conflicts: CMS in Wartime 
There are sign that western culture is breaking down tribal authority and the social 
structure built upon indigenous beliefs...Western culture is infused with spiritual ideals 
and if our education is to be the living force we all desire it is essential that it should be 
infused with the same ideals. It is therefore the policy of the government to continue to 
work to a great extent through the Christian missions and churches and through other 
religious bodies.283  
 
Introduction 
 The fallout from the various political, educational, and medical crises that erupted in 
Kenya during the 1920s affected mission groups to varying degrees. While the CMS emerged 
unscathed from the political and health controversies, lack of funds, recruits, and students all 
took their toll on morale and effectiveness. The state also evolved throughout the decade as 
development schemes began to coalesce around the idea of preparing Africans for life in the 
‘modern’ world. Many of the same ideas of nineteenth century liberal empire retained their allure 
in the post-war years, but now the colonial state seemed willing and able to take on more 
responsibility for themselves. Naturally these new initiatives created a lot of anxiety for mission 
organizations and they scrambled to reform their ideas and goals to fit these new parameters. 
Groups such as the CMS were more successful than most in adapting to the needs of the state—
they provided more technical training, even at the expense of their own missional ethos, but the 
resulting crisis of identity plagued Anglicans throughout the interwar period. The question of 
how to be a missionary and state employee beleaguered many in Kenya and London and the 
resulting answers were many and varied. The stark lack of resources and personnel available 
from the Home Office meant that they were more willing to compromise in terms of theological 
vigor and mission bona fides than most missionaries actually in the field. The resulting split 
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between metropole and colony reverberated throughout the halls of missional leaders and the 
colonial state.  
This chapter will examine the deepening rifts between missionaries within the context of 
their relationship to the colonial authorities. Although the Great Depression overshadowed every 
action and decision of the 1930s, the discovery of gold in the Kavirondo region temporarily 
revived old methods of intervention and protection in the CMS. Despite this brief resurgence, the 
advent of World War II put paid to any plans the CMS had for expansion of their role in the 
state. In the aftermath of war, everything changed for the British Empire. This chapter will 
analyze these changes for both church and state, particularly as they relate to both group’s 
responses to the Mau Mau conflict. Finally, we will return to education which was both a burden 
and boon to missionaries in empire.  
In 1949 one CMS missionary, Archdeacon Leonard Beecher undertook a government 
survey of education. The results of his findings, published in the Beecher Report, modified the 
church, state, education relationship in important ways. Although the same patterns of 
communication and action between missionaries and authorities continued throughout this 
period, as they had done since 1916, the advent of Mau Mau and the beginning decolonization in 
Kenya brought these archetypes into sharp relief. This chapter will delve deeper into the 
foundations of modern liberal empire as practiced by missionaries and examine how it modified 
or strengthened earlier understandings of church and state interactions in the colonial field. 
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Gold 
 In the midst of the education crisis, gold was discovered in the Kavirondo reserve. 
Authorities had set aside the land for the Bantu-Luo, but unearthing such a valuable resource 
changed state priorities. They maintained that the protection of African interests remained their 
paramount responsibility, but they could not overlook a gold mine. The Kavirondo reserve 
housed more than half a million Africans and that infamous missionary W.E. Owen, sometimes 
known as the Archdemon.284Unlike many in the CMS, Owen believed that full and public outcry 
was the best response to problems in the colonial setting. Rather than wait for private deputations 
with the government, Owen took to the press to highlight the injustices of Kavirondo. These 
public denunciations frequently created problems for his fellow missionaries. Africa Secretary, 
W.A. Pitt-Pitts wrote to Hooper in the fall of 1930 and described the government’s response to 
the negative press.  Apparently Owen’s letter had “caused such a blaze in the press” that the 
authorities felt the need to write to Pitt-Pitts and ask what he planned to do to keep Owen in 
check in the future. Additionally the authorities argued that CMS representative Canon Leakey 
had promised in the late 1920s that all protests would go through private channels via a Native 
Interest Committee run through the Kenya Missionary Council rather than be aired in the 
press.285  
 Pitt-Pitts had legitimate reasons to worry about the government’s wounded feelings; two 
years earlier they had threaten to discontinue grants-in-aid to Owen’s region. The CMS was only 
able to secure the grants after promising that no money would go to Owen personally, but rather 
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to a more amenable missionary, Carey Francis.286 One week after Pitt-Pitts disclosed this 
information, Owen met with the Acting Governor in Kenya. He asked about the withdrawal of 
aid, but the Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Dobbs claimed that the money transfers were the 
consequence of “unsatisfactory inspection reports on the schools concerned.” Henry Monk-
Mason Moore, then Acting Governor reassured Owen that no steps were taken to silence him, 
while also reiterating the promise of Leakey to use the Native Interest Committee.287 Despite 
Moore’s assurances of free speech, it was clear that Pitt-Pitts was running scared. In the same 
letter to Hooper, he claimed that he would support Owen’s fight, even if he believed it to be very 
dated, but the presence of government grants made that impossible. Other missionaries relied on 
the government for their salaries and Pitt-Pitts could not abandon them.  
But look at the long list of faithful souls who are out here on Government Grants. The 
Colony is very badly hit at present, and reductions have to be made in any case at the end 
of the year and if we let this sort of thing go on then they will drop us in a very nice and 
easy manner.288 
If the government withdrew all funds from the CMS they could not have carried on their work in 
Kenya in any meaningful way. Pitt-Pitts contended that he was willing to fight for Owen, but he 
was also on good terms with “Government folk” and did not like to upset them with what they 
termed “blackmail.”289  
 Clearly the CMS and Owen were working at cross purposes. Both wanted to maintain 
their trusteeship position in regards to the African population, but Owen’s tactics and character 
put him at odds with many of his fellow missionaries. While many within the CMS leadership 
wanted to delicately raise concerns with colonial authorities, utilizing unofficial communication 
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channels based on previously established relationships, Owen had no such desires. He lacked the 
finesse and conciliatory attitude possessed by men such as Pitt-Pitts. This made him a fierce 
opponent, but it did not necessarily prove any more effective in the long run. This was due, at 
least in part, to his inability to persuade those within the CMS to follow him. As Pitt-Pitts 
described it, if Owen were allowed to continue to publicly denounce the government with no 
pushback from the Home Office would become the “dictator of the Mission.”290 Pitt-Pitts 
certainly overdramatized the situation, but it was clear that Owen’s personality and tactics won 
him few friends within the CMS.291 His lack of allies would hurt him in the fight over gold 
mining in Kavirondo, but it also reaffirmed many missional official’s beliefs that private 
deputations were more effective. At the very least, private criticism did not lead to veiled threats 
for the removal of financial aid for many essential CMS services.  
 In the aftermath of the initial crisis, Owen took a furlough to the United Kingdom, but 
was soon back in Kenya prepared to do battle over the mining of gold in his district.292 His first 
line of defense was through, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association, which he helped 
created in 1923.293 The organization’s members were primarily alumni from the local CMS 
school, and they focused heavily on improving the economic and hygienic lives of the Luo. 
Throughout the 1920s the organization, with Owen as its official mouthpiece, fought against 
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forced labor by the state. Owen and KTWA’s efforts had decidedly mixed results in that the state 
remained largely unwilling or unable to curtail the worst labor abuses in the colony.294 
 Despite the lack of concrete results, the KTWA was well positioned in 1932 to defend the 
land and political rights on the Luo in the face of increasingly aggressive incursions on their land 
in search of gold. By early 1933 there were almost 2,000 Europeans in Kavirondo, making it one 
of the largest European population centers in the colony.295 This influx of whites into the land 
reserve strained resources that were already at their breaking point. The government faced a 
serious quandary. Gold would provide a much need influx of energy into the local economy and 
fund development projects but the gold fields were almost entirely in land dedicated to the 
Bantu-Luo reserve. The easiest method forward for colonial authorities was to divide the land 
into two spheres—underground and above ground. Underground mineral rights were always 
under the purview of the state and could be safely explored with little disruption to the above 
land reserve.296 They released a memorandum to those on the land reserves explaining their plans 
and promising that full compensation would be paid out for any man who had to move his hut 
due to the discovery of gold.297 Even missionaries struggled to accept this proposal, as they 
argued that it would completely destroy African trust in the Native Land Ordinance, which had 
been passed only two years prior.298 
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 In order to counteract the deep betrayal represented by the de facto repeal of the Native 
Land Trust Ordinance, the CMS focused its efforts on two aspects of the mining scheme—
compensation and the need for the state to oversee all mining operations rather than private 
companies. Initially the CMS hoped that the introduction of cash compensation would provide 
impetus for growth and development amongst the Africans, but they quickly realized their 
mistake as locals demanded land for land.299 Part of the problem was that the land on offer from 
the government was more than one hundred miles away from the reserve, in Elgon, and it was 
thought to be inferior to the land in Kavirondo.300 While leaders such as Pitt-Pitts chalked up 
African resistance to the plan to lack of foresight and planning, Owen was ready to lead the 
charge against government infringement.  
Owen’s first call to action was an article published in the Manchester Guardian, a 
frequent recipient of his efforts.301 Just as in his earlier campaigns, again the colonial authorities 
attempted to muzzle him both personally and through the CMS. Pitt-Pitts met with the new 
governor, Sir Joseph Byrne soon after Owen’s article was published. Bryne was a military man, 
and a former police officer. Kenya was to be his last colonial appointment before retirement back 
to the United Kingdom.302 He was less enamored with white settler opinion than earlier 
governors, but retained their distaste for Owen’s antics.303 In this meeting, Pitt-Pitts claims that 
Byrne harped on the Church’s responsibilities to be loyal citizens of the Government and not 
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“stir up trouble.”304 Despite the repetition of earlier patterns of communication from the 
authorities, in this instance the CMS was not willing to completely backtrack. For the first time 
in Kenya, the CMS pushed for a division between mission and home field. Pitt-Pitts acquiesced 
to the governor’s heavy-handed suggestion, but encouraged Hooper in the home office to carry 
on the fight for land compensation back in the United Kingdom.305 This type of division would 
be repeated in the midst of the Mau Mau conflict, albeit with less support from the mission field.  
After the publication of Owen’s article, both houses of British Parliament heatedly 
debated the bill. Although the CMS was not the subject of the debate, this was one instance in 
which they were important catalysts for publicity and the possibility of creating change in one of 
their mission fields. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Gordon Lang, collaborated with 
Lord Lugard in both the House of Lords and the press to decry the change in the land ordinance 
to allow for payment in monies rather than land. Lang was a practical Scotsman, overworked and 
overtired in his position as the Archbishop. He generally refrained from political entanglements 
despite his deep personal friendship with George V.306 Lang broke from his normal habits in 
1933 to take part in the public campaign against the repeal of the Native Land Ordinance. In an 
article to the Times, the Archbishop highlighted both the need for state leadership in mining 
efforts and for time to be given for public debate before opening up the land for additional 
mining efforts.307 This letter set off a very public debate in the paper between the Archbishop 
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and Edward Grigg, former governor of Kenya.308 The dispute spread to both the House of 
Commons and House of Lords, where it was hotly debated. Lord Lugard took the floor in favor 
of slowing down mining momentum. He argued that the loss of confidence Africans would 
experience through the breaking of the Land Trust Ordinance was more important than any 
individual profits to be made from mining.309 Both Lugard and the Archbishop were careful 
within their speeches to highlight their loyalty to both government and empire. As the 
Archbishop stated in a rare speech to the House, “I need scarcely say that the last thing I wish is 
to do anything to embarrass the Government charged with so great responsibilities in every part 
of the world.”310 Throughout these speeches, both men were very careful to separate the issue of 
mining rights and land rights. Both sides of debate agreed that mining gold in Kavirondo was a 
fiscally sound future plan, but men such as Lugard and Lang wanted to ensure that African land 
rights were not entirely trampled in the process.  
The House of Commons debate followed among similar lines, with the realities of the 
British financial situation butting against ideological concerns of empire. For some, the right to 
rule was absolute. One Parliamentarian compared Kenya to a book written by the British. With 
the privileges of creation, he argued came the rights to handle the land in the manner best suited 
to British needs.311 However, it was clear that the Archbishop’s public pleas did have some effect 
on political opinions. William Lunn, MP from Rothwell stated:  
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There is indignation in the Church, and we cannot ignore the Church in its opinion in this 
matter. It is not usual for the Archbishop to rush into the Press, but the Archbishop of 
Canterbury has come out on this matter because he knows, or at all events he fears, the 
possibilities to missionary work, to missionary societies and perhaps to missionary funds 
from what is being done by the Government to destroy the interests of the natives.312 
Lunn argument hearkened back to the ideas put forth by Randall Davidson, who served as 
Archbishop during the Great War. Davidson argued that missionaries were the moral compass of 
empire and trustees of native interests. But 1933 was a different time, and more politicians 
agreed with Sir John Allen, who claimed, “One cannot help feeling that if Church dignatories 
(sic) in East Africa confined themselves to their missionary work and did not try to do anything 
outside their proper sphere it would be better for all concerned.”313 The gold mine debate 
presented the CMS with a rare opportunity to critique imperial practices and sway public debate. 
Unfortunately their efforts were in vain, as Parliament passed a motion supporting the policy of 
financial compensation rather than land for land.314  
In the aftermath of their public loss, the CMS began to back away from the issue, with 
one notable exception. While church leaders quietly moved on, W.E. Owen remained 
passionately devoted to the cause. He worked with a small group of local Africans to create a 
petition for the British government.315 This petition highlighted the betrayal of the land 
compensation scheme launched by the government, and expressed their worries that Kavirondo 
would turn into another Johannesburg where they would have no power and no land.316 In May 
that year, the whip for the Scottish Liberal Party, Sir Robert Hamilton presented the appeal to 
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Parliament.317 Hamilton had worked in East Africa during the early part of his career and only 
turned to politics upon his retirement from the civil service in 1920. He was the ideal candidate 
to present a petition of this nature, but the document was presented and then disappeared with no 
further public debate. Economic realities had clearly won the day, and CMS efforts to affect 
change would quickly revert to more traditional patterns, namely private discussions and 
cultivated relationships with high ranking colonial officials.  
This reversion to older tactics was made clear by their reactions to Owen’s repeated 
attempts to bring publicity to the issue of mining and labor. In May 1933, Owen complained in a 
letter to HD Hooper that the miners in Kavirondo had conspired to push for the passage of the 
Undesirables Expulsion Bill in order to force him to leave the reserve.318  In reality, the bill’s 
passage was thanks to the work of a CMS missionary on the Legislative Council, Canon Burns. 
The Council hoped that the Bill would allow for the eviction of European men who engaged in 
sexual relations with African women on the reserve.319 The combination of Owen’s paranoia and 
the embarrassment over the failure of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s campaign in the press 
concerning mining rights meant that many in the CMS leadership wanted to place this issue 
permanently on the back burner. In a letter to Hooper, Pitt-Pitts still expressed limited support 
for Owen, namely in his right to bring his case before the British public and land for land 
compensation for those in Kavirondo, but on all other counts, the secretary was ready to push 
past the whole controversy. Pitt-Pitts’ claimed that Owen was  
determined to get an inquiry into what he believes are grievances, and I am afraid that his 
own prophecy; that they were worrying him so much, that he dreaded the day when his 
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power of seeing things in their real light would vanish has come true. Much as I love 
Owen I cannot but feel that this has taken place in or two cases.320 
The one or two cases that Pitt-Pitts refers to specifically are the expulsion bill and the mining 
situation in Kavirondo, but the bigger question for CMS personnel was how to support Owen in 
his claims back in the UK. In the aftermath of the disastrous meeting with the Chief Native 
Commissioner, Owen, and Pitt-Pitts on May 15th, Owen demanded to be released from his work 
to travel to the UK and make his case to the British public. The Executive Committee of the 
CMS Kenya ultimately decided to support Owen’s trip but they also claimed “we [the Executive 
Committee] cannot make ourselves responsible for all that he is going to do and say when he 
gets home, especially if he is in the mood that he is in at present.”321 The Bishop of Mombasa 
took this warning a step further. In the aftermath of their meeting, the Commissioner wrote to the 
Bishop of Mombasa, Richard Heywood, claiming that Owen looked “haggard” and needed a 
vacation away from the colony. Rather than providing caveats for supporting Owen, Heywood 
refused to provide succor. He stated that he felt “that if we are to do any good out here we must 
let the authorities realise (sic) that while critical we do believe in the absolute sincerity of their 
actions and that they too from their point of view do really mean to do what is right.”322 
 Owen dutifully traveled back to the United Kingdom, but it was clear to the CMS and the 
colonial authorities that the protest was over for everyone but Owen. The government doubled 
down on their support for the original compensation and mining plans for the land reserve. In 
1934 a government commission recommended the continuation of the government’s earlier 
policies, albeit with a small addition of land to the reserve.323 Despite these losses the so-called 
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Archdeamon remained dedicated to his causes in Kenya. Until his death in 1945, Owen worked 
tirelessly, if paternally, to help Africans under his charge. His refusal to alter his tactics, despite 
the repeated attempts by the government to stifle his voice. This is clear from a meeting he held 
with the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1938. Prior to the meeting, the Colonial Office 
prepared talking points for the Secretary, most notably one highlighting the need for Owen to 
modify his approach.  
It might be suggested to Archdeacon Owen in this connection that the most fruitful line 
of advance in the checking of abuses in connection with any of the subjects which he 
proposes to discuss would be for all missionaries to make a point of bringing any case of 
abuse, which may come to their notice, to the notice of the District Officer concerned 
with a view to his considering what action he could appropriately take in the matter. This 
would surely be a much more fruitful method of dealing with these abuses than by merely 
saving them up and then writing about them in the press of this country.324 
Clearly Owen had not been swayed by persuasion or threats from the authorities, nor had the 
CMS cowed his outspoken attitude. 
 Both Owen and the CMS held onto the notion presented by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury during World War I—that Christianity is the moral lynchpin of the British Empire; 
however their respective visions of what those ethical safeguards should look like. In a letter to 
the Times in 1938 Owen claimed 
For me there is only one issue, and it is this: Can Empire be based on the Christian 
religion? Some would deny this. I believe that there is a Christian basis for Empire, that it 
can be for the glory of the Church, and that its aim is, broadly, that outlined by the 
present Secretary of State for the Colonies in the recent Colonial Office Summer 
School… He stated that it was our task to fit the backward races for freedom, which will 
take a long time.325 
Owen could only see issues in black and white; the empire worked for the advancement of 
Christianity or it did failed and thus deserved a public denunciation. Conversely many in the 
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CMS saw shades of grey in their imperial endeavors. In order to maintain their position in the 
colony, compromises had to be made with the authorities. For the CMS to provide the services 
necessary to continue to bring in potential converts they needed government funding. These 
grants-in-aid came with invisible strings attached; namely the promise to keep their protests 
private. Additionally, it was clear in the aftermath of their first foray into public dissent that loud 
did not necessarily equal success. The reaffirmation of personal relationships and quiet 
objections was reaffirmed in the wake of Owen and Archbishop Lang’s articles and speeches.  
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War  
War proved to be a boon for the CMS in 1914, but the same could not be said for the 
conflict that emerged after the twenty-year cease fire that was the Treaty of Versailles. The 
resulting global war against the Axis powers irrevocably altered the course of the British Empire 
and missionaries’ place within that empire. The financial consequences for the British state were 
catastrophic and the cost to the spiritual health of was no less extreme. Naturally these changes 
in the metropole affected missionaries in the far flung locales of empire. And while World War 
II was a watershed moment for the British Empire and its denizens United Kingdom, in Kenya 
the situation was more complicated. CMS missionaries in the colony had to contend with not 
only war but the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, as well as the beginnings of communal 
violence amongst the Kikuyu. 
When war broke out in 1939, the British immediately began recruiting for soldiers 
throughout the empire. Most of the propaganda efforts focused on the dominions—Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia—but the armed forces depended heavily on African soldiers as well. 
Unlike in the Great War, widespread conscription for porterage duties was not utilized in Kenya, 
thanks largely to the absence of German colonies in the region. Nevertheless, Kenyans fought in 
large numbers for the British Army during the six years of conflict. Additionally, Mombasa’s 
status as a major port city for Africa troops headed to Burma to fight the Japanese.326 Despite the 
appearance of a voluntary army, many in East Africa were in fact men who had been conscripted 
by their local leaders. The British set recruitment quotas each week, and African leaders used 
                                                           
326 Ali Mazrui, African Thought in Comparative Perspective (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2014), 329—30. 
125 
 
this as opportunity to again purge their local communities of rivals and troublemakers.327 Once 
enrolled or conscripted into the army,  Kenyans received decent pay, usually around 20-30 
shillings a month, almost twice what many could make on the land reserves. The army also 
provided some semblance of education to many young men, teaching them sufficient literacy and 
mathematical skills to fire artillery.328 This separate branch of education, completely outside 
missionary purview, had 600 African teachers working to educate new recruits and proved to be 
quite effective, at least in terms of teaching the limited subjects the army felt it necessary for 
African soldiers to learn. These schools were doubly important because the army only recruited 
mission educated African men if no other alternatives were available. They wanted the more 
traditionally martial ethnic groups, and eschewed the athomi as cowards.329  
Africans were not the only group to participate in the war effort. Both missionaries and 
white settlers joined the armed forces, and were promoted above Africans, no matter their level 
of training or battlefield skill.330 More importantly, Kenya’s agriculture sector became an 
increasingly important part of the larger imperial economy. Before the war African squatters 
cultivated almost two million acres of land for their own use, but the advent of war and the 
increasing demand for foodstuffs meant that white settlers had the financial means to take back 
control over that land.331 In 1941 the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board obtained the 
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power to plan the agricultural output of the entire colony to meet wartime needs. The Board 
stipulated that corn was the crop of choice, and European settlers were paid a guaranteed price 
for their yields. Africans also had a price assurance, but it was for considerably less than white 
produce.332  
 While young African men were off, learning to read and fighting in the far flung fields of 
Asia, the financial and ideological underpinnings of empire were being reshaped, strengthened, 
or destroyed. As Adrian Hastings described the conflict, colonial troops learned that European 
powers were merely “emperors without clothes.”333 Veterans returned to Kenya with a wider 
perspective on the world and their own place within it. No longer would small scale imperial 
efforts be accepted; for some no imperial schemes were tolerated. Conversely, just as Africans 
began to reject empire in greater numbers than ever before, the British seemed more determined 
to hold onto that empire than ever before. John Darwin argues the British entered into a new 
imperial era in the twentieth century, a third British Empire predicated on the importance of 
alliances with the white Dominions.334  
Kenya was only tangentially connected to the ideas of the third British Empire and the 
Dominions, but the colony felt the full force of Churchill’s claim that, “We mean to hold our 
own. I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the 
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British Empire.”335 The showcase piece for this new imperial vigor was the passage of the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act. This new legislation promised new funds to colonies in 
order to provide better social services and living standards. Earlier acts had provided little money 
and focused heavily on development leading back to encouraging industry in Great Britain, but 
after a series of strikes throughout various parts of the empire in the late 1930s, the Colonial 
Office decided to act.336 Although the CDWA passed Parliament in 1940, the advent of war 
delayed its implementation into the empire. Initially the CDWA called for £5 million a year to be 
spent in the colonies, but that was a hard sell to the Treasury. Eventually the CO packaged the 
grants with a debt forgiveness program and it was presented to Parliament on May 2, 1940.337 
Unfortunately for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm McDonald, May proved to be 
an inauspicious date. Ten days later his Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain lost his position in 
a hail of denunciations and Winston Churchill created a War Coalition. The act finally passed in 
July but by this point Britain prioritized survival over colonial development.  
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A Whole New (Postwar) World  
The combination of desperation, de facto conscription, and development schemes meant 
that the British policy of a light touch via indirect rule could no longer be sustained. Every aspect 
of colonial life felt the impact of war and economic necessity. The CDWA did not take full effect 
until after the conclusion of the conflict, but for many missionaries it signaled a troubling future 
for their colonial work. In the midst of the war the CMS elected a new general secretary, Max 
Warren. This appointment was a momentous one on multiple levels—Warren’s leadership would 
guide the CMS through the era of decolonization and his centrist policies envisioned a mission 
society that would provide a helpmeet to self-sustaining indigenous churches.338 This renewed 
focus on a blueprint of aided churches was close to Warren’s heart, but it was a decision 
predicated on financial and personnel necessities. In the aftermath of war, Anglican identity and 
purpose shattered as the Church attempted to restore order in a fundamentally altered society. In 
other words, the Church of England became the Anglican Communion as missionaries and 
church leaders attempted to rebuild confidence throughout the world.339 These attempts were 
moderately successful, but church attendance and devoutness never fully recovered. Instead, 
those in Britain slipped into a type of “secular Anglicanism” which allowed English men and 
women to retain a core sense of Anglican morality without practicing their faith on a daily or 
weekly basis. In this understanding of Anglicanism, questions of theology or doctrine were 
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irrelevant in the face of social and moral movements that attempted to elevate the living 
standards of people in England.340  
While secular Anglicanism proved useful in many ways to the Church of England, it also 
presented new wrinkles in an old set of problems. In 1948 Anglicans still had almost one 
thousand missionaries in the field, but recruits were increasingly hard to find.341 Secular 
Anglicanism did not lend itself to missionary careers or to massive donations for missionary 
programs. For Warren, the renewed emphasis on a self-sustaining church was not only a 
theological imperative, but also an economic necessity. In order to bridge the gap between 
personnel needs and recruiting realities, Warren worked with other Protestant mission groups to 
create a new type of employment—missionary associate. Now young men and women could 
work for short, fixed terms in overseas mission fields without the pressure of signing onto a 
lifetime of mission work. Warren heavily targeted teachers with this scheme, in hopes of 
providing enough educators to satisfy indigenous needs, particularly in places such as Kenya.342 
Despite these hopes, missionary staffing would never achieve pre-war levels and the CMS was 
consistently understaffed throughout the post-war period. 
While the CMS worried about the potential overreach of the CDWA in the midst of their 
own crises, Colonial Office administrators faced massive problems of their own. In the aftermath 
of the war, they reaffirmed their support for the CDWA, and even upped the financial backing 
for the program to £120 million as a signal to the colonies that the British Empire was still a long 
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term endeavor with a definite strategic policy. The main problem, in addition to financing this 
grand plan, was the worry that their efforts would be for naught. As assistant under-secretary 
A.J. Dawe argued, elevated social services and living standards would not be an “acceptable 
substitute for freedom.”343 This seemed especially true in Kenya, where the white settler 
population complicated every aspect of colonial development.344 Indeed white settlers 
confounded many post-war colonial development policies, however that did not deter authorities 
from pushing for greater white settlement in Kenya after the war. By 1948 a further 8,000 white 
settlers had moved to the colony, bringing the overall European total to 30,000.345 This new 
influx of settlers only strengthened the desires of the pre-existing white population to create a 
stranglehold on the economic and political future of the colony. War already allowed them to 
reassert control over the farmland of the Highlands and now they wanted to create a dominion 
which would retain its connection to the United Kingdom but would also completely exclude 
Africans.346 
Their political aspirations ran directly counter to the nascent nationalism exhibited by 
Africans, particularly de-mobilized servicemen. These discontented men and women found a 
spokesman in Jomo Kenyatta. Born Kamau Ngengi, the young man morphed into mission 
educated and re-named Johnstone Kenyatta in the 1920s before undergoing his final 
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transformation in Jomo Kenyatta after living and studying in the United Kingdom. He waited out 
World War II and on September 24, 1946 he returned to the colony. He was thronged after 
stepping off the passenger ship and he immediately took the reins of the nascent nationalist 
movement in the colony. In order to fully realize his vision of an independent Kenya, he created 
the Kenya Africa Union.347 When Kenyatta left the colony in 1930, most Africans remained on 
land reserves or squatted on white owned farms, but upon his return he tapped into a new source 
of power—the urban poor. During the war Africans flocked to Nairobi and for young men in the 
city life had few benefits and much hardship. The combination of poverty, unemployment, and 
high crime rates all meant that youth in the city were ripe for militant politics. Kenyatta did not 
necessarily agree with the fringe elements on these new radical ideologies, but he did want to 
persuade them to incorporate their politics into the KAU.348 In this he was only partially 
successful as militant gangs in Nairobi and rural groups outside the city both paved their own 
way forward. For those in the country oathing proved to be the most attractive viable alternative 
to party politics. As early as 1943, oathing ceremonies began in Olenguruone with elders 
practicing the ritual on men, women, and children in a pledge to fight against social injustice. By 
the end of the war, the practice spread to other towns and would eventually spawn the Mau Mau 
movement.349 
 In the midst of the confusion and disarray of the spread of oathing from rural areas such 
as Olenguruone to Nairobi and the outset of violence, missionaries were more concerned by a 
long standing problem—education. By the 1940s African taxpayers were wholly responsible for 
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funding education in Kenya, and their financial power meant that missionaries needed to alter 
their methodologies to better accommodate African needs and priorities.350 Of course the 
government still funneled those taxpayer funds through their own departments before trickling 
down to missionary coffers. This meant that missionaries more than ever needed to please both 
of their masters. As L.B Greaves, the Educational Advisor to the Non-Roman Missions in Kenya 
and Uganda, stated at the end of a long career in East Africa,  
Perhaps the crucial question is this: Are we educationalists (missionary) or missionaries 
(educational)? This is not a quibble; … We are bound to class ourselves as 
educationalists (missionary). And if so, I think it is only a matter of time before we are 
assimilated to that group—so long as it remains in which we can fulfil our Christian 
vocation. The process will be gradual, [and] I do not say it would be wise to speed it up; 
but it would be even less wise, I think grudgingly to retard it. I do not think it will come 
about without a change in the organization, but I think such a change is inevitable, in the 
direction of schools under local authorities or under self-governing Boards whether 
united or denominational.351 
The question of “educationalists (missionary) or missionaries (educational)” was a persistent one 
for missionaries. It was equally relevant in 1946 as it had been in 1929, but missionaries still had 
no good answers. For Greaves the solution was clear; use African funding through government 
channels and hope that the Christian aspect of education continued to be respected by Africans 
and the government. 
In addition to the frank acknowledgement concerning the future of missionary work in 
Kenya, Greaves also understood that the future of Christian work on the continent would need to 
be performed by Africans. As he said, “There is no future in African education for what one may 
call, without offence, the rank-and-file European; he must be replaced as soon as possible by the 
African.”352 One reason for Greave’s desire for African teachers was the explosion of 
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educational demands in the immediate post-war period. Both those on the ground and the 
Colonial Office through the CDWA wanted to provide more teachers, but both groups worried 
about the low quality of many European teachers in the colony.353 The rudimentary education 
given by many missionaries was adequate for colonial needs in the 1920s, but by the 1940s many 
in both Kenya and London were calling for university level schools. In 1943 the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley appointed Justice Cyril Asquith to head up a commission 
specifically dedicated to the question of university education in East Africa. In their report, 
published in 1945, the commission recommended the implementation and construction of 
universities in various colonies. Upon completion, these new universities would link up to 
universities in the UK to receive proper training and develop proper academic rigor.354 Within 
this expanded framework for all levels of education, missionaries struggled to retain and express 
their purpose in the colony.  
In the immediate post-war period, the government appointed multiple commissions to 
examine African education and each successive meeting, conference, and report confirmed the 
new trend in educational policy in Africa—universities and technical schools were the future, 
while universal primary education was an all too expensive pipe dream.355 Within the CMS there 
were multiple strategies to deal with the new threats and opportunities presented by the 
expansion of liberal empire in the aftermath of World War II. The CMS not only had to contend 
with the Colonial Office, independent schooling in Kenya through the KISA continued unabated 
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throughout the war.356 For Max Warren, the solution was to continue recruiting Europeans for 
short terms as missionary/educationalists and hope that volume would replace careers of service. 
LB Greaves saw the future quite differently; he argued that only by co-opting African talent 
could mission groups survive. Into this swirling debate the Colonial Office published the 
Beecher Report in 1949. 
Of the many educational commissions set up by the Colonial Office, none would be more 
important than the Beecher Report for missionaries. Scholars focus primarily on the report’s 
recommendation to formally promote English as the preferred language of instruction in the 
colony as opposed to Swahili.357 This was a remarkable break from the government’s earlier 
educational policies of actively discouraging English in schools. The final switch to English as 
the language of instruction is an important moment in the colonial history of Kenya, but the 
Beecher Report had deeper implications than language for Africans and the missionaries who 
taught them.  
In CMS circles the appointment of Archdeacon Leonard Beecher to head up the 
commission that would bear his name was a large feather in their cap. He had a reputation for 
being sympathetic to African causes and a man destined to move up the promotional ladder 
within the CMS.358 One reason for his stellar reputation was Beecher’s aptitude with languages. 
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He was fluent in nine separate dialects of Kikuyu and worked with Arthur Barlow to publish 
Scriptures in Kikuyu along with a Kikuyu-English dictionary.359 Beecher’s work with language 
propelled him through the ranks of CMS hierarchy, but he was also helped by a fortuitous 
marriage to Gladys Leakey. Her parents were arguably the premier missionary couple in the 
colony—Harry and Mary Leakey.360 The final piece of the puzzle for Beecher was his 
appointment to the Executive Council in 1943.361 This led to his ultimate appointment to the 
commission whose report would bear his name in 1949. Initially both Africans and the CMS 
praised the appointment, but the final report proved to be controversial at best.  
Despite the fact that the report bore the name of missionary, its findings were not 
altogether friendly to missional interests. The commission set out to examine the quality, 
quantity, and fiscal implications of African education in Kenya at all levels and began with a 
brief history lesson of education in Kenya. Naturally missionaries play an important part in the 
early story—they established the first schools and the commission praised their work with grant-
in-aid funds. The report also heavily glossed the controversy created by Dr. Scott’s proposed 
changes to education in Kenya with his annual report in 1928. However, it the report makes it 
clear that missionaries were becoming increasingly irrelevant, particularly in terms of finance by 
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the mid-1930s.362  Africans wanted universal literacy and university education which posed an 
insurmountable problem for missionaries.363 African teachers could provide basic literacy skills 
and missionaries were unable to provide college level instruction. Added to these difficulties, the 
Beecher Report made it clear that African education, while still requiring a moral Christian 
foundation, should be focused on “the restoration of a practical bias to education appropriate to 
the kind of life which the great majority of the products of this expanded programme (sic) will 
lead.”364 What the report meant by this was the creation of a 4-4-4 system which aimed to 
provide primary education to half the population over the course of the next decade.365 
Previously Kenyan education was based on the 6-2-4 system, which provided for six years of 
primary education, but the Beecher report advocated for a four year system across the board.366 
Many Africans opposed this plan due to the relatively small enrollment numbers promised by the 
plan. Of the fifty percent who would be targeted by schools, only thirty percent would advance 
from the first four years of primary school to the four year intermediate stage.367 Africans also 
strenuously opposed the report’s contention that despite expansions to education, most African 
men would eventually find jobs doing manual labor.368  
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The Beecher Report strove to highlight the continued importance of missionaries to 
education in Kenya. This was done primarily through the lens of morality: 
Little or nothing is done in most homes to inculcate moral standards; the child does not, 
in consequence, acquire character in its early years which is built up on principles which 
alone have any relevance in the modern society of which the child is to become a part. It 
is, therefore, the task of the schools to implant these principles, and to do so almost 
entirely without help from the parents. This is a specialist task, like teaching chemistry or 
history, and it should be given to those who are qualified to do it. The secular teacher, 
whatever his other qualifications, has generally has not been trained to take part in this 
work.369 
In other words, secular Anglicanism was not enough for Kenyan schoolchildren. They needed 
the training only a missionary could provide, even if that missionary could not teach chemistry or 
welding. Despite this strong statement of support, missionaries remained unhappy with the report 
for two reasons. First it revealed the deep cleavages and contradictions currently facing 
missionary work. While Greaves freely stated that missionaries were now primarily educational, 
even the report acknowledged that some missionaries “deplored” the fact that they were expected 
to provide so much attention and effort to education at the expense of their evangelistic efforts.370 
At the turn of the century, a missionary’s only real requirement to work in the field was a heart 
for God and basic literacy, but by 1949, missionary applicants needed more education and 
training at every level. Not only did their home societies demand it, so too did colonial 
authorities. As missional coffers, particularly for the CMS, came to rely more and more heavily 
on grants in aid from the government, those in leadership positions focused on providing the 
types of services and skills that the government preferred. This meant an increased emphasis on 
“moral standards” in education, and less of a focus on strict evangelical teachings. This did not 
                                                           
encourage teachers to promote agricultural, technical, and “rural” skills. Naturally many Africans 
remained unconvinced by these efforts. 
369 Government of Kenya, 55. 
370 Ibid, 31. 
138 
 
mean that CMS leadership at the home office in Salisbury Square made a deviously calculated 
money grab, but they firmly believed that in order to carry on with any missionary work, they 
needed to have government backing and they planned accordingly. 
 The need for government funds highlights the second problem that the CMS had with the 
Beecher Report. While they agreed with the importance of moral teachings and the church’s role 
in that sphere, the report added an important addendum to their recommendation, “We desire to 
see a morally sound education, largely based on Christian principles, conducted with adequate 
inspection and supervision.”371 Missionaries wanted to continue receiving grants in aid, but they 
worried about the inspection and quality standards demanded by the report. If the CMS could not 
do that, Max Warren warned the Bishop of Mombasa that if they could not achieve the 
benchmarks set out by the Beecher Report by 1952, the government would take over all failing 
CMS schools.372 Without schools, CMS work in the colony would be seriously hampered at all 
levels, but Warren had little faith that the mission could maintain control over a majority of their 
schools. Thus the question became how to maintain that influence without a monopoly on 
education. For the CMS, the emergence of the Mau Mau conflict seemed to be that chance.  
 Traditionally, government authorities and the Colonial Office remained relatively 
uncommunicative with missionary bodies. There were personal relationships, particularly in the 
colonies, but generally the CMS was left to decipher colonial intentions on their own time and in 
their own company. The exception to this state of affairs was of course when particular 
missionaries raised the ire of the government. At that point communication generally came 
swiftly and from multiple government offices. The Beecher Report marked a departure from 
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standard operating procedure—administrators in the Colonial Office knew the report had created 
a firestorm of angst and worry in missional circles and their concerns were valid. As P.J. Kitcatt 
commented, “unless educational standards were raised at [mission] schools the Beecher Report 
would be indefensible in ten years’ time.”373 Their plan to blunt missionary concerns was to use 
communication channels in the UK to forewarn mission societies of potential changes to school 
authority. The Colonial Office believed that home offices understood the big picture better than 
individual missionaries on the ground.374  
 The CMS focused the majority of their attentions and efforts on education in hopes of 
proving that they were necessary, not only to the government but Africans. Unfortunately they 
failed on both fronts. The Beecher Report accidentally seemed to write them out of legitimacy 
and authority, even while trying to uphold the status quo. More damning than the details of the 
Beecher Report were the feelings of Africans who also largely rejected their claims. Local 
leaders in Kenya objected to the lack of access and short duration of primary schools for 
Africans, but they also demanded that control be wrested from missionaries and given to Local 
Native Councils or be put under direct supervision of the government.375 Many Africans argued 
that even so-called mission schools were in fact independent, despite any previous affiliation 
with the CMS.376 Africans no longer wanted mission schools; they demanded something better 
The Colonial Office attempted to find a middle ground, keeping both groups but compromise 
was difficult to achieve. They struggled to develop a long term strategic policy that clearly 
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elucidated the purpose and end goal of African education reforms. The Beecher Report was 
entrusted with that task, but largely failed because the larger imperial structure could not or 
would not set forth a clear agenda. What was the purpose of education for Africans? Was it to 
merely provide them with enough education to take up positions as manual laborers on farms and 
in mines? Or was it something larger? Rather than create a firm policy, colonial authorities 
crafted a sort of intellectual loop, Africans were always at threat from modern society and 
needed to be sheltered from those horrors, but they also had to learn to function in the 
enlightened society established by the British.  
 This type of intellectual loop is clearly seen in the Colonial Office documents. In the 
1925 Educational Policy in British East Africa: Memorandum it states: 
Since contact with civilization—and even education itself—must necessarily tend to 
weaken tribal authority and the sanctions of existing beliefs, and in view of the all-
prevailing belief in the supernatural which affects the whole life of the African it is 
essential that what is good in the old beliefs and sanctions should be strengthened and 
what is defective should be replaced. The greatest importance must therefore be attached 
to religious teaching and moral instruction. Both in schools and in training colleges they 
should be accorded an equal standing with secular subjects.377 
The 1950 African Education: A Statement of Policy sounds eerily similar:  
There are signs that western culture is breaking down tribal authority and the social 
structure built upon indigenous beliefs: education must encourage a strong sense of 
responsibility to the community and inspire in the individual a devotion to a spiritual 
idea. Western culture is infused with spiritual ideas and if our education is to be the living 
force we all desire it is essential that it should be infused with the same ideals. It is 
therefore the policy of the government to continue to work to a great extent through the 
Christian missions and churches and through other religious bodies which have the same 
devotion to a spiritual ideal and to habits of self-discipline and loyalty essential to the 
well-being of the community. The Government will at the same time seek to achieve the 
same discipline and spiritual foundations to the teaching in its own schools.378  
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Despite these assertions, the Beecher Report seems much more realistic when it declares that 
education should prepare men for manual labor. Missionaries were unsure which vision of 
African society will win out—should education be a pragmatic endeavor, designed for entry into 
the work force, or should Christianity be the tool which allowed Africans to more fully 
participate in wider colonial society via universities and higher education? No matter the 
outcome, missionaries would struggle to fulfill their government sanctioned duties. They did not 
have trained teachers to help students prepare for university life, nor did they have instructors in 
the arts of industrial training. Lack of suitable employees, combined with a dearth of clear 
strategic planning on the part of colonial authorities proved to be a long standing problem for the 
CMS, one that they futilely hoped to overcome with the outcome with the outbreak of Mau Mau.  
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Conclusion  
 The post war years were not kind to the CMS. They struggled to maintain their 
entrenched positions within Kenyan society, but it was clear that there had been fundamental 
shifts amongst both their African congregations and the colonial authorities. Despite these 
changes, certain patterns remained the same, particularly in regards to communication between 
CMS leadership and the government. When individual missionaries such as W.E Owen 
attempted to breach these informal rules and publicly demand change from the authorities, he 
revealed deep fissures within the CMS. Those back home in Salisbury Square briefly engaged 
with the issue of compensation and protection for those living in the Kavirondo land reserve, but 
after a short-lived publicity campaign, headed by none other than the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
they quickly learned that open denunciations and demands only led to veiled threats from those 
in power. In the face of government hostility they chose their relationship to the state over their 
traditional claims to provide protection to Africans. This choice was not made with malice, but 
rather CMS leadership looked at their financial situation and realized that only with government 
backing could they continue to function as a missional society in Kenya. Thus the compromise 
became—we shall protect Africans, but only if we can do so discreetly and directly. W.E. Owen 
was left with his job, but his personal campaigns only earned him the enmity of his fellow 
missionaries.  
 The Archdeamon’s understanding of missionary work became increasingly divorced 
from the larger CMS organization throughout the 1930s and 1940s. World War II did provide the 
same opportunities for missionaries to prove their usefulness that the Great War had. Rather than 
glory and safety through the Volunteer Carrier Corps, missionaries had to contend with the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which offered them no chance to demonstrate their 
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power. Instead it seemed to remove their responsibility and agency in Kenya in favor of 
government development work. This combined with the publication of the Beecher Report in 
1949 created much anxiety in missional minds. In spite of the fact that the CDWA and Beecher 
Report promised additional funds to missionary schools, the concurrent increase in government 
oversight meant that the specter of government takeover loomed large in the minds of men like 
Max Warren. They hoped to find some other means of serving Africans and the colonial state, 
but again individual missionaries proved problematic. For those who came to Kenya to 
evangelize, working on government approved projects such as education were only distractions 
from their true calling. Again this was not a new debate for the CMS, they also struggled in the 
aftermath of the Great War to find their footing, but the combination of straightened finances, the 
CDWA, and the Beecher Report strengthened these conflicts.  
 In the midst of these setbacks, there were signs of hope as the CMS moved into the 
1950s. If they could prove their worth to the state, bring their schools up to appropriate 
standards, while also recruiting new personnel, they had a chance of maintaining their positions. 
The decade also provided a chance to choose new leadership for the CMS in Kenya, as the 
current Bishop of Mombasa was close to retirement. New leaves could be turned over and funds 
were theoretically available thanks to the CDWA. The source of their angst could also be the key 
to their continued stability if the CMS played their cards right and Warren could find suitable 
short term missionary associates. Even the outbreak of communal violence in the colony was 
initially welcomed by many in CMS ranks. Mau Mau seemed to be catalyst the CMS needed to 
ensure that they could fulfill their plans. The colonial authorities quickly branded the violence 
Satanic, thus necessitating the presence of good Christians to cleanse the fighters of their vile 
contamination. Even missionaries who balked at state led work in education could agree that 
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rehabilitation and cleansing were necessary evangelical efforts. New recruits would flock to 
CMS stations so that they too could participate in the redemption of Kenya and its people. Most 
importantly, Mau Mau offered the CMS opportunities to prove their worth to both Africans and 
the colonial state. They could protect good African Christians from the terrible violence of the 
bestial Mau Mau fighters and only those with Christian training could work with the state to 
cleanse and restore the population to good order. Mau Mau was a watershed moment for the state 
and missionaries working under their auspices. How they handled the conflict would determine 
the success of failure of decolonization in Kenya. 
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Chapter 4: Optimism in the Midst of the Devil: CMS and the Outbreak of Mau Mau  
“And let us be quite sure, this society of Mau Mau is not African, it comes from Satan. It 
is evil, It is against Jesus and His Church.”379 
Introduction 
 “May you die of this oath.” The utterance of this phrase in land reserves and squatter 
holdings signaled a sea change in the future of Kenyan politics and society.380 These were the 
final words in an oath taken by evicted squatters in Olenguruone as they promised to unite and 
fight land injustice in the region.381 Initially the CMS response to oathing ceremonies was varied, 
with some blaming the evil influence of communism, while others condemned aggressive white 
settler tactics.382 No matter the cause, CMS missionaries faced the ultimate test to their future 
work with the arrival of the Mau Mau conflict in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Their response 
to these conflicts would set the tone for their church/state relationships through decolonization 
and independence in the colony.   
Missionaries firmly believed that Mau Mau provided them with a key opportunity to 
stake their claim for legitimacy in the colony—if they could supply recruits, support, and 
cleansing for the colonial state they would cement their place as a key cog in the colonial 
machine. Indeed, this seemed like the perfect time to remind the authorities of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury’s 1920 speech about the imperatives of the British Empire, namely “the instinct of 
freedom, the instinct of empire, and the instinct of philanthropy.”383 For the CMS, Mau Mau was 
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the opportunity to prove the Archbishop correct; they were the lynchpins to empire. Only 
through Christian faith could Africans find the full freedom offered by the imperial mission; one 
without the other was only half a mission, half a person. Missionaries still saw themselves as 
trustees over the fortunes and futures of their African subjects and important cogs in the imperial 
machine, and Mau Mau was to be their ultimate test, and their ultimate victory. 
 In this vision of missionary responsibilities the CMS needed to do two things for their 
African converts: protect them from both Mau Mau violence and unwarranted state detention. 
This promise hearkened back to earlier decades of missionary work during the Great War. In 
1916 the Volunteer Carrier Corps ably safeguarded young African men from the worst horrors of 
porterage duties and in return for that shield, locals began attending churches and schools in 
larger numbers than ever before. However in the post-war years the CMS had been much less 
successful. They could not halt the spread of kipande regulations or the spread of native land 
reserves. Even their attempts to protect those in the mining district of Kavirondo had proved 
disastrous. In the face of missionary defeats, Africans became increasingly independent minded. 
They refused to bow to religious pressures regarding independent schooling and political 
organizations. Because missionaries were on shaky ground with many Africans, their 
relationship with the state became increasingly important. They developed a certain mindset and 
pattern of behaviors which stressed privacy, discretion, and working with the government to 
improve the situation on the ground in hopes of forestalling the need to publicly accuse anyone 
of abuse.  
This method worked brilliantly in the Great War, as their corps provided support and an 
outlet to escape the worst conditions of the war. Unfortunately for the CMS, the post-war years 
proved less beneficial. When the state halted their attempts to provide similar protection and 
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benefits to Africans under their paternalistic care, CMS priorities began to shift. Education 
became the most important tool in the missional tool belt. It was subsidized by government and 
local funds, and it seemed that only missionaries had the right skills to produce Africans with a 
proper moral mindset. Unfortunately this type of education only pleased the state and the rise of 
the independent school movement forestalled any attempts by missionaries to monopolize 
education. By 1952, the CMS realized that education was no longer the key to maintaining their 
position vis a vis the state and their African congregations. Thus their response to Mau Mau 
became even more important as an indicator of their long term viability in the colony. Initially 
missionaries did not think of the clash as a pre-cursor to independence, but rather a small 
skirmish that needed to deal with a multitude of issues. Importantly it was not about the 
sustainability of the British Empire.  
If Mau Mau was not a nationalist fight for independence, missionaries felt that their 
primary goal should be the maintenance of their relationship to the state. However, they also 
needed to provide some benefits and protections to their own converts. In the first phase of the 
conflict, CMS leadership in Kenya and Great Britain attempted to find the delicate balance 
between protection and compromise. Not surprisingly they again fell back into old patterns of 
communication, in the hopes that working within the system would curtail the worst of the 
abuses perpetrated by the state. The CMS was caught in the midst of an internecine war and their 
plan of attack was to retreat. By falling back into the protective arms of the state, they hoped that 
they could keep everyone, both African and British, happy. Alas that was not to be their fate. 
Their tactics only served to alienate those on every side of the war and following CMS failures 
will be our touchstones through the next two chapters. This chapter will highlight the early 
phases of the conflict, as the CMS struggled mightily between their desire to protect the Africans 
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under their care and their requisite need to keep the state happy. Despite their failures, ultimately 
this dark period of CMS history paved the way for success once independence arrived in Kenya. 
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Mau Mau: The Beginning 
The first oaths promising loyalty to what would become Mau Mau were taken in 
Olenguruone, a rural area dominated by squatters. But Mau Mau put down roots in the cities as 
well, particularly in Nairobi where trade unionism was aggressively on the rise. As oathing 
spread to cities it underwent several important changes, namely the inclusion of support for Jomo 
Kenyatta, the independent schools movement, and the Kenya African Union.384 Kenyatta had 
returned to Kenya in the aftermath of World War II and immediately set himself to the task of 
shepherding a new nationalist movement into the forefront of African politics. During his two 
decade absence in London, the British had banned the KCA and in 1944 its successor, the Kenya 
Africa Union made its debut on the Kenyan stage. Upon Kenyatta’s return, he immediately 
assumed leadership of the group, but it would always be a difficult movement to contain.385 
Despite British protestations to the contrary, Kenyatta was ultimately a moderate who wanted 
independence, but the militant faction of the party demanded not only independence but support 
for trade unions. This faction of the KAU called themselves the Muhimu; they were the working 
class balance to Kenyatta’s middle class lifestyle. It was the Muhimi who brought united the rural 
desires for land security with urban demands for better working and living conditions.386 The 
third factor that galvanized the Kikuyu into action was the demobilization of World War II 
veterans on two fronts. African men who returned home from the war expected benefits for their 
service. In Britain the first post-war election saw the election of the Labour Party and a new 
Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. Atlee promised homes for heroes and to win the peace for Great 
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Britain.387 But it was unclear whether or not any of these homes and victories would be found in 
the empire. African veterans certainly wanted better lives and benefits upon their return to the 
colony, but it was a different group of veterans who prospered in the aftermath of war—
demobilized British soldiers who were promised land via settlement schemes.388 In the face of 
what they saw as betrayal from the state, Kenyan soldiers quickly joined this burgeoning 
movement.  
British government officials and CMS missionaries were unsure what to make of these 
mysterious nighttime oaths. Some blamed communism, while others assumed that Jomo 
Kenyatta was the puppeteer behind the movement, and a third faction looked to witchcraft and 
Satan as the culprit.389 The porous nature of Mau Mau leadership certainly did not help the 
situation—each group pledging its oath did so within a very local context, and while many of the 
words were the same, their local interpretation could vary widely. Part of the difficulty for those 
on the ground was the forcible nature of the oaths and the murky meaning of even the word Mau 
Mau. While the Kikuyu had long taken oaths in times of war or distress—these oaths were 
voluntary and only given to men.390 But the new generation of oathers targeted everyone. No 
longer were oaths voluntary or for men; those in charge of the ceremonies claimed every 
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member of society, even the children were to participate in the ritual.391 Ultimately these oaths 
promised to fight for ithaka na wiathi or self-mastery through land. Rosalind O’Hanlon ties this 
promise to the Kikuyu conception of manhood; one could not be an adult until he had created a 
self-sustaining household. Land and marriage were key components to this model of 
masculinity.392 Unfortunately for colonial leaders and missionaries, ithaka na wiathi was truly a 
foreign concept, which only added to their confusion.  
As oathing spread to the cities, so too did violence. Initially clashes were localized, as 
squatters and militants clashed. The government attempted to quell the rising dissent, but they 
repeatedly ran into a veritable brick wall of silence in every village. By August 1950, Mau Mau 
was officially an illegal organization, but since no one would talk, local district officers still 
struggled to make headway. It was not until the end of 1951 that the first Mau Mau adherent was 
put on trial for his membership.393 Initially this may have been seen as a success by colonial 
officials, but in the end it only seemed to spur on more violence, as each act of destruction was 
meant with its own form of retribution by those who eventually formed the backbone of the 
loyalist factions.  By 1952 Kenya was on the brink of all out civil war, as Mau Mau fighters and 
loyalist factions destroyed each other’s property and land at will. In an attempt to regain order 
colonial authorities passed the Collective Punishments Ordinance, which called for fines against 
entire villages if they failed to cooperate with police forces. Ultimately the CPO failed to 
produce any major breakthroughs for the police; it only upped the communal violence among the 
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Kikuyu. The very next month the colony experienced the first murders of the brewing civil war 
when two bodies were found floating in a local river.394 
In many ways both the government and CMS faced watershed moments in the early days 
of 1952. The Empire was then embroiled in two separate military operations in East Asia: the 
Malayan emergency and the Korean War; but the current governor, Sir Philip Mitchell’s term 
was up that summer.395 Many of the British tactics to quell violence and deal with the communist 
insurgency in Malaya would eventually be transferred to Kenya with varying results, but in 1952 
the main concern for the British would be manpower and money.396 Counterinsurgency 
campaigns are rarely cheap and despite the promise implied in the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act, financially the British were in deeply straitened circumstances.397 For the next 
twelve years Britain would attempt to quash the civil war, but financial concerns would always 
be paramount in their minds. They wanted victory as quickly and cheaply as possible, although 
neither would prove to be easily attained. The then governor of the colony, Philip Mitchell 
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proved to be a liability as well. Mitchell served with a long and distinguished career in both Asia 
and East Africa but seemed ill-prepared to deal with the rising violence.398 Mitchell frequently 
refrained from reporting acts of violence in the colony, which meant that his successor would 
have little forewarning about the true state of things in the colony.  
Much like the British Empire, the Church Missionary Society was in a state of flux by 
1952. While the colony descended further into violence, the CMS worried over their continuing 
recruitment and personnel woes. After his appointment as general secretary of the CMS in 1942, 
Max Warren attempted to modernize missionary service. He wanted to increase the number of 
British men and women who served overseas, but he believed that short term appointments were 
the key to the long term survival. No longer would most evangelist minded solitary men and 
women toil for decades in the far flung fields of empire; now they would serve as missionary 
associates for short fixed terms, usually three to five years. Warren hoped that these missionary 
associates would fill the gap left behind by retiring career proselytizers.399 There were high 
hopes for this new type of missionary service, but the postwar years were not successful ones for 
the CMS.  
Staffing difficulties took center stage for CMS officials, even when Kenya was on the 
verge of martial law. Almost every letter home in the first six months of 1952 concerned the 
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difficulties of finding enough qualified staff members to carry on with mission work. Assistant 
Bishop Leonard Beecher highlighted these problems in a circular letter sent back to Britain. In 
this missive, he focused on one problem area in Kikuyu territory. Recently locals had discovered 
two dead goats, one of which was found on the altar of the local church. Despite the implications 
of the deeply anti-Christian message, Beecher was more concerned with the relative lack of staff 
in the area. He urged the Anglican Church to send more help and lamented the loss of workers. 
He claimed that twenty five years ago there had been 8 or 9 European clergy there, with their 
wives, along with several single lady “workers.” Alas by 1952 there was only one missionary 
and one “woman worker.”400 Beecher’s decision to deemphasize local conditions while 
underlining European staffing conditions illustrate two important points. First, while Beecher 
himself harped on the need for more African staff, European men were still the gold standard in 
the mission field.401 Second, the origin of the problems in Kenya were less important than the 
solution, namely more British Christians to come and work in the colony. The question of 
whether or not the Kikuyu had legitimate grievances was less important than the cure-all of 
missional work.  
In the nineteenth century Henry Venn had laid out his plans for the future of Christian 
work in the ‘heathen’ lands of the world. He called for a euthanasia of missions and the creation 
of churches that were self-sustaining, self-propagating, and self-governing. As part of the 
creation of these churches, indigenous bishops would be appointed to govern the new 
bishoprics.402 While many in the CMS gave vocal support to Venn’s ideas, as evidenced by the 
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various church union schemes of the late 1920s, actually turning power over to Africans proved 
more difficult. The financial strain of the 1930s meant that more Africans became padres, i.e. 
local church leaders who could conduct services, but an independent Anglican church in Kenya 
was certainly not seen as a quickly approaching reality. As part of their self-propagating plans, 
the CMS worked in the early 1930s to combine in closer union with other missionary societies. 
The idea was to pool resources and help push forward some semblance of independence for 
churches in Africa. While missionaries supported these plans, African congregations did not 
want greater independence from the home office or from the Archbishop of Canterbury.403 They 
worried that independence would provide openings for Europeans in Kenya to take more control, 
which Africans did not want. As Hooper explained, “There is a sort of sentimental feeling that 
the nearer one gets to King George and Canterbury the safer one is for justice. That is putting it 
crudely, but that is the way they put it.”404  
The weight of ninety years of missionary philosophy colliding with continuing African 
desires for closer connections to the Archbishop of Canterbury left the CMS with a morass of 
conflicting desires and on the ground realities. In the face of staffing and financial difficulties, 
they increasingly relied on Africans to fill positions. By 1951 each clergy member needed 
African lay-readers to fulfill their duties. One missionary had sixty two churches under his 
purview. Naturally lay-readers shouldered the majority of the priestly role in many of these 
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churches.405 As missionary staff declined, Africans became indispensable in the day to day 
workings of the organization. But the CMS had other reasons to want to include “an expanded 
African ministry.”406 African responses to Christianity were never monolithic or passive, as 
evidenced by their strong reactions to the female circumcision crisis in the 1920s. By the next 
decade some Africans had split from European denominations and formed independent churches. 
Many of these new churches were swept up in the revivalist movement of the early 1940s.407 
Known as the Ruanda movement, revivalists called for a return to strong evangelist theology and 
liturgy. Their belief and behaviors frightened church, state, and Mau Mau and it was clear to men 
like Beecher that African leadership was necessary in order to maintain some semblance of 
European order in Kenyan churches. While white, male missionaries remained the ideal model, 
the CMS was willing to bend and accept African leadership for some positions within the 
organization. However, for what they considered their most important work, the CMS remained 
firmly dedicated to the idea that British men, and a few women, were the only force strong 
enough, moral enough, to lift Kenya from the quagmire of Mau Mau. 
Before the CMS or the government could ‘fix’ the problem of Mau Mau, they had to 
decide what Mau Mau was. In the intervening years between Kenyan independence and the 
recent electoral violence in the country, historians have spilled much ink concerning the origins 
of Mau Mau and the initial British response to oathing and the outbreak of violence. Initially race 
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was seen as the primary motivating factor but other theories soon complicated the picture.408 The 
second wave of historiography focused primarily on the internecine aspects of the war; for these 
scholars Mau Mau was partially about self-mastery and injustice, but it was primarily a civil war 
between those who benefitted from colonialism and those who bore the brunt of colonial and 
tribal authority.409 The second school of thought concerning the origins and development of Mau 
Mau stress the grey areas between those who took the oath and those who refused. To understand 
the CMS response these historiographical debates are less important, but it is imperative to 
understand the complexity of the movement as a whole. While there were many shades of gray 
between loyalists and Mau Mau fighters, for missionaries the distinction that was most important 
was believer and non-believer. They hoped that the division between those who had participated 
in the oath and those who refused was a mirror image to the group who professed belief in 
Christ. Unfortunately, as tended to be the in case in regards to Mau Mau, the issue was never that 
cut and dried.   
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The Declaration of Emergency  
 The initial period of violence and oathing Kenya confused British missionaries and 
officials on the ground. Both groups were sidetracked by personnel issues in 1951, but by the 
summer of 1952 it was clear that war had arrived in the colony. After the departure of the 
outgoing governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, new appointee Sir Evelyn Baring was due to arrive in 
June 1952 and take up his post. Unfortunately before he could take leave of the United Kingdom, 
he suffered a small wood chopping accident that incapacitated him until September. In the 
meantime Henry Potter was sent in as a short term Acting Governor. Potter had no idea that 
Kenya was then in the midst of a civil war and due to the nature of his appointment had little 
power to proscribe any remedy. Potter held the colony together until the arrival of Baring on at 
the end of September in 1952. His first act as Governor would be to initiate the process for a 
declaration of a state of emergency in the colony. 410  
 Martial law was meant to give the government the tools necessary to regain control of the 
situation in Kenya, but that was quickly becoming impossible. Soon after Baring’s arrival Mau 
Mau claimed its biggest prize, the assassination of the loyalist Chief Waruhiu. On October 7th 
Mau Mau assassins ambushed Waruhiu’s chauffeured Hudson, killing him while leaving his 
driver and other passengers unharmed. The chief’s power, particularly in relation to land tenure 
and usage rights made him a primary target for Mau Mau, as did his Christian faith and close 
relationship to those in power. Within a few weeks, the attackers had been arrested and tried. 
They were hanged seven months later.411 The chief’s assassination was but a first step in the ever 
escalating violence in Kenya. Waruhiu had been a vocal and powerful Christian within his 
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community, and a close friend of the Leakey family. Despite this the CMS spent little time 
mourning his death in favor of focusing on their own needs. Waruhiu’s death had been tragic, 
and it sparked new fears in the hearts and minds of every un-oathed Kikuyu that the government 
could not properly protect them. The CMS hoped that they could step in and shield believers 
from the violence. If they could provide protection and security from Mau Mau, much as they 
had done in the face of the harsh British practices during World War I, their recent setbacks 
might fade away.  
These plans help explain why the first bulletin released by the CMS in the aftermath of 
Waruhiu’s death remains silent on the killing in favor of focusing on two different issues—a 
perceived slight in a Parliamentary speech by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver 
Lyttelton and the continued financial and personnel needs of the CMS. In an October speech 
updating the House of Commons on the progress made in finding Waruhiu’s killers, Lyttelton 
tried to explain the presence of secret societies in Africa. He explained that, 
I have some diffidence in giving the House a considered opinion about what the causes 
are. There are a great many causes for these secret societies. One, which perhaps will 
strike hon. Members as being rather curious, is that many of the tribal dances and other 
means of "letting off steam" have been suppressed by the missionaries, and this has given 
an impetus to secret societies. Other causes, no doubt, are land famine and social 
problems, but as regards the second part of the hon. Member's question, I think I could 
reply that in the main the object of the Mau Mau is to drive the Europeans out of 
Kenya.412 
While Lyttelton only partially blames missionaries for creating the right atmosphere for Mau 
Mau to emerge, missionaries could not accept even partial blame. These bulletins were sent from 
the office of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the current Archbishop Geoffrey Fisher, 
lamented that such statements hurt missionary work. He blamed land hunger, population 
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increases, and increased social and culture pressures for the creation of Mau Mau and argued that 
the CMS forestalled such terrible violence for as long as possible. But Fisher also acknowledged: 
The situation in Kikuyu-land calls for radical rethinking of the organization of the 
Church. No longer is it possible to secure the money required for the Divinity School and 
for overheads, nor for employing the army of evangelists and padres, aggravated as such 
burdens are by the steadily increasing cost of living. This structure belongs to the days 
when the Church was numerically strong.413 
Clearly the CMS realized that it could not carry on using old methodologies, but that is what it 
continued to do throughout most of the 1950s. Only when the “army of evangelists and padres” 
failed to appear, did the CMS grudgingly turn to Africans to staff their church leadership 
positions. Patterns of church life and practice were hard to shake, even in the midst of the 
massive upheavals in Kenya.  
 In the short term Lyttelton apologized to the CMS for the perceived slight. In a letter to 
Canon Bewes he tried to clarify that the suppression of traditional practices, even traditions that 
were seen as detrimental to the social well-being of the group, would always lead to the creation 
of other outlets such as Mau Mau.414 Bewes’ response to Lyttelton has not been preserved, but it 
seemed that all the ruffled feathers had been smoothed over. But this was the first in a long line 
of miscommunications between the government and church officials. Throughout the 
decolonization process, CMS leaders felt shut out policy decisions and planning strategy. 
Naturally, the government did not consult the church for every decision, but the lack of 
meaningful interactions between the two groups seriously hampered the CMS’ ability to plan for 
the coming of political independence. And the state church of England would not necessarily be 
the state church of Kenya. In the absence of communication, the failures of the missionary group 
                                                           
413 UBL CMS/B/OMS G3/A5/6/1/1952.  
414 Ibid.  
161 
 
made de facto decisions for them. The government felt free to use the CMS as an unofficial 
enforcer of state policy throughout the twentieth century, but they took few steps to include the 
group in the creation of that same policy. Consequently, the CMS repeatedly tried to uphold 
colonial policies that they could neither fulfill nor agree with. This disconnect formed the heart 
of the decolonization and independence experience for the CMS—failure to succeed in terms of 
colonial policy meant long term success for the independent church that emerged in the 
aftermath of political independence.  
 In the first months of the Emergency the CMS had plenty to be optimistic about, despite 
the violence in the colony. Baring’s first goal after the declaration of martial law was to arrest the 
leaders of Mau Mau, which for the governor and his advisors meant the leaders of the KAU, as 
well as other nationalist and trade union leaders. On October 20th, Baring made the formal 
announcement that Emergency regulations were now in place, and at midnight on the same night 
a joint military and police task force rounded up over 150 men who were suspected of being Mau 
Mau leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta. The government hoped that a show of force would 
restore their authority in both Nairobi and the surrounding countryside. Unfortunately it had the 
opposite effect. With most moderate nationalists now in jail, Mau Mau now had fled to the 
forests and were prepared to fight in force for self-mastery.415 
 The first consequence of Operation Jock Scott was an increase in violence on all fronts. 
The very next day Mau Mau murdered a local chief and two police escorts when they tried to 
break up an oathing ceremony. While officials and white settlers were concerned about the 
bloodshed in the colony, at this point it was still largely contained within African communities. 
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While Kikuyu men and women had died, the only loss to white settlers thus far were cattle and a 
few outbuildings. That all changed on October 22nd when Mau Mau claimed its first white 
victim. While Eric Bowyer was relaxing in his nightly bath, militants broke in and hacked him to 
death. Two of his servants were also killed with pangas, the Kikuyu version of a machete. 416 
Soon thereafter the Meiklejohns, an elderly couple enjoying their after dinner coffee were also 
attacked by roving bands of Mau Mau fighters. Mrs. Meiklejohn managed to survive despite her 
numerous injuries, but the violence was only beginning.417  
 Most missionaries remained remarkably unconcerned about the deaths of their fellow 
Europeans, despite their shared heritage. The CMS saw the declaration and the violence 
surrounding the introduction of military force into the colony as an opportunity for growth. Mau 
Mau was a terrible, internecine war for self-mastery among the Kikuyu people, but Africans 
generally remained in the background for the CMS. Not surprisingly, most of the correspondence 
between home office and mission field were written by British men talking about how to survive 
this war with the bulk of their congregations and government financial support intact. These 
were necessary concerns for the CMS to be sure, but it also created a narrative that focused 
primarily on the missionaries themselves. Africans rarely had individual voices within the trans-
continental relationships maintained between Salisbury Square and Mombasa.  
 Within this paradigm, Africans played an important but passive role. As a group they 
were meant to provide important anecdotes about the strength of Christianity in the face of the 
devilish Mau Mau forces, and they were a group of victims that the Church could protect, but 
rarely were they individual names and faces. This is evident in one of the few letters written by a 
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Kikuyu to the Home Office. Samuel Muhoro was a teacher at St. Paul’s Divinity School in 
Limuru and padre at a church in Njumbi. This testimony may have been passed along by CMS 
leaders because it fit so neatly into these categories; namely he provides evidence of the 
importance of the CMS and Christian faith in fighting Mau Mau. Muhoro began by describing a 
goat left on their altar, but more important were the descriptions of two nameless Christian wives 
who refused to take the oath. Their husbands had been members of the church, but backslid and 
joined Mau Mau. When the women defied their husbands, they were “trussed up and left to die 
by their husbands.”418 It is unclear what the wives’ ultimate fate was, but Christian bravery to the 
point of martyrdom would become an important part of the CMS story in the coming years. Mau 
Mau also claimed two more victims in Muthiria. A young married couple refused to take the oath 
and were killed. Muhoro officiated at their funeral and put forth the call to all Christians to resist 
the siren song of Mau Mau:  
I told the people that this was the saved ones’ time. Before this the war was not ours; but 
now it was ours, so then let us stand firm and fight it together wherever we meet it. 
From that day on we all rejoiced whenever we heard that so and so had completed his 
course and each and all of us were ready to go whenever God called.419 
Muhoro’s sermon highlighted the ways in which Christian Kikuyu were increasingly drawn into 
a conflict that coalesced among the powerful figures in their society and those who had little 
experience with the benefits of imperialism.  
The situation on the ground in Kenya was quite murky. The war drove apart friends and 
families, but the CMS was less interested in the familial impact of the war. They concerned 
themselves with the second half of Muhoro’s sermon—those who professed the faith must be 
willing to suffer, even unto death, for their fate. Mau Mau had several unexpected consequences, 
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and one of the most important, at least for missionaries, was the ability to separate the wheat 
from the chaff. From the beginning of the their tenure in Africa, missionaries worried that those 
who ‘converted’ were doing so only for the temporal benefits it provided—greater access to 
those in power, education for their children, or potential for white collar careers.420 Mau Mau 
offered a useful, if dangerous, tool that missionaries could use to determine who had the ‘true’ 
faith. For this reason martyrs, or almost martyrs, were incredibly important part of CMS 
narratives of the fight against Mau Mau. This was the case, despite the fact that rarely if ever 
were these faithful Christians named or rewarded for their bravery.   
Muhoro’s sermon contained another piece of important dialogue for missionary ideation 
of self during Mau Mau:  
The Government has now come to understand that those whom the Lord jesus has truly 
saved are the only Kikuyu able to stand up to the Mau-Mau oath. Yet these people feel no 
need of protection from Government as they know that Jesus is looking after them. You 
may be surprised to hear that at Weithaga for instance there are 300 living in the camp on 
the Mission station about 16 miles west of Fort Hall. They and the Missionaries have no 
troops to guard them, indeed many have lost all their possessions and are just helping 
each other with food and clothese (sic) and the money which was sent from C.M.S. 
London. They have no fear of death.421 
This story functioned on multiple levels for the CMS. It highlighted the good work they had 
already done in created a strong base of Christian believers, able to stand against an anti-
                                                           
420 These fears were present in every mission field and for every missionary body. Virtually all 
scholarly texts that focus on missionary work include a section on the difficulties missionaries 
faced in trying to determine who ‘true’ Christians were. For more information on the idea of 
‘true conversion’ and the various tactics used by missionaries to test their new congregants see 
Karen Vallgårda, Imperial Childhoods and the Christian Mission: Education and Emotions in 
South India and Denmark (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 41—2; Susan Neylan, The 
Heavens are Changing: Nineteenth-century Protestant Missions and Tsimshian Christianity 
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), 112—18; Tara Alberts, Conflicts and 
Conversion: Catholicism in Southeast Asia, 1500—1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 7—12; Jean Brierly and Thomas Spear, “Mutesa, The Missionaries, and Christian 
Conversion in Buganda,” International Journal of African Studies 21:4 (1988), 601—18. 
421 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G3/A5/6/1/1954. 
165 
 
government force, but it also emphasized that missionaries were still needed in the colony. They 
could deliver protection that the government could not, despite its military strength. Only the 
evangelists had the personal connections and spiritual strength to withstand the bestial onslaught 
of the forest fighters. Brave missionaries, living with their Christian brethren despite the fact that 
they have no possessions and only the charity of British Anglicans to offer succor drew parallels 
to an older generation of missionaries who suffered and died for Christ. It seemed at the time that 
the pressure of Mau Mau might produce a few diamonds for the CMS.  
 Stories such as Muhoro’s also allowed the CMS to combine their two priorities—
protection of African Christians and aid the state in its efforts in new ways. If Mau Mau forced 
men and women into taking satanic oaths, only the CMS could create a cleansing ceremony that 
would rid the Kikuyu individual of his internal disease. By late November 1952 the CMS had 
done just that with the creation of a ceremony that would allow an individual to return to the 
church and proper Kikuyu society. Wisely Leonard Beecher turned to an African padre, Obadiah 
Kariuki, to help craft this ceremony.422 Much like later state run efforts, confession was a key 
component of cleansing and reentry into the church involved multiple steps of confession. First 
one had to confess to the padre and to a council of church elders selected by the padre. When this 
body was convinced of true atonement, the penitent then had to confess before the church at a 
regular worship service. Beecher and Kariuki their own oath to counteract those taken in service 
Mau Mau. It stated:  
I Confess to God Almighty, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, that I have sinned 
through my own fault in having taken a heathen oath which I most earnestly believe to be 
contrary to God’s most holy law; I truly repent, and pray God to have mercy upon me, to 
cleanse and purify me though the blood of Christ my Saviour who died on the Cross that 
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I might cease from sinning, and I pray that, in the power of god, the Holy Spirit, I may be 
enabled to live faithfully in accordance with God’s will and commandments.423 
If, after all of these conditions are met, the congregation believed the former Mau Mau adherent 
to be truly repentant he or she would be allowed to resume membership, although they would be 
barred from communion for a time. 424 
 Eventually these types of cleansing ceremonies would be used for re-entry into society, 
not just the Christian fold. Although based on Christian ideas of cleansing, this oath focused 
more heavily on loyalty to the government and Crown:  
I SWEAR THAT:- 
a. If I _________ have ever taken this secret oath known as Mau Mau oath, let this 
Githathi kill me. 
b. If I have even been present at a Mau Mau ceremony or if I have ever forced, 
persuaded or induced anybody to take the oath, let this Gitathi kill me. 
c. If I have ever known any of the Mau Mau secrets which I never revealed to the 
Government, or if I have ever withheld from the Government any information 
concerning Mau Mau, let this Githathi kill me. 
d. If in future I take the Mau Mau oath voluntarily or if I fail to report immediately I am 
forced to take it or if I consent to its administration to anybody or if I induce, 
persuade force anybody to take it, let this Githathi kill me.  
e. If in future I fail to supply to the Government any information known to me now, or 
which I will know if future, regarding already committed, intended, planned and 
future atrocities or if I fail to give Government any information whatsoever 
concerning Mau Mau movements, let this Githathi kill me.  
f. If I made to vomit this oath, let this Githathi kill me. 
g. And finally, I swear that I am and will always be a faithful and loyal subject of Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth and her Government.”  
 
Signature or Thumb-print425 
No doubt the CMS would have preferred a more specifically religiously oath of denunciation, but 
they still had plenty of opportunities to make their mark in knitting Kikuyu society back together.  
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 For missionaries the first step in reconstituting Kenyan social order was re-entry into the 
church; the second step was regaining control over the independent schools that had flourished 
for the past two decades. The government closed thirty four independent schools in Kikuyu 
areas, which left more than seven thousand students with few options. They could flee to the 
forest, which many did, or attempt to enroll in a mission-led school, which few did. As a further 
deterrent, the government also seized the school buildings and surrounding property, all of which 
had been built with funds raised by the communities themselves.426 The CMS hoped for a return 
to full classes, and they were excited about the opportunity to prove themselves. Unfortunately 
they still needed to grapple with the reality that the schools were “hopelessly understaffed.”427 
Despite these problems, the CMS entered into 1953 confident that they could secure their future 
in the colony via education and cleansing ceremonies.  
 In the face of such positivity, the CMS faced two major problems—the dawning 
realization that government actions frequently descended to the level of brutal retaliation and 
localized violence was also on the rise. The first police action post Operation Jock Scott was a 
“mixture of tragedy and farce.” Police opened fire on an unarmed crowd of two thousand Kikuyu 
gathered in the Thika marketplace to listen to a young man prophesying an end to the war. Police 
attempted to arrest him, the crowd grew restless and the commander ordered his men to open 
fire. Sixteen people were killed and another seventeen were wounded.428 Other police actions 
fared better; they frequently moved on the basis of little intelligence and their tactics generally 
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aroused bitterness in the local population but did little to stem the tide of fighting.429 The CMS 
acknowledged these problems as early as November 1952, but it would take them years to sort 
out how to respond. However, the organization knew it needed to place a high priority on the 
protection of African Christians. One missionary discussed the treatment of a local deacon when 
he omitted the honorific bwana when handing over his kipande.430 He was careful to emphasize 
the danger presented by Mau Mau or as he called them “roaming bands of male youth,” but he 
also stressed the importance of trying to contain police violence when directed at good 
Christians.431 Back in London, Max Warren also lamented the official tendency to see Mau Mau 
as a local problem, not one connected to larger strands of African nationalism.432 
While Warren was correct in linking Mau Mau to the nationalist storm then brewing 
across the continent, independence in Kenya played out in a very specific and violent context.  In 
the aftermath of school closures and with bitterness running high due to police actions, Mau Mau 
attacked a Church of Scotland service in the village of Nyeri on Christmas Eve 1952. Although 
rebel leadership called off the attack at the last minute, one group still attacked and killed eleven 
loyalists.433 This attack put African Christians into a panic, and helped lend credence to those 
who who pushed for an understanding of Mau Mau based less on broader nationalist trends in 
Africa and more on the supposed occult foundations of the movement. As Canon Bewes argued,  
I think that it is a spiritual movement land therefore of the devil, and I think it is the 
devil’s way of getting in on particular people with their particular characteristics at a 
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particular time (as in Hitler’s Germany for example) and because of that it is anti-
Christian and the people who suffer most are the keen Christians.434 
It was important for missionaries to accentuate the strength and suffering of African Christians, 
but it would be difficult for them to understand the root causes of Mau Mau. Indeed, they would 
waver between satanic and real world explanations throughout the conflict. In turn, this 
confusions hampered their ability to respond to the violence perpetrated by both the state and 
Mau Mau fighters. Although they struggled mightily to craft an effective response, the lack of 
ideological clarity and resources meant that the CMS would always be playing a dangerous game 
of catch up in Kenya. Their ability to maintain a legitimate presence would be sorely tested in the 
years to come.  
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Colonial and Religious Transitions 
 As the war against Mau Mau carried over into the new year, Governor Baring reassured 
those in Kenya and the United Kingdom that the conflict would be short-lived.435 Unfortunately 
this proved not to be the case as the events of 1953 so amply evidenced. Combatants and 
adherents on every side dug in, with missionaries while desperately to appeal to white settlers, 
Mau Mau fighters, African Christians, and the government. The year would prove to be a 
watershed one for the CMS as they faced for the first time widespread police and military 
brutality. As the internal debate raged about the proper response to the violence, the CMS also 
grappled with the possibility of increased funding from the state for rehabilitation and education 
efforts. However, they worried that by speaking out against the government, those funds might 
be withdrawn. In the end CMS leaders decided, with one or two key exceptions, to keep quiet 
regarding official abuses in hopes of better protecting African Christians and maintaining their 
funding from the government. They did not become puppets of the government, as scholars such 
as Caroline Elkins have suggested, and their responses were always predicated on previous 
experiences with government officials.436 The future of Anglican missionaries in the colony were 
perched precariously on the foundation of government support; therefore they would always try 
to ameliorate the worst of the abuses privately, while trying to keep the government happy.  
 CMS leaders in London may have had a pragmatic outlook, but that perspective did not 
always trickle down through the ranks as smoothly as they would have hoped. Indeed their 
primary opponent in the early days of Mau Mau was a retired missionary, Walter Carey. Self-
described as “racehorse rather than a carthorse,” Carey was the fiery Bishop of Bloemfontein in 
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South Africa before retiring to Kenya at the onset of Mau Mau.437 He had written several articles 
for the Evening Standard and even published a short book entitled Crisis in Kenya: Christian 
Common Sense on Mau Mau and the Colour Bar.438 His very public opinions frustrated CMS 
officials in Salisbury Square. Soon after the initial flurry of publications, Warren wrote to Carey 
and promised him that the CMS was working hard to collect all the pertinent details, but they 
were “distressed” at the tone of his letters to the press.439 While Warren’s letter to Carey was 
conciliatory, he was much more direct in a letter to another CMS official. Warren argued that if 
Carey could not be silenced, it needed to be made clear to the public and the government that he 
spoke for no one but himself. Warren’s anger was palpable at the misconception that Carey was  
Splash-headed in The Evening Standard as “The Bishop on the spot”, the implication to 
everybody being that he is the bishop of the diocese speaking with authority for the 
Church in East Africa. It really is quite damnable! He is also advertised as a missionary. 
The fact that he is an old man and retired and is speaking for nobody but himself is 
cleverly obscured.440 
The CMS wanted to contain the Mau Mau situation, and they felt that Carey’s words would only 
stoke the flames of violence. Indeed, the CMS’ depth of concern was so deep they released a 
press statement one day later, calling Carey’s article “contentious and ill-balanced.”441 This show 
of force was not only an effort to keep a retired firebrand in line; it was meant to highlight to the 
British public and the state that the CMS was not a loose cannon. As stories of abuses continued 
to mount, they hoped to maintain that status quo to the best of its ability.  
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 The first opportunity to walk this perilous line between cooperation and contention came 
with the journey of Canon Bewes to Kenya in late January. Violence in the colony was on an 
uptick, and on January 24th another white settler family, the Rucks, were brutally murdered in 
their homes. The press attention was intense and the violence of the killings meant that white 
settler fears were at a fever pitch. Indeed, pictures of six year old Michael Ruck, killed in his bed 
by former servants, raised such an outrage that over a thousand white settlers marched on 
Nairobi the very next day to call for protection and justice for their besieged community.442 Into 
this powder keg Canon Bewes made his first trip to the colony since his return to London in 
1949. Bewes had been a career missionary, working in Kenya for two decades and he retained 
multiple correspondences with various missionaries and African Christians working on the 
ground. Even before he landed, Bewes was worried about the future of the mission, particularly 
as he looked at the situation in other places where nationalists charged missionaries with 
implementing western imperialism by another, more religious name.443  
 Essentially the CMS had sent Bewes on a fact finding mission. He was to meet with 
Africans on the ground as well as Governor Baring and report his findings back to the Home 
Office. General Secretary Max Warren wrote to Baring before the visit, assuring the Governor 
that Bewes’ only purpose was “to bring to the Kikuyu Christians the assurance of the continued 
remembrance of the members of the Society during these very difficult days.”444 Despite Bewes 
guarantees, the personal correspondence between Warren and Bewes made it clear that his job 
was to document abuses, but he also had a secondary purpose, namely to ensure that William 
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Carey remained silent after the repeated warnings from Warren. Bewes would be unsuccessful at 
this task, and his visit ultimately created more problems than solutions for the CMS. 
 Before Bewes left for Nairobi, Warren laid out his tasks in a letter, stressing the need to 
follow the proper chain of communication regarding military and police abuses. First any 
information which may have been “political dynamite,” it would first go to Governor Baring and 
then Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Lyettelton before ever becoming public.445 
Warren believed that Bewes “may very well have some really important things to say about the 
need for the Government to make definite gestures with regard to some of the African 
grievances,” but documentation of abuses would be necessary, as would discernment about the 
bigger picture in Kenya.446 As Warren stated,  
Revolting as it is to think of this kind of brutality occurring at all a distinction must be 
made between the brutal action of individuals and a brutal policy either encouraged or 
connived at. In any Police Force there will be brutal individuals and brutal things will be 
done, but that is not a condemnation of the authities (sic) unless the authorities have been 
informed and have failed to take action.447 
Thus even when abuses occurred, the CMS wanted to ensure that the government was given 
every opportunity to respond, before any public action would be taken. This allowed the CMS to 
maintain its position as helpmeet to the Government while still allowing them to claim they were 
protecting Africans in their care. The only avenue through which public outcry was possible was 
through a lengthy series of steps:   
The Governor must be both convinced and given the opportunity to issue instructions. If 
his instructions are not obeyed then the next step would be to report to him this 
disobedience. It will only be after the complete failure to get effective action taken that 
there will be any question of raising things in this country, though I am of the opinion 
that when you get back and have an opportunity of seeing the Archbishop that you would 
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be well advised to open the matter up with him so that he may have been informed in 
case action has to be taken at a later stage.448 
In order to for each of these steps to be followed properly, weeks, if not months, would pass 
between the first documented abuse and a public response by the CMS. It is important to note 
that any notion of “raising things,” would be done in the United Kingdom, not in Kenya. Warren 
worried that the position of missionaries in Kenya would be harmed if public campaign 
originated in situ. This would be a common theme among missionary writings during the early 
days of Mau Mau.  
 Missionaries had multiple obligations in Kenya; they felt that they had to propitiate the 
government, but they also need to mollify their congregants. Bewes trip was an attempt to 
accomplish both tasks, but he had an uphill battle. One missionary wrote from Fort Hall that, 
“religious instruction classes have generally lapsed; many churches no longer have any service at 
all; and the bottom has fallen out of church finances.”449 Like many missionaries, the author of 
the letter, Neville Langford-Smith believed that despite these setbacks, 
we look on this scene of trouble and sorrow, with the glory shining through, to gain 
renewed hope and confidence in the loving purpose of God. The time has come that 
judgment must begin at the house of God. We know that judgment lies over the world, 
not only Kenya; and to the people of God belongs the responsibility and the glory of 
proclaiming the way of salvation and life in Christ alone. And only through a church 
judged and purified will this be done.450 
If Mau Mau was God’s judgement on Kenya, Langford-Smith welcomed it as a tribulation worth 
suffering for such a worthy cause. It would separate the true believer from the false convert and 
allow for growth in faith. Unfortunately at this point it seemed that few true believers were left 
for Langford-Smith to shepherd! Bewes’ job was to forestall this mass exodus and prove to 
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Africans that not only could Christianity protect them, just as it had during the Great War, the 
CMS was the best vehicle through which to obtain this security.  
 When Bewes arrived in Kenya his first job was to reassure those Africans who were still 
loyal to the Church. After landing, Bewes quickly went to the local radio station to present a 
broadcast message written by the Archbishop of Canterbury, which reminded them that 
Christians in Britain had not forgotten them, nor had the leader of the Anglican Church. 
From England there goes out a constant volume of prayer to Almighty God that you may 
be upheld in all perils; kept true to the Christian faith in all temptations, and that you may 
find God’s peace even in the middle of your suffering. May He lead you and your whole 
Kikuyu people, and all the citizens of Kenya back into the ways of quietness and peace, 
and we pray that with the return of mutual trust and confidence all may go forward 
together for the good of the Country and of all races within it.451 
The speech called for a restoration of peace so that real change could be effected in the colony. 
Bewes highlighted the upcoming work of a Royal Commission concerning the “land question,” 
and reminded his listeners that only with peace would progress come.452 But the Archbishop was 
careful to highlight the primacy of the Christian faith in the midst of the trials and tribulations of 
Mau Mau. State violence was deemphasized in favor of quotes that praise for those who 
remained true to the faith:  
[t]errible tribulations have fallen upon you; many of you have had to suffer grievously, 
and some have died as faithful witnesses to the Christian duty of upholding law and 
order, and rejecting the ways of violent men. The Church in Kenya has been tested in the 
fire of affliction; and indeed some have been found faithless; but in every affliction the 
disciples of Christ shine out with the light of His strength and truth, and he has been 
found among you, a true Saviour (sic) indeed. God be praised for your steadfast faith and 
courage.453 
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 In this speech both Bewes and the Archbishop attempted to stand firm on middle ground. They 
acknowledged that Africans had legitimate grievances, but no mention was made of possible 
abuses, and the call to peace was reiterated.  
Publicly Bewes remained neutral, but privately he became increasingly concerned about 
the actions of the state. Soon after his radio address, Bewes met with Governor Baring to discuss 
the situation on the ground.454 After the meeting ended, Bewes took the additional step of 
sending Baring a letter, laying out in explicit detail he described multiple types of abuse, 
beatings on the head and genitals, castration seemed to be the tip of the iceberg. Bewes 
confronted Baring with these stories, and claimed, “this information was given to me from such 
widely separated sources that I am sure it was at least based upon fact.”455  
Soon after this meeting, Baring received a troubling report about a mission teacher, Elijah 
Njeru, who was beaten to death by police forces. Two officers, Reuben and Keates, suspected 
Njeru of having Mau Mau sympathies and during the course of the interrogation Njeru expired. 
RA Wilkinson was the local magistrate in charge of the subsequent investigation, and his 
conclusion was that although excessive force killed the captive, an old tuberculosis infection 
rendered the victim much more susceptible to the blows. His conclusion was that while the 
police may have been at fault, Njeru’s health was equally to blame.456 Bewes received notice of 
the death from the local missionary, Neville Langford-Smith. While reassuring Langford-Smith 
of Baring’s desire to see that kind of behavior stamped out, Bewes admitted that despite Baring’s 
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new corrective to the police, it may not be obeyed throughout the colony. Bewes also promised 
to bring the issue to the Kenyan public’s attention in his press conference which was to be held 
the next day, but admitted that he did not “want to raise the issue in England at present.”457 
 Despite Bewe’s desire to keep police issues in Kenya and not publicize the troubles in the 
United Kingdom, it became increasingly difficult to do so as the scope of abuses and violence 
widened in the colony. Three days after Langford-Smith’s letter, CMS Information Officer, BD 
Nicholls crafted a memo for the Home Office entitled “Kenya ‘Atrocities.’” Nicholls enclosed a 
copy of a letter from a local missionary in Kenya, Jean Drinkwater, which again highlighted the 
recent human rights abuses, particularly in Embu. In addition to the shocking tales of police 
cruelty, Nicholls worried, “how long will it be before missionaries include such accounts as this 
in their duplicated circular letters to their friends? Or send such letters as this to their 
relations?”458 Indeed, as Information Officer, Nicholls’ anxiety centered primarily on the idea 
that, “[t]ime is short. It cannot be very long before the truth—or worse—a garbled version of the 
truth—gets out. Then will come a day of reckoning if C.M.S. appears to have “suppressed” such 
information.”459 The fallout from a public outcry about a hypothetical missionary cover-up might 
have sunk the organization entirely. Therefore the Home Office needed to craft a scheme through 
which they could reveal enough information to satisfy their African and British audiences that 
they were working hard to stamp out abuses, while not becoming overly critical of the 
government’s program.  
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 It was in the midst of this heated swirl of events that Bewes returned to London and gave 
a press conference on February 9th, 1953. He established his bona fides via his twenty year career 
in the colony and his close friendships with many Kikuyu men and women. The tone of his 
speech was measured and moderate; he described the grievances of those on land reserves, but to 
soften the blow he also ascribed a measure of blame to the continuance of occult behaviors in 
Kikuyu society.  
We were, however, aware that witchcraft had not died out, and there was an undercurrent 
of real grievances. It we were aware of a streak of savagery and cruelty we were 
conscious of its presence also in all of us. (Perhaps more refined in Europe after centuries 
of Christian civilization, but none the less dangerous and able to defeat us, if we get away 
from Christ.)460 
Bewes wanted to inform the British public, and perhaps even alarm them, but he also wanted to 
push them towards specific ends. Namely, he hoped to induce the public to provide financial 
assistance and prayer to the CMS and the persecuted Christians suffering under the double 
punishment of Mau Mau and the state. Bewes praised the “strong and courageous” spirit of 
African Christians, but compared it to first century Christianity: it was the responsibility of those 
living with a twentieth century faith to aid their brothers and sisters in Christ.461  
 This press conference served a dual purpose. It informed and exhorted British Christians 
to support the CMS, but it also functioned as a public notice to the government that the CMS 
would not keep silent forever. Bewes public denunciation of state actions was relatively mild 
compared with what was to come from MPs and human rights organizations, but it was an 
important moment for the CMS. This was their first official open critique of government policy 
since W.E. Owen and the Archbishop of Canterbury’s press tour regarding gold mining in 
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Kavirondo. Their most recent attempt had been a dismal failure, and thus it was more important 
than ever to not only assess critically government actions, but to do so in a way that maintained 
their privileged position in the colony. In essence, the CMS wanted to ensure they would not be 
charged with “suppression” of the truth, but they did not want to launch a full-scale offensive in 
the manner of William Carey. Therefore, Bewes carefully selected certain aspects of colonial 
rule to appraise; Home Guard action and collective punishment. He claimed that many Africans 
were “bitter and puzzled” by collective punishment, and it only engendered bitterness among 
locals.462 In regards to the Home Guard, Bewes argued that while the government might prefer 
members of the militia to loyal Christian subjects, they were sadly mistaken. Loyalist Christians 
wanted to join the group, but “some resistance groups are brutal in their methods, and this has 
caused Christians to shy off joining the Home Guard.”463 If the government cleaned up these 
problems, African Christians would provide an important force to counteract the violence and 
witchcraft of Mau Mau. With this press conference Bewes brilliantly managed a host of complex 
and contradictory priorities. He highlighted the importance of Christianity as a force for good, 
and thus the need for missionary groups such as the CMS and he prodded the government in 
regards to certain policies but in such a way as to sidestep many of the most controversial and 
heated aspects of police action. 
 Scholars see the press conference as an important moment in terms of public outcry 
against British policies, however they frequently miss the multiple layers of meaning presented 
by the CMS in presenting this particular speech at this particular point in time. For many 
historians, Bewes is important by virtue of being first. Both Fabian Klose and David Anderson 
                                                           
462 Ibid.  
463 Ibid.  
180 
 
argue that Bewes was successful in forcing Baring to publicly pursue the Njeru murder, and 
opened the veritable floodgates of public knowledge concerning the abuses in Kenya.464 Caroline 
Elkins sees the press conference as damning of both government and missionary actions. Bewes 
wanted to keep things quiet, as evidenced by several earlier statements, but government inaction 
pushed him into the spotlight.465 Bewes public critique provides her with ammunition to decry 
later missionary efforts, especially the Archbishop of Mombasa, which focused almost entirely 
on private communications with officials.466  Others argue contra-Elkins that full scale 
condemnation is incorrect. Rather we must understand Bewes’ actions within the larger scheme 
of missionary philosophies and realities. As William Sachs contends, the CMS worked hard to 
create “indigenous ecclesiastical” churches, but their understanding of order, even in the face of 
colonial violence made that difficult. Indeed CMS actions in the midst of Mau Mau were located 
within difficult realities regarding church state relations, but they also emerged during a period 
of importance transition within the Anglican Church as it moved towards becoming a true 
Anglican Communion.467 Each of these perspectives highlights a difference fact of the cause and 
effect of the press conference, but it is important to remember the delicate balance between 
missionaries in the field and those at home. Despite the expansion of the Church to a truly 
global, independent force, the experience of many Anglicans in the twentieth century was one of 
fear and contraction—within that paradigm government relationships became increasingly 
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important. It was no accident that the Anglican Communion came to fruition in the midst of the 
loss of the British Empire. The two are inextricably linked. The liberal British Empire could not 
exist without the presence of evangelistic and educational missionaries, and missionaries could 
not exist without the financial and administrative succor of the state.  
 In the aftermath of Bewes’ press conference, the Colonial Office went into damage 
control. Granville Roberts crystallized their fears:  
It is unnecessary for me to say how very damaging to the Government accusations in 
these terms are particularly in view of the fact that Bewes told Press he would not give 
many details but left to go ‘straight to the Archbishop with whom he would be 
completely frank.’ This implies that he could have told much [a] worse story if he 
cared.468 
Clearly Bewes press conference had jolted the Colonial Office into motion, as Baring quickly 
passed the “Governor’s Directive on Beating up,” which was meant to formalize his earlier 
assurances to Bewes that he doing his level best to stop atrocities.469 In the end, the CMS’ public 
actions had mixed results. The two police officers went on trial later in the year, but were only 
fined £150 and dismissed from the armed forces as part of their sentence for battery.470 Elkins 
argues that this light verdict caused Bewes to “reconsider the public nature of his reproach.”471 
Certainly by late 1953 and early 1954 the CMS strategy had retreated from press conferences to 
denounce government actions, but did the organization back off due to their lack of success in 
this one instance. That was certainly part of the reason, but the development of the CMS 
response was an ever evolving organism. One judicial case was not enough to create a sea 
change. There were multiple factors that led to their declining public presence in regards to 
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publicizing abuses, including their increasing work within the government’s plans of 
rehabilitation.  
 Certainly the CMS did not immediately retreat in the days and weeks after their moment 
in the limelight. One week after the press statement, Bewes wrote to William Carey, previously 
seen as an outspoken thorn in the side of the CMS, to ask for more details regarding the death. 
He urged Carey to get information to him, “no matter the cost,” because he believes the 
conference had a positive impact on the situation.472 Bewes wrote,  
Neville [Langford-Smith] has written stressing that the Governor’s injunction to the 
Police is already having effect, in that the D.C. is exercising stricter control. I want to 
make that point to those who should know at this end, and it will help our whole case 
very considerably.473 
Rather than being disheartened, Bewes believed that he had effected positive change for the 
colony. Importantly he had done so without angering the government, while also reassuring 
Anglican African congregants. He also took his talents to the radio. On February 25th, he gave a 
talk on BBC’s radio home service. This broadcast was meant to be a travelogue of sorts for his 
recent trip, but Bewes spent the majority of his time stressing the connections between African 
and British Christians. He implied that African believers were closer to Christians in the UK than 
to their fellow Kikuyu, and this is why Mau Mau fighters hated the faith. Bewes concluded his 
speech with a story about a Kikuyu Christian who told him, “‘Do you know we are now called 
European by our people?’ It is the Kikuyu equivalent of “Quisling.”474 Clearly the enmity 
between white settlers and most missionaries had not abated.  
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 The early months were a time of transition for the CMS, and not just in terms of their 
willingness to go public with stories of police atrocities. By January of 1953 it was clear that the 
Bishop of Mombasa, Reginald Crabbe was on the verge of retirement.475 His successor would be 
the most powerful Anglican in the colony, and it was important to find the right man, and find 
him quickly. This was a mutual feeling in both metropole and colony. As William Carey wrote 
concerning a recent meeting of the Standing Committee of the Synod of the Diocese of 
Mombasa, “[t]he disastrous consequences to the colony of the interregnum between Sir Philip 
Mitchell’s retirement and the arrival of Sir Evelyn Baring was pointed out, and the parallel 
strains in relation to Christian affairs was stressed.”476  
 As the CMS continued to work on maintaining their position in the colony and protecting 
Africans under their care, things were changing rapidly in the colony. In late January the war 
office appointed Major General W.R.N. “Looney” Hinde as the director of military operations.477 
Upon his arrival, Hinde toured the colony and created new policies which he believed could 
quickly and efficiently defeat Mau Mau forces without the need to call in special forces. The 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff disagreed and sent in army and air reinforcements.478 In the 
aftermath of these changes, it became clear that Mau Mau was now a war, no longer a series of 
skirmishes primarily between African groups. One unfortunate side effect of Hinde’s tour of the 
colony was his immediate sympathy for white settlers, particularly those who had served in 
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World War II as he had. These feelings were heightened when a fellow veteran, Anthony 
Gibson, was killed by Mau Mau only days before Bewes’ press conference.479  
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The Carrot and Stick—War Comes to Kenya 
 Two actions signaled the change in Kenya from small scale revolt to full scale war. The 
first was the arrival of Looney Hinde and the transition of responsibility for British 
counterinsurgency tactics to the British military. Previously military action had been under the 
purview of the police force, but their long history of brutality combined with Canon Bewes’ 
press conference convinced Lyttelton that the change was necessary.480 Unfortunately Hinde 
lived up to his namesake a little too well. He was outmatched in every respect for his post, but 
his worst deficiencies were in the social realm. Immediately upon his arrival Hinde cozied up to 
white settlers and was relieved of his duties after commenting at a party, “100,000 Kikuyu 
should be put to work in a vast swill-tub.”481 Hinde was quickly replaced with Lieutenant 
General Sir Bobbie Erskine, but the damage was done.482 Despite the military weaknesses of 
Mau Mau, the British would struggle for another year to contain and defeat the irregular forces 
and guerilla forces.  
 The second indication of war was the attack by Mau Mau forces on the village of Lari in 
March of 1953. The Lari Massacre created on the largest single incident death tolls of the war, 
and was an unsettling change of pattern from their usual guerilla tactics.483 In the middle of the 
night on March 26th, local Home Guards were called away for their posts to retrieve a dead body. 
While they were gone, Mau Mau forces attacked and burned the village, killing 120 men, 
women, and children. The same night they attacked a police station in the neighboring town of 
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Navisha and freed more than 150 prisoners and stealing necessary implements of war. Security 
forces and the Home Guard took their revenge, killing many suspected Mau Mau fighters and 
sympathizers. Those who were not killed were arrested, and the court ordered 71 of them to be 
hanged for their actions in Lari.484  
The CMS response to the Lari Massacre was muted to say the least; there were no letters 
put forth discussing the increase in violence or the long term implications of the village’s 
destruction. Instead the CMS doubled down on their attempts to understand the origins of the 
movement; it was their hope to classify Mau Mau in order to better serve the state in ridding 
Kenyan society of this scourge. There were two primary theories put forth by missionaries and 
CMS leaders—the first condemned Mau Mau as the work of outside communist forces while the 
second attributed the violence to the rapid change in lifestyle and culture among the Kikuyu 
people. Missionary Peter Bostock spent most of 1953 pushing for a communist interpretation of 
Mau Mau, and the Information Officer, B.D. Nicholls seemed sympathetic, but CMS leadership 
worried that these charges would backfire. Indeed, the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to Canon 
Bewes to instruct him to keep Bostock quiet. The Archbishop worried that Moscow wanted to 
intervene and by publicizing their preferred narrative Bostock had in fact become “Moscow’s no. 
1 agent.”485 While claiming such prominence for a local missionary in Kenya was a bit 
hyperbolic on the Archbishop’s part, it spoke to the sensitivity at every level of church leadership 
to ensure that no government feathers were unduly ruffled by loose talk in the colonies. Loose 
lips could still sink ships apparently.  
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In a 1953 article for International Affairs, Canon Bewes presented the second argument 
for Mau Mau origins. Additionally he integrated the local with the international by tying the 
colonial violence to the larger goals and purpose of the CMS throughout their mission fields.486 
He argued that while the advent of a British style modernity may have created Mau Mau, it was 
not enough to simply identify the problem. Only Christians, and specifically the CMS could 
rectify the issues besetting Kenya. Missionaries had long provided educational services and the 
“partnership of government and missions” had created “a close knit educational system for the 
whole country.”487 In order to defend the work done by missionaries, Bewes overstated the 
church’s importance and scale by a large margin. While it might seem strange to highlight the 
success of an educational framework that many argued pushed too hard too quickly and thus 
created the “pagan” backlash that was Mau Mau, Bewes claimed that missionaries were not to 
blame for their good work. Rather the true culprit, and thus the true problem in Kenya was that 
the church was too successful. 
and yet the Church herself was facing a problem of her own which was to prove perhaps 
the greatest of all. And this is the strange disease from which she was suffering. She had 
actually become too large, too successful, and too popular. In some parts it was the ‘done 
thing’ to go to Church. Progressive people liked to be thought Christians. When applying 
for a job, it was thought a ‘good thing’ to have a letter from a missionary. It was thought 
a ‘good thing’ to have a Christian name. To be a Christian was to be respectable. In other 
words, the way was open for a flood of nominal Christianity.488 
Thus the real evil Kenya was less about a murderous civil war, and more about the ways in 
Christianity had been abused by Kenyans.  
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 Bewes gloried in the remnant of what he termed the “Christian Resistance” in Kenya and 
the ways in which they embodied the true spirit of what it meant to find new life in Christ. Their 
numbers may have been small, down to 800 from 22,000 in Fort Hall alone, but their dedication 
was more important than size.489 By 1953 the missionary experience had come full circle from 
the struggles of 1916. The crucible of war initially pushed Africans to join the ranks of 
Christendom, but missionaries were never quite sure if those conversions were heartfelt. Only 
through struggle and persecution would true Christians preserve. As Bewes described it, 
“Perhaps this was the purge the Church had been needing.”490 For some missionaries Mau Mau 
could prove to be the test the Church needed in order to emerge from the ashes, stronger and 
more faithful than before.  
 Unfortunately for missionaries such as Bewes, they no longer had sole control of the 
narrative and theology of Anglican Christianity in the colony. While CMS leadership was still 
overwhelmingly white and male, by the 1950s Africans had greater access to media platforms 
and church pulpits.491 While Bewes crafted his article for International Affairs he received a 
letter from Obadiah Kariuki, a local Christian. Kariuki presented a very different picture of 
Kenyan society and the Church; he argued rather than British modernity, the true culprit was 
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British imperialism. He claimed that land hunger was a trigger but so too was the lack of respect 
Africans received in Kenya.  
There is another point: if a man has gone ahead in his education as far as Makerere or 
South Africa or England, when he comes back home again he finds a great difficulty in 
reconciling his new habits with his old ways, whether it is the question of wages or 
esteem or responsibility.492 
Kariuki contended that Kikuyu men handled the transition to modern life quite well, but the stark 
realities of life in a racially divided society drove them to violence. Kariuki did not stop there, 
however, he also laid blame at the feet of the Church by claiming,  
Then there’s another point: up till now the Church has not yet set a good example. You 
may remember there was an occasion years ago when some of the European churches 
used to spray Africans with disinfectant when they came into their church. Surely this 
was not in the spirit of Jesus? Darkness is cast out by light—darkness can never cast out 
another darkness.493 
Bewes’ response to this letter was not preserved, but it seems clear that Kariuki’s version of 
events did not sway those in the Home Office to change their tactics, as evidenced by their 
continued public support of the arguments Bewes presented in the International Affairs article.  
 Throughout the remainder of the year, the CMS focused less on changing their churches 
and more on pushing forward their dual schemes of celebrating the internal purge of the church 
while simultaneously convincing the government that Christian missionaries and teachers were 
needed to cleanse Kenyan society. In the midst of their attempts to achieve both of these goals, 
the CMS also continued to struggle with the best way to deal with the abuses perpetrated by the 
state. 1953 was not a year of decolonization for the CMS, it was another year of transition within 
the familiar framework of the British Empire.   
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Chapter 5: Who Will Save Your Soul?—Rehabilitation Efforts in the Pipeline    
“The problem for the British government, therefore, is to find a method by which these 
inexorable African forces can be reconciled with future British interests. How are we to 
bind these people to us in such a way that their moral and material sources of strength 
will continue to be ranged on the side of Great Britain?”494 
Introduction 
After the arrival of new military leader Bobbie Erskine to Kenya, the British military 
began winning the war on the ground against Mau Mau forces. But the British were not simply 
hoping to win tactically; they needed to win the war for the hearts and minds of the Kenyan 
people. CMS missionaries had few fighting skills, but they believed they were the only group in 
the colony who could aid the British in restoring British ideals and values into society that 
seemed, at least to them, to have slipped back into the dark days of paganism. When CMS 
missionary Peter Bostock raised the specter of communism, CMS leadership moved quickly to 
silence him because this explanation left less space for missionaries to maneuver in regards to 
their plans to prove their usefulness to the British colonial state.495 Although the last major Mau 
Mau general was not captured until the fall of 1956, military operations began winding down as 
early as 1954.496 It is during this phase of the war that missionaries remained optimistic about 
their future in Kenya. If 1953 was not a year of decolonization nor was 1954. The CMS firmly 
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believed that their future as a missionary society in the colony would eventually be secured, as 
would British imperial control. Anglican missionaries were incredibly late to the decolonization 
game, and did not realize that Kenya was on the verge of independence until the spring of 1955 
by which point they were almost too late.  
The CMS greeted war and the declaration of emergency by Governor Baring with a hope 
that it would fill their coffers and their pews, and that confidence remained intact despite the 
early losses in both church and school attendance. Both of these setbacks were easily explained 
away, as evidenced by Canon Bewes’ article in International Affairs, and there was still the 
likelihood of the state opening its pocketbook for rebuilding and rehabilitation schemes. The 
largest problem on the horizon for the CMS in late 1953 was not the prospect of Kenyan 
independence, loss of membership, or even the violence of an internecine civil war but rather the 
repeated perpetration of acts of brutality by police and military forces as they waged their 
campaigns against Mau Mau fighters. CMS leadership had little inkling that the British Empire 
was on its last legs, they assumed they could quickly refill the pews, and the state had created a 
militia to protect loyalists after the Declaration of Emergency.497 The only problem missionaries 
could never quite solve was how to respond to human rights abuses in colony. In early 1953 it 
looked as if they would take a strong stand when the public face of the CMS, Canon Bewes 
spoke out in a press conference about the situation in the colony. However at the press 
conference Bewes pulled his punches and focused only on the evils of collective punishment and 
Home Guard abuses. The CMS would not speak on the issue again publicly until 1955.  
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Their silence was due to a variety of factors, all of which will be explored in more depth 
throughout this chapter. CMS actions during the height of the Emergency bring to light the ways 
in which the idea of decolonization began to trickle down through the cogs of the imperial 
machine. Scholars have long understood that the British Empire was more than just a military or 
political force. Colonial subjects adapted, adopted, and modified the cultural, social, and 
religious precepts presented by the British throughout their empire.498 Our job now is to 
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understand how that process carried through into decolonization and how missionaries are key 
part of that process. British decolonization was not a speedy or clean process. It began in 1947 
with the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan and carried on throughout the 1960s. 
Some may argue that the Britain is still in the process of shedding its imperial power and 
mindset, as evidenced by the short lived Falklands War in the 1980s. Scholars continue to debate 
the hows and whys of how British leaders and colonial nationalists worked through the political 
and military processes to achieve independence. This chapter will focus on one small part of that 
by examining the transition of the CMS from an imperial organization into one that eventually 
transformed into the Anglican Church of Kenya. That path begun by missionary activity in 1916 
climaxed in 1955 with failure of the publication of the CMS pamphlet, Time for Action to 
produce new revenue or recruits for service in East Africa. In the fallout after its publication, 
Time for Action created a decisive split within the CMS and paved the way for decolonization to 
move forward, but in order to get there we must first examine the CMS’ initial participation in 
various rehabilitation programs for Mau Mau detainees.   
By the fall of 1953 the CMS realized that their best avenue forward was to focus on 
rehabilitation work in the detention camps. This work would allow them to theoretically protect 
their African converts while bringing more true believers into the fold. They hoped that it would 
also allow them to privately persuade the government that their current carrot and stick approach 
leaned far too heavily on the stick, and not enough on the carrot of Christian civilization.  Before 
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his dismissal Looney Hinde outlined the “carrot” approach which was modeled after similar 
successful counter-insurgency tactics in Malaya. It focused on promising a better standard of 
living for those Kikuyu who submitted to British authority. For Hinde, and most British 
intelligence and administration officers, the carrot needed the stick in order to function properly. 
In this case, the stick came in the form of police operations throughout the colony which focused 
on the maintenance law and order while Mau Mau operatives were “hunted and annihilated by 
the Army.” 499 Unfortunately under the Hinde the carrot received short shrift in favor of the 
application of brutal force. After Hinde’s dismissal and the arrival of General Erskine, the carrot 
received new attention and missionaries hoped to capitalize on Erskine’s moderate sensibilities.  
These new tactics coalesced primarily on one group of people: detainees who were held 
indefinitely in one of three camps throughout the colony. The government detained these men 
without benefit of a trial, and declared prisoners to be prisoners of war. Unfortunately the British 
classified them as such without actually declaring war on anyone, which was problematic to say 
the least.500 They contravened international law to keep these men, and later women in the name 
of public safety and rehabilitation. In the succeeding decades scholarly debates concerning the 
nature of the detention camp system in Kenya, known as the Pipeline, have been both heated and 
prolific. While all historians condemn the violence of the British state, their understandings of 
the nature and purpose of that brutality differ. For Caroline Elkins and David Anderson, the 
violence of camp life was akin to that of a Soviet gulag: the purpose of British aggressiveness 
was to maintain control and punish those who they saw as threats to “the life of the colony [and] 
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that of British civilization as well.”501 For Elkins particularly, the violence of repression 
practiced by the authorities in Kenya during the Emergency fit neatly into a vision of an 
authoritative and repressive empire.502 Kenya was not unusual in terms of brutality practiced but 
rather its uniqueness lies in its visibility and scope. Others such as Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon 
and Huw Bennett see this violence as reprehensible, but not as part of a larger condemnation of 
the imperial project. For Grob-Fitzgibbon atrocities were an unfortunate side effect of British 
determination to see through their ideas of liberal empire.503 Conversely Bennett downplays 
ideological concerns such as liberalism, in favor of highlighting the long standing British 
military tradition of responding with overwhelming force to crush rebellions quickly, even if that 
meant “bending” the law. Anything less was a sign of weakness.504 
Missionary planning and action provides scholars with important counterpoints and 
confirmations for scholars of Mau Mau, decolonization, and violence. Much like Bennett’s 
vision of a Britain terrified of appearing weak, or as Churchill would term it “scuttle,” 
missionaries scrambled to maintain an appearance of and connection to larger powerful forces in 
Kenya.505 This led them to condone, or at least not publicly denounce various activities that in 
normal circumstances they would find inexcusable. They did not want to appear to abandon, or 
scuttle, their responsibilities to the British Christians who financially supported them, or to loyal 
African Christians, but in order to do that they needed to placate their main fiscal backer, the 
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state. Their ensuing silence would be roundly condemned by many of those same Christians as 
well as successive generations of historians. What this dissertation seeks to accomplish is 
provide the larger context as to why CMS missionaries wanted to work in camps that were later 
compared to gulags. Why did they remain silent after Bewes’ initial press conference? Were 
missionaries supporters of the ideals of an oppressive, brutal colonial power? Yes, but they were 
also true believers in the civilizing mission of empire. Scholars have examined the ways in which 
these opposing ideals clashed during the Emergency in Kenya, but that is not enough. By 
analyzing these issues in a missional context we can better see how difficult the tangled web of 
the British Empire was picked apart during decolonization.  
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The Early Days of Rehabilitation 
The first thread we need to unravel is that of detention camps. As evidenced in the 
discussion above, debate concerning the use and abuse of these camps has been hotly contested 
by scholars, but missionaries only appear on the edges of the debate. Only John Stuart delves 
with any depth into missionary actions in Kenya as they relate to camps, but he focuses primarily 
the initial optimism of CMS officials who hoped to provide support to detention camps. But he 
shies away from delving into the darker side of camp life in favor of examining the short lived 
inter-denominational work that accompanied many rehabilitation efforts.506 Elkins condemns 
them for their silence, but for most missionaries were an irrelevant side show.507 The scholarly 
desire to shunt aside missionary involvement in camp programs can be partially attributed to the 
attitude exhibited by colonial officials. While they were certainly willing to use missionary 
‘expertise’ in providing the civilizing mission experience to Africans, officials shied away from 
sharing long term goals and plans for the empire. This is equally true for decolonization as 
authorities used missionary labor in camps and to provide positive press for rehabilitation 
schemes, but never discussed plans for independence. This stance provides an important 
counterpoint to the view that the end of Britain’s empire was less about chaos and nationalism 
and more concerned with “managed decline” and an understanding of pragmatic realities.508 If 
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the British truly planned a managed decline why did they not also push for the same type of 
staged withdrawal for those groups who made liberal empire possible?  
The first missionary to take up the mantle of rehabilitation work was Howard Church, a 
priest at St. Marks Church in Nairobi.509 In September of 1953 he preached his last sermon and 
took up work as a Rehabilitation Officer for the British government at the Athi River Camp. 
Church gathered around him a staff of Kikuyu instructors, including David Waruhiu, son of the 
assassinated chief Waruhiu. Church and his Kikuyu assistants wanted to “rehabilitate Mau Mau 
detainees and return them cleansed and made new,” but in order to accomplish this task he felt 
that labor was necessary.510 As Church stated:  
When we first arrived we found the detainees, bearded and sullen, doing practically 
nothing and spending all day doing it. Their food was good, convicts performed the 
menial tasks and the Camp was nicknamed ‘Queen’s Lodge.’ Many of the men had taken 
an oath not to work. To idle indefinitely has a diasterous (sic) effect on men’s minds and 
bodies and breeds an antisocial attitude. Left thus they would never change and would be 
a drain on public funds for an indefinite period. So our first objective was to get them to 
work.511 
The idea that labor makes the man was certainly not a new one for colonial authorities or 
missionaries—many scholars that the expansion of the British Empire in Africa was predicated 
on the ever increasing labor needs of the colonial state. Missionaries also saw labor as important 
stepping stone in the creation of good Christians. The natural laziness of Africans must be 
stamped out to produce a modern Christian man.512 Thus, Howard Church tapped into a long line 
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of colonial and missional attitudes regarding Africans in their ‘natural state’ when he argued for 
the saving grace of labor. And CMS leadership was certainly happy to have a missionary work in 
such an important position within the rehabilitation program.  
However there will still problems for the CMS to overcome, not only in terms of their 
continuing financial difficulties, but also the presence of a new group in Kenya, Moral 
Rearmament. Not only was Church’s main assistant, David Waruhiu, a member, so too was the 
camp commandant, Colonel Alan Knight.513 The main goal of MRA was to provide an anti-
communist force in the world, while also highlighting the four cornerstones of its rather porous 
theology: honesty, purity, unselfishness, and love.514 Despite these positive ideations, the Bishop 
of Mombasa, Leonard Beecher worried that the MRA would only rid Kenya of Mau Mau, not 
also bring that back into the Christian fold.515 Indeed, he claimed that the watered down version 
of Christianity presented by the MRA would only drive Africans away from both real faith and 
rehabilitation. Thus while it was important to move Howard Church into Athi River, the CMS 
needed to ensure that they maintained their strong links with the authorities outside of the 
detention camp programs. 
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These links were increasingly important as the rehabilitation program began to take shape 
under the leadership of Thomas Askwith, the commissioner of the Community Development 
Department. Askwith was a sporting legend in Britain, famous for his rowing prowess, but he 
was also a liberal minded colonial official, known for his progressive tendencies in regards to 
race relations.516 Askwith’s job was to create a workable model of rehabilitation in Kenya based 
on earlier tactics utilized by British defense forces in Malaya.517 As Howard Church entered into 
employment at Athi River, Askwith set to work recreating Malayan models in Kenya, focusing 
on cleansing detainees from their Mau Mau influence while also providing resettlement and 
reemployment schemes. Essentially while authorities tasked Erskine with bringing the stick 
down on Mau Mau guerilla forces, Askwith and Church provided the carrot. The ultimate result 
of these combined plans was the Pipeline, so termed by Askwith because it was meant to be a 
process through which both individually and communally the Kikuyu could find healing and 
purpose.518 Erskine and Askwith certainly believed in their programs and each man focused on 
creating programs of rural development and education, and they had the full support of the CMS, 
but there were always kinks in the system, namely while the leadership supported the carrot and 
stick approach, rank and file British soldiers, the white settler militia, and the Home Guard 
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frequently espoused rhetoric and actions that celebrated retribution and death, rather than 
rehabilitation and release.519 
CMS leadership was also caught between these two extremes. They wanted to reduce 
abuses, but they did not want to lose their entrenched positions within the rehabilitation and 
release section of the pipeline. While they did not fight in the forest, missionaries were on the 
front lines in detention camps and protected villages, beginning with Howard Church and ending 
with no less than the Bishop of Mombasa, Leonard Beecher. In the early days of camp life, CMS 
missionaries worried more about the influence of other European groups such as the MRA, but 
they realized rather quickly that their problems were larger than wishy-washy theology. Despite 
the optimism of rehabilitation, the stories and rumors of human rights abuses continued to swirl 
in both colony and metropole. In late October Canon Bewes met with Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to discuss the need for greater restraint of the part of the armed forces. 
He also wanted to highlight the need for increased missionary input in detention camp 
policies.520 It was a propitious time for the meeting, as it was the one year anniversary of the 
declaration of emergency by Baring, and thus the conflict received additional press coverage for 
the entire week, which Bewes hoped to use to his advantage.521 In a letter to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury he discussed his plans for the meeting and cited the article, “A Kenya Balance 
Sheet,” which he claims includes an Erskine quote which argued that Mau Mau could not be 
defeated purely by military force. Bewes wanted to use this article to push for greater 
responsibility for missionaries. He stated,  
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Here I would ask what steps are being taken by Government to consult Kikuyu Christian 
opinion and get alongside missionaries. We are not out to catch the Government out, but 
we want to help, even though we may have to maintain an independent line on many 
matters.522 
Bewes’ letter was an optimistic viewpoint to say the least; he wanted to push Lyttelton into an 
admission that Christianity was a necessary part of the rehabilitation process, but he was on 
shaky ground. In reality the article took a much softer stance, with no direct quotes from Erskine 
on the issue. The special correspondent stated,  
Whatever form the operations now take they must last for some time. The authorities 
realize that military operations alone can never end the Emergency. That can only come 
about when the bulk of the Kikuyu cooperate with the Security Forces and the Home 
Guard instead of with Mau Mau, as they still do in many places.523 
Indeed the article concludes with a call for stronger work by the “information services,” because, 
“a self-destructive mania seems to have taken the tribe in its grip; it is only up to a point that this 
can be dealt with by rational methods and its duration is incalculable.”524 Nowhere is Christianity 
specifically mentioned, but Bewes still wanted to push hard for the inclusion of the CMS within 
the “rational methods.” This will be a recurring problem for the Home Office, and one they never 
quite managed to solve. 
In their attempts to maintain their position as a necessary force for good in the colony, the 
CMS made deals with devilish forces. However, Bewes was not alone in his determination that 
the CMS must remain independent, or at least maintain the appearance of an autonomous 
organization. The day after Bewes wrote to the Archbishop concerning the upcoming agenda for 
his meeting with Lyttelton, he received a letter from B.D. Nicholls, the CMS Information 
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Officer. Nicholls wanted Bewes to “give a ‘cutting edge’ to [his] visit with Mr. Lyttelton by 
pressing him to do at least one thing publicly in the near future.”525 Not only should Lyttelton 
publicly assuage the public conscience concerning the abuses, Nicholls demanded that the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies should simultaneously reaffirm government support for the 
Church. Indeed the authorities should state that, “the Christian Churches and Missions have 
vigorously supported the Governor and Administration in its endeavours (sic) to effect an 
improvement.”526 
 Nicholls and Bewes prepared to go on the attack at this particular meeting. Nicholls 
wanted Lyttelton to: 
understand that through our endeavours (sic) to avoid undue embarrassment to the 
Kenya Government and colonial Office in their difficult task we have laid ourselves wide 
open to the criticism (which I know to be widespread) that we in particular, and the 
Christian Churches in general, have condoned all the jiffery pokery that has been going 
on. There comes a point at which our interests could be so prejudiced by this situation 
that we would have to speak up to defend the name of our Society and the Church at 
large. Such a defence, if we were forced to it, would involve our revealing a great deal 
that we know that would be unfortunate for the Government. It would not be unfair of us 
to ask and it would not be impossible for Mr. Lyttelton to make it clear that the strongest 
representations have been made by the Churches from time to time, and that whilst these 
may have been irksome at the time the Government has been glad to have this moral 
under-girding and has been sensitive to it.527 
Essentially the CMS threatened to blackmail the British government with a public shaming 
concerning the human rights abuses in Kenya if they did not accept some of the criticism 
currently being leveled at missionaries. Unfortunately Nicholls’ leverage proved less effective 
than he hoped for. There no letters discussing the fallout from that meeting, but it is clear from 
subsequent actions by both parties that the CMS emerged with little show from their private 
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show of force. Lyttelton’s next public address on the Kenyan situation came during a 
Parliamentary question on the 28th of October and despite his full speech and replies, no mention 
was made of the Church.528 While the government remained silent, the CMS’ response 
highlighted their lack of agency—none of the Nicholls’ threats ever panned out. There were no 
press conferences to “defend the name of our Society and the Church at large,” only a speech 
given by Bishop Beecher two weeks later in Nairobi. During his talk, Beecher spoke of the need 
for the church and state to continue to work together and the necessity of financial aid via 
charitable contributions for rehabilitation work, because success will come with a large price tag 
for both church and state.529 While Beecher’s philosophy on the nature of the church state 
relationship diverged from that of the Home Office in that he never called for a public 
denunciation of state abuses, it is clear that by the end of 1953 the CMS seemed to have two 
options: they could continue to support rehabilitation programs and hope to stem the tide of 
abuses from within the system or they could burn their bridges,  and call out the state’s treatment 
of detainees, but in turn they would lose their largest financial backer and access to detention 
camps and protected villages.530  
 The CMS continued to debate the issue until the end of the Emergency, and with only 
one major exception, they largely chose the path of most discretion. Access and optimism 
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remained their keywords—access to detainees and protected villages meant they could perform 
many of the same services they had in 1916, especially in regards to the protection of African 
Christians. And church leaders in Kenya persisted in their belief that they could more effectively 
change things for the better in the colony by remaining restrained in public forums. There was 
only one kink in this system, the presence of the Christian Council of Kenya. This 
interdenominational body pushed for a public statement concerning abuses, a move which 
angered the Anglican on the body, Bishop Beecher. He and the Church of Scotland 
representative butted heads throughout the Emergency, and frequently the work of the CCK all 
but shut down as the two men proved immovable and unbending in their stances. Steele 
demanded a full public reckoning for the authorities, and in December 1953 they published an 
open letter to discuss the issue. 
 The furor raised by the relatively mild open letter continued to haunt CMS officials into 
the early days of 1954. Beecher in his capacity as Bishop of Mombasa and member of the 
Christian Council of Kenya expressed his agitation publicly in a statement about the CCK’s open 
letter. Beecher reaffirmed his support for security forces, including the Home Guard. He 
concluded his statement by implicitly condemning public attention hitherto given to abuses.  
I should be clear that the Churches in Kenya have sought to secure that local problems 
are solved locally. We would dissociate ourselves from extravagant Press comment and 
from attempts to exploit the situation for political ends. These things were neither 
instigated by the churches in Kenya nor are they approved by them.531 
But it was clear, at least to CMS officials, that Beecher was not solely condemning the CCK; 
they were also under attack. Beecher argued vehemently that CMS missionaries on the ground 
could best provide succor and restraint in the colony. They were the local solutions, not the 
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Home Office. For Beecher those back in London were meant to provide recruits and funds, not 
criticism of colonial situations that they could not hope to understand.  
All of a sudden the very private workings of the CMS had become available for public 
scrutiny and consumption via these two statements. For an organization that prized discretion, 
these comments were frightening and confusing. They laid bare both internal and 
interdenominational conflicts that the CMS preferred to keep hidden. For the remainder of 1954, 
CMS officials debated, sometimes at great length and passion, how and what to reveal to the 
public concerning their activities in Kenya. Naturally many officials in London bristled at the 
notion that they should remain silent merely because Bishop Beecher demanded obedience. 
General Secretary Max Warren wrote to the East Africa Regional Secretary, Colonel Grimshaw 
demanding more updates on the situation on the ground and a brief on local public opinion. He 
groused that at the moment the only people, “in England who are not being kept properly 
informed are the missionary societies whose responsibility it is to give a Christian slant on 
things.”532 In another letter written to Willoughby Carey he argued that they only way they 
receive notice of local Christian opinion was through the press. The best Warren could tell “the 
position would appear to be very confused.”533 It was left to Information Officer BD Nicholls to 
play peacemaker. He wrote back home to soothe ruffled feathers in the aftermath of Beecher’s 
statement. His mediation boiled down to this:  
I do realise (sic) that the C.M.S. at home and specially the General Secretary are anxious 
that the Society should raise its voice against wickedness in high places and unlawful 
practices in the treatment of fellow human beings, but we also have a very definite and 
clear responsibility to the Government so long as the authorities give us access and a 
sympathetic hearing on all matters we bring to their notice.534 
                                                           
532 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G3/A5/7A/2. 
533 UBL CMSB/OMS/G3/A5/7A/2. 
534 UBL CMS/G3/A5/6/1/1954. 
207 
 
Nicholls’ attempt was ultimately a failure, as evidenced by subsequent correspondence between 
Nairobi and London. Pressure was too great on those in London to make a public statement, and 
those in Kenya felt that it was too dangerous to make any statement, other than one that 
supported government efforts. As Carey wrote to Warren:  
In view of this safe-guard [the press] the churches and Missionary Societies in Kenya 
must exercise the greatest care in not bringing unnecessary embarrassment to the 
Government, since in fact the British Press is well able to take care now of unlawful 
happenings by police or military. We must as far as it is right and possible (provided we 
do not omit our clear duty to make representations to Government about unlawful 
matters) keep in step with the Government. The people of Kenya will not be greatly 
helped by an open breach between the Churches and Missionary Societies and the 
Government during this time of emergency when the only independent observers in the 
Reserves are the Missionaries.535 
Beecher reiterated this sentiment in his description of a meeting he held with the Governor, 
during which he worked “in exercise of my own personal relationship with Government House, 
to endeavor to secure the redress, where redress was needed.”536 This meeting, despite its 
inherent dangers in terms of losing his privilege access, Beecher was ultimately successful. He 
created his own Rubicon moment, “Protest was needed. Protest was made. Protest has been 
heeded.”537 
The complexities of the relationships between church and state in both Kenya and the 
United Kingdom became increasingly fractured throughout the decade, and the fissures between 
missionaries in the field and those back in the Home Office exacerbated these tensions. Both 
sides used the plight of Africans, particularly African Christians, as fodder for their debate, but 
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this was really a power struggle and Africans remained pawns in the larger game. The links 
between Home Office and government on one hand, and CMS with colonial authorities on the 
other added an extra layer of complexity to proceedings. Both groups understood the importance 
of maintaining good rapport and support from the government, but for those in Kenya it was an 
imperative to their continued existence and work in the colony. The CMS could not see past this 
tangle to understand the larger picture, namely that the British Empire was in retreat. Conversely, 
the authorities, despite their avowed adherence to the ideals of liberal empire did little to help the 
CMS realize that the future was written on the wall. Thus the frustrating cycle of debate 
continued unabated. 
In late January Canon L. John Collins of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London launched another 
grenade into the fray with his Sunday sermon. Collins claimed that pushed for a sympathetic 
reading of the Mau Mau situation in favor of the Kikuyu.538 Beecher again displayed his 
displeasure, writing to Secretary Warren that,  
the dismay caused by irresponsible statements in word and in print from people, some of 
whom hold high posts in the Church’s life in England. I still believe that the Church is 
fashioning a way towards a successful plural society. But my task is made virtually 
impossible when chaps like Collins and Acland lump all the white settlers in one 
category, condemn the lot, and the Church with them.539 
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Beecher wanted the CMS to put a muzzle on those back in London raising a ruckus about abuses, 
and initially the Home Office placated these desires. Warren soothed Beecher’s anger by 
claiming that Collins has been silenced and that he recently read Elspeth Huxley’s biography of 
Lord Delamere.540 This work allowed him to better understand the settler’s mindset, with the 
implied correlation that he could better understand Beecher’s position as well. But Warren may 
have had ulterior motives in his placating missive. He concluded the letter by suggesting that 
Beecher needed a vacation, one that would allow him to see things “afresh from a remoter 
perspective, so that [he] can really get the feel of the things in this country and America. [He] is 
ever so close to things in Kenya and that isn’t altogether an asset.”541 Ultimately this call for a 
vacation went unheeded, and tensions continued unabated. Beecher’s appointment as Bishop of 
Mombasa was initially controversial, and it is clear that a residual uneasiness remained over a 
year into his appointment. His bombastic personality, coupled with lingering resentment over the 
Beecher Report for Education pushed Home Office officials to work around him. 
It was clear that the lines of communication were still open between home and colony, 
but the information transmitted was less than welcome. In many ways the church still operated 
with a nineteenth century mindset despite living in a twentieth century world. Thanks to 
improved communication tools whispers, or sermons, in Britain could reverberate in Kenya. 
Likewise, the freedom with which missionaries on the ground in the colonies was curtailed by 
the availability of communication tools. Despite the fact that most missional correspondence was 
still conducted via letters, the availability of carbon copy meant that the letter could be easily 
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passed throughout the office at a relatively rapid pace. In spite of these advances, CMS officials 
were never able to corral this technology and use it to their best advantage. It became a tool to 
sow dissent rather than one to streamline workloads and communication. These problems also 
transferred to their dealings with the authorities. They were never able to leverage quicker 
communication into a larger platform which would push the government to recognize their 
legitimacy as an organization that was still able to provide liberal empire. Thus, when CMS 
officials back in London threatened blackmail, the Colonial Office brushed them aside.  
Although colonial officials did not fear power of the CMS publicity machine, they did 
provide much needed financial assistance throughout the rehabilitation period. Through their 
special CMS Kikuyu Relief Fund, missionaries were able to raise and collect almost £150,000 
for their programs. For the first time since the Great Depression, CMS coffers were in the 
black.542 Some of this money was raised through special donations, but the majority of it came 
from the government. Church officials were cagey about where exactly this money originated, 
but it was made clear several months later in a letter passed on from W.H Carey. Property 
destruction was a hallmark of Mau Mau violence, and they burned down many schools as part of 
their campaign of violence. In villages with destroyed schools, the government forced the locals 
to pay an extra tax to fund their rebuilding. The tax was a punishment for allowing the schools to 
be burned in the first place. The CMS hoped that for inclusion into the rebuilding process. “We 
need to pray very much that reconstruction as it is now beginning many be founded upon the 
Rock which is Jesus Himself.”543  
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This sentiment was foremost in CMS’ minds as they continued to participate in the 
rehabilitation process. It seemed to offer all kinds of opportunities for sustainable growth and 
financial security, so long as ‘proper’ relations with the government could be maintained. For 
missionaries, rehabilitation was a pathway to relevance: simultaneously they could protect their 
own members, stock their coffers, and prove their usefulness to the state. But there were 
problems with CMS plans, namely the march towards independence in Kenya and their inability 
to provide effective pushback to the state. Missionaries did not plan for independence despite the 
writing on the wall. The empire was in a state of retreat, but missionaries refused to acknowledge 
that fact until it was almost too late. Independence presented a complex tangle of issues for many 
British led organizations throughout the empire, and the CMS was no exception.544 In addition to 
their lack of foresight, problems on the ground always hampered their ability carry out their 
optimistic plans of redemption and re-education. In early spring 1954 the Colonial Secretary 
announced that Kenya would have a new constitution one that provided for a multi-racial 
society.545 Two months later, security forces began clearing out the city of Nairobi, detaining and 
deporting 50,000 men from the city in a month long security action known as Operation Anvil. 
Officials devised the plan as a way to cut off supply chains and support for Mau Mau fighters in 
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the forests, while also ridding the city of potential troublemakers.546 For British officials Anvil 
was an unmitigated success, but for the CMS it was a disaster.  
In the aftermath of Operation Anvil, CMS missionaries scrambled to find and protect 
their own loyal followers, but they were largely unsuccessful. One missionary, George 
Grimshaw, wrote to Cecil Bewes describing the plight of his houseboy, Jidruf, a victim of the 
ruthless efficiency of the operation. Grimshaw went to Langata camp in an attempt to secure 
Jidruf’s release, but was turned away. He was able to bring Jidruf several supplies, including his 
Bible, but the two police officers who escorted Jidruf to the meeting stated that “They should all 
be shot and them we would have no more trouble.”547 Naturally Grimshaw’s distress only 
increased after hearing this kind of statement, and he redoubled his efforts to petition the 
Magistrate for Jidruf’s release but to no avail. Jidruf was held for several months before his 
eventual release. Grimshaw’s fury at the treatment of his employee, as well as the lack of respect 
given to a missionary practically leaps off the pages. 
Unless Sir Evelyn Baring, who presumably knows the public feeling at home, can do 
something to improve the situation, I think we will have to get questions asked at home 
as you suggest. My own feeling is that we wait far too long for the sake of relationships 
to be maintained and strengthen when in fact the conditions are such that no-one gains 
anything and the innocent man suffers.548 
Clearly Grimshaw doubts Beecher’s ability to influence Governor Baring and keep the security 
forces in check.549 He drove this point home in his concluding sentence,“[m]y own opinion is 
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that if officials out here knew that the Church was a body to be reckoned with and which did not 
waste time in getting justice done, they would respect it much more.”550  
 In an unusual divergence from normal practice, Jidruf himself wrote a letter to the CMS 
Home Office. The vast majority of African Christians had little to no contact with the Home 
Office in London. It was clear that Africans understood who the Archbishop of Canterbury was, 
and many held the office in great esteem. In the earlier days of empire, many African Christians 
turned to the Archbishop in hopes of securing protection and privileges from the state. But their 
ability to communicate directly with church leaders remained difficult due in part to language 
barriers. Jidruf’s letter to Canon Bewes required the work of an unnamed translator, and if 
Bewes responded no record of that response was kept. Jidruf’s epistle was written very much in 
the style of a testimony, which was not unusual for Kikuyu Christians at the time. He described 
his internment at camp and how his faith in Christ saved him from destruction at the hands of 
other detainees and the police: 
Now, about 600 people were [there] who had gone to the bad, and the Lord helped me so 
much to give them the Gospel, some of them said I should be thrown down the lavatory 
pit to me saying that Jesus is Lord. But He over [came the] war of words and physical 
persecution because May was a month of continual rain, and there was nothing to sleep 
on but mud. Another thing was that a letter came to call and, I went to the gate where 
there was an important European who asked me all about my affairs.  
He asked me how many times I had taken the oath, but because Jesus had saved me I told 
him I had never taken it—because of Jesus—so he told me to come into the prison, 
because if I had never [taken] the oath, nor had been killed by Mau Mau, my God could 
deliver me from prison. But Jesus did not leave me alone—He was there with me. Now 
my friend, the Gospel is Jesus, for only He could take me out of the camp. The time I was 
there was a long time—nearly 100 days. But I love Jesus very much for I learnt the 
witness of my Lord, that He would decline me from all my sins and my temptations.551 
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Jidruf’s testimony was exactly the type of fodder CMS missionaries needed to restore their faith 
in the idea that Mau Mau was a useful crucible, sent to test Kikuyu men and women on the 
authenticity of their conversion. But that would not be enough; the CMS needed more than 
testimony they still needed financial support and that could only come from the government. 
Additionally, despite Jidruf’s faithfulness, the inability of the CMS to free him from prison 
blunted the usefulness of his witness. Indeed, the only real boon of Jidruf’s release was the 
discharge of CMS’ responsibility to take up the matter with the Colonial Office.552 
 During the early years of the Emergency the CMS desperately wanted stories such as 
Jidruf’s to highlight the faithfulness of their converts, but by 1954 the situation on the ground 
was more complicated. CMS personnel now focused primarily on rehabilitation through the 
detention camp/protected village system and they had presented an image of a well-functioning, 
safe process. In May a group of church leaders including CMS missionary Peter Bostock visited 
Langata camp, the same one which held Jidruf, and Bostock affirmed that screening was,  
done most carefully, and that it is most unlikely that any people are classed as hard-core 
on false identification. We are satisfied that everything possible is being done to protect 
the detainees from brutal or rough handling either by the Mau Mau hard-core in the 
unscreened pens or by security personnel.553 
Bostock presented a picture of a camp with “adequate” living quarters and plenty of food, unlike 
Jidruf’s description of sleeping directly on the mud.554 But to contradict Bostock’s picture would 
mean jeopardizing their access to rehabilitation funds. This was made clear in a parliamentary 
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debate on July 22, 1954 when Colonial Secretary Lyttelton praised churches for their work in the 
colonies saying,  
Let me in passing pay tribute to the contribution the churches in Kenya have made in this 
work. They are co-operating wholeheartedly with the Government in the work of 
rehabilitation, and a working party under the chairmanship of Mr. Ohanga, the Minister 
for Community Development, is studying new schemes for combined action by the 
Government and the churches.555  
However these accolades came at a cost, namely the use of a CMS report to promise Parliament 
that conditions in the camp were quite good. Lyttelton quoted, 
The Government of Kenya have informed me of a report by the Church Missionary 
Society which might be worth quoting. as it comes from outside Government circles. The 
report says: On the whole, conditions in the camps are good. The food is adequate, and 
even in some cases liberal.556 
These quotes most likely came from Bostock’s letter back in May, and to turn back on those 
words in the aftermath of the debate would have seemed very dangerous for CMS leadership. 
They did not remain quiet out of a sense of collusion with the government, but they did hope to 
reform from within, rather than using public pressure to enforce change. This seemed to be a 
much safer, fiscally responsible solution for the CMS, even as late as 1954. 
 Five days later Oliver Lyttelton’s resignation seemed to throw a wrench into the 
proceedings. The Colonial Secretary needed to shore up his financial affairs before his final 
retirement, and working for the Establishment was not lucrative enough.557 Despite the surprising 
turn of events, the CMS soldiered on and remained hopeful about their future prospects in 
imperial Kenya. George Grimshaw, the same missionary who struggled so mightily to free Jidruf 
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from Langata wrote glowingly of the prospects for missionary work in villages. Grimshaw 
described the religious make up of these villages as largely pagan, with some who had been 
“nominal Christians,” and a few who had remained faithful. He believed that, 
I suspect that we will find more knees that have not bowed to Baal than we realise once a 
greater security is available. The newness of this opportunity may sweep some people off 
their feet. Be cautious [at] your end.558 
Grimshaw seemed incognizant of the fact that connecting security to conversion threatened to 
create many of the same problems that led to fears by missionaries that converts were not ‘truly’ 
believers in Christ. However, his letter again highlighted the connection that many missionaries 
felt between protection, safety, and Christianity. Belief in the Christian God was not merely a 
question of theology, it was tied to the ideas of modern life—hygiene, education, domestic life. 
Missionaries such as Grimshaw believed that in this moment, as Kikuyu society fractured 
beyond repair, true English Christianity could stake its claim in perpetuity. As he stated,  
Church, school, and welfare must come together in a new way to cope with this 
opportunity. I believe that the Church has an opportunity to reach pagans which it has not 
had for ages. Schools will be required for the 50% of the children who in the past just 
‘slipped’ school. Welfare will be needed for the families who in this new community life 
will not be able to go their own sweet way as in the past. With close neighbours domestic 
science and hygiene must be carried out or we will faced with slum conditions miles from 
any town.559 
In making this argument, Grimshaw ignored fifty years of Christian development in Kenya, as 
well as the numerous African led religious movements, but he was not alone in these sentiments. 
Canon Bewes expressed very similar ideas in writing to Lyttelton concerning his resignation, as 
did Peter Bostock in his early comments on the detention camp system.560  
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In order for this new beginning to be effective, churches needed money from the 
government. The CMS was not the only organization which benefitted from government 
assistance, indeed the MRA, CSM, and various other groups all worked to a certain extent with 
government funds. Monies had to be divvied up among the various groups, and that created 
friction, particularly with the Christian Council of Kenya. The CCK was a conglomeration of 
multiple churches, including the CMS and CSM. The de facto leader of the group was S.A. 
Morrison, a former CMS missionary in Egypt, who acted as the organization’s secretary.561 
Morrison and the CMS were in agreement that, “the Christian Church has a very important role 
to play in the process of rehabilitation,” but they had different visions of how exactly that needed 
to happen.562 Morrison argued that the government and the CCK should each provide forty 
percent of the funds for rehabilitation works, with the missionary societies financing the 
remaining twenty percent. Bewes however wanted the government to grant full financial backing 
to the missional societies in exchange for recruitment of personnel to work on rehabilitation 
schemes.563 Both of these options proved unfeasible in the long term for the CCK and the CMS. 
The government did eventually endow missions with money to work on their rehabilitation 
plans, but it was never enough money, nor were there ever enough recruits.564  
Despite these problems, the CMS remained optimistic throughout much of the reminder 
of 1954. While the CCK expressed some discomfort at the continued existence of abuses in 
detention camps and in protected villages, the CMS refused to do so. The two groups worked 
together for the release of Christians from Nairobi who had been swept up in Operation Anvil 
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and even tried to create special identity cards for those who professed faith in Christ so that they 
would be spared in future sweeps.565  These joint ventures did little to mask the internal strife in 
the CCK. Bishop Beecher, representing the CMS frequently butted heads with the CSM leader, 
David Steel.566 The two men did not agree on the proper methodology for airing their grievances 
with the state, nor did they particularly care for each other. In September the CCK published a 
mild statement on the situation in Kenya, gently condemning certain aspects of standard 
operating procedures in the camps. This statement focused heavily on the idea that things will 
keep getting better, so long as the government remains careful to uphold traditional British 
standards of justice.567 If the first half of the statement was Steel’s voice, the conclusion was all 
Bishop Beecher. It focused on all the ways in which churches could aid the government. The 
CCK promised that, “The Government has on several occasions openly avowed its desire to 
secure the full co-operation of the Christian bodies in Kenya in its policy of rehabilitation.”568 
Whether or not this was actually the case remains to be seen, but Beecher was a true believer in 
his cause.  
Beecher’s steadfastness seemed to imbue his fellow missionaries with a renewed sense of 
purpose. Earlier doubts were pushed aside in favor of full participation in the camp and village 
system. Peter Bostock wrote again about the process of village development in August, 
enthusiastically describing how important missionaries are to the process. 
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The work is handed over to the Missions for educational and spiritual purposes. Not only 
shall we be able to gather the people together for instruction, but if it is necessary to build 
a church or school, or an evangelist’s house, then there is labour available. If, as is quite 
often the case, the village is close to the school plot and it is not necessary to put up any 
more buildings, then we can use the labour for terracing our plot and putting it in general 
good shape.569 
Bostock glosses over the methods through which this free labor was obtained, nor did he spend 
much time discussing the demographic makeup of many of these villages. By 1955 there were 
over one million people scattered throughout the 854 protected villages built by the state.570 
Bostock saw these camps as opportunities to bring Africans into modern, domesticated life via 
Christian teachings concerning community living. By making such arguments Bostock clearly fit 
into long held patterns and philosophies held by the CMS concerning the need, not just for 
Christian theology, but the connection of that theology to a British lifestyle. Two months later he 
wrote a very similar letter concerning detention camps. In this missive, Bostock discussed the 
screening process, arguing that it was free of violence and that many detainees had begun to 
confess.571 In fact the only complaint the Venerable Archdeacon made was that food rations had 
been too high, leaving men too well fed and no work to occupy their time. Bostock’s visit was 
due to his membership in a newly formed Visiting Committee, and their only recommendation 
                                                           
569 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G3/A5/6/3, memo from Bostock, “Village Development in the Kikuyu 
Reserves,” 16 August 1954. 
570 David French, Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945—
1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 116—17. Living conditions and population 
numbers for these villages are hotly contested, just as they are for detention camps. For some, 
such as Caroline Elkins, protected villages were cesspools of violence, degradation, malnutrition, 
and death. For more see, Imperial Reckoning, 241—43. Others, such as French focus on the 
usefulness of resettlement as a way to protect families from insurgents while also cutting off 
supplies for guerilla fighters.   
571 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G3/A5/6/3, letter Bostock to Bewes, 21 October 1954. 
220 
 
after touring the camp was that food rations be lowered, “and the scales brought into line with 
those commonly practiced in the prisons in the country.”572  
 While Bostock praised government work, Beecher continued to work closely with the 
government. It was his influence that placed Bostock on the Visiting Committee for detention 
camps and he himself was on the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee formed by the authorities. 
This group first met in October 1954 and it seemed that, again missionaries were successful in 
their attempts to carve out a sustainable niche for themselves within colonial society. Beecher 
specifically asked for the right not only to cleanse those Kikuyu tainted by Mau Mau, but also to 
lead in the creation of “the whole policy of social rehabilitation for the country as a whole.”573 
Echoing Bostock’s earlier comments regarding the importance of work and domesticity, Beecher 
explicitly lays out the necessity for cleansing Kikuyu women because they, “provided the 
toughest material to cope with.”574 While Bostock eschewed naming women, the demographic 
realities of protected villages meant they had an overabundance of women whose male spouses 
and relatives were in detention camps. While men received rehabilitation efforts in the camps, 
women were to be taught how to be proper wives and mothers. Eventually the CMS even moved 
into the Kamiti prison, where women classified as hard-core were kept. There were only two 
problems with the current situation, lack of recruits and Catholics. Beecher closed his letter with 
a plea, “that we should be much more aggressive and more effective in providing men and 
women to fill posts for which the Government is in fact prepared to pay, and in point of fact 
become members of the specially recruited Civil Service.”575 If the CMS could find enough 
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recruits to travel to Kenya and work for the government in a Christian capacity, they could 
forestall their own slide into obscurity. But at this point the only group able to provide enough 
able bodied men and women to put into the field were Catholics, which greatly distressed 
Beecher. If the CMS found recruits they could outflank Catholic missionaries and cement their 
position of strength in Kenya. Indeed everything old had become new again for the CMS in 
Kenya.  
 Unfortunately, old squabbles and long term staffing issues were to be just the beginning. 
The final months of 1954 foreshadowed the ultimate fractures that brought the CMS to its knees 
in 1955. The first evidence of what was to come was the work of Howard Church. He was a 
CMS golden boy after his appointment to work on the rehabilitation staff at Athi River Camp in 
the summer of 1953. Church was a “dyed in the wool” believer in the Moral Rearmament 
movement, which worried several church leaders, but his initial appointment was met with much 
rejoicing in CMS circles.576 In his Christmas newsletter for 1954, Church described the work 
being done in the camp and is positively optimistic about the future. He claimed, “[t]hey (the 
detainees) have completely lost their hates and hurts and fears and their very facial features are 
changed.”577  
No doubt CMS leadership was pleased by this report however they must have been 
concerned about the next section of his missive, which described a play written by his wife 
Elizabeth entitled The Good Way. This drama, as Howard described it, allowed detainees to see 
“how all races in Kenya are responsible for Mau Mau.” Additionally he claimed that Mrs. 
Church wrote the play because detainees “had a hard time divorcing Christianity and 
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imperialism.”578 In his private epistles, Howard was little better, emphasizing the need for trained 
Africans to perform the work of rehabilitation, not recruits from Great Britain.579 He claimed 
that, “We are convinced that it is the Kikuyu & preferably the Ex-MM leaders who must be 
trained & used to visit other camps. They will get a hearing where we Europeans or Kikuyu in 
pay of Government cannot.”580 Clearly this was not what the CMS wanted to hear, the attempted 
dissolution of their ties with imperialism, and the taking away of their rehabilitation jobs in favor 
of Africans. Granted not many recruits had been found for these types of positions, but the CMS 
lived in hope that more would be found eventually.581 This was the first of many steps that would 
lead to Church’s eventual dismissal from the Athi River camp in 1956. 
 In addition to their problems with Church, the authorities dealt the CMS another 
devastating blow at the end of the year. In December, Colonel Arthur Young resigned from his 
post as commissioner of police in Kenya. Young’s job was to clean up the police force in Kenya, 
and tamp down on the abuses currently bedeviling Kenya. After less than year Young returned to 
Britain with tales of Baring’s incompetent and overbearing nature.582 CMS officials in London 
were horrified by Young’s resignation, they met with him upon his arrival home and published 
several letters in local newspapers.583 Young’s ousting was the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel’s back for CMS officials in the Home Office. They were no longer willing to stand by and 
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privately discuss these issues with the Colonial Office and Governor Baring. Not only did many 
in CMS leadership no longer want to play by the proscribed rules that governed church/state 
relations, they also began to call for Baring’s head.584 Unfortunately in their rush to condemn 
Baring and support Young, they overlooked a key aspect of the situation—the feelings of the 
Bishop of Mombasa. This would prove to be a most untimely and unfortunate oversight.  
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Time for Action? 
 If optimism was the byword for the CMS in 1954, depression and disarray were 
hallmarks of 1955. The optimism of 1954 evaporated in early days of 1955, never to return. In 
the aftermath of Young’s resignation and the powerfully divisive conflict concerning the 
publication of their pamphlet Time for Action, the CMS never managed to recover their 
momentum or relevance in the colony. Ultimately this would pave the way for the success of the 
Anglican Church, but it certainly did not feel that way to the leadership in the Home Office or in 
Kenya. Divine decolonization, when it came, was brutal and swift, leaving a bewildered and 
stunned organization on the brink of extinction. While colonial officials such as A.J. Dawe 
preached managed decline and the continued fellowship with independent African nations, 
religious leaders were left out in the cold. CMS officials such as Bishop Beecher believed that 
they had something meaningful to contribute to liberal empire and to their African congregants. 
They felt that could provide a type of Christian British modernity on the cheap for colonial 
officials, while also affording African Christians protection and benefits. And while episodes 
such as Jidruf’s proved the opposite to be true, the CMS continued to believe in their ability to 
affect change on the ground in the colony. But the events of January and February would put 
paid to that idea. 
Kenya in 1955 was a colony in turmoil, as evidenced by Young’s resignation and the 
announcement of a new amnesty policy in the early days of January. Baring outlined the details 
of this new policy on January 18th and it created immediate worry within CMS circles. This new 
plan called for ‘double amnesty’ for Mau Mau fighters who surrendered as well as for security 
forces who may have committed illegal acts in earlier phases of the war. Double amnesty was 
meant to enhance the current military action in the forest, Operation Hammer, by making 
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surrender more appealing. At the same time the government disbanded the Home Guard and 
dispersed their talents and firepower elsewhere.585 Ultimately these measure proved successful, 
but they created much consternation when combined with Young’s resignation. Shortly before 
Baring announced the new double amnesty plan, Canon Bewes met with Colonel Young in 
London. It was after this tête-à-tête, that Bewes first put forth the idea of putting something out 
in print in Britain. He worried that, “I cannot think that these matters can be kept out of the 
public eye much longer, and the Christian Church out not to be the last to mention them.”586 
Bewes and other leaders in the Anglican Church worried that the government’s tacit admission 
of wrongdoing via the granting of amnesty to security forces would also shine a harsh spotlight 
on the lack of public speech undertaken by the CMS.587 Bewes also wanted Bishop Beecher to 
make some sort of statement which would express his “grave disquiet on these affairs,” but that 
would prove untenable to the Bishop. His secretary responded that he would only send a letter to 
the local newspaper, stating, “it is just a direct letter of appreciation and an expression of hope 
that the reasons for his resignation will be published.”588 While the CMS worried that the 
moment to speak would pass them by, Beecher idly waited for another audience with Governor 
Baring.  
In the face of Beecher’s silence, the CMS was forced to speak. One day later they sent a 
joint memorandum to Baring, describing the ways in which “certain regulations and procedures 
seem to many to contravene the elementary concepts of justice and fair-dealing.” These seem to 
center on the forced repatriation in the protected villages as well as the treatment of local 
                                                           
585 Bennett, 28. 
586 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/7A/5/23, Letter Bewes to Carey, 14 January 1955. 
587 Parliamentary Debate (Hansard), House of Lords, “The Kenyan Situation,” 10 February 
1955, Volume 190, column, 1128—204.  
588 UBL CMS/G59/Y/A5/7A/5/29, Letter Carey to Bewes, 17 January 1955. 
226 
 
women.589 The very next day Baring announced the new amnesty program, and CMS leadership 
was left in a predicament. They were clearly pushing for more public actions, but Beecher 
continued to drag his heels. CMS officials in the home office felt like they had to do something 
publicly, if only to save face in England.  
 This quandary resolved itself with the public notice shown in Britain to a sermon given 
by David Steel in Nairobi. On January 9th the Scottish Presbyterian Steel presided over a service 
at the very Anglican church, All-Saints Cathedral. In this sermon Steel lambasted the churches 
on multiple counts. 
The Church itself is not guiltless. It has too long remained silent in public, though it has 
made repeated representations on these matters to Government in private. This that I have 
said tonight is a repentence (sic). We do not underestimate the difficulties of the situation 
which confronts the government of this Colony, but (it) must be said and said plainly that 
there can be no confidence in measures that are more indicative of a pogram (sic) against 
a people than of a programme to end the emergency and to establish good government.590 
For Steel the main target of this speech was probably the Bishop of Mombasa, Leonard Beecher. 
Throughout the Emergency the two had served on an inter-denominational action group together 
and Steel had continually pushed for greater public action against abuses perpetrated by the 
government, while Beecher wanted to continue making private deputations to the government, 
particularly to Governor Baring. The two men butted heads so furiously that the CMS in London 
was well aware of the tension between the two as well as the fact that the work of the action 
group was seriously hindered by the conflict between the two men.591 Thus Steel’s sermon was 
going to begin to drive a greater wedge between the CMS in London on one hand and the Bishop 
on the other. For the CMS this call by Steel for more public action was the final push they 
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needed to go public about their own misgivings, while for Beecher this was a public 
embarrassment, meant to weaken his leadership within the action group and with the CMS.  
 Three days later the CMS made its move: the Executive Committee authorized the Africa 
Secretary, Canon Cecil Bewes and the General Secretary, Max Warren to take action in the 
manner they saw fit. First they turned to Beecher and asked if he wanted to make a public 
statement. Beecher declined due to fears that he would lose his personal connection with the 
Governor, and also that the government as a whole might become less willing to share its funds 
for CMS projects in the colony.592  Warren and Bewes continued to debate the appropriateness of 
public action, but the events of January 14th and 20th would finally spur them into action. On the 
14th they, along with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fischer met with Colonel Young 
and discussed his resignation from the head of the Kenya Police Force.593 Six days later, on 
January 20th the colonial authorities announced the new amnesty program they would put in 
place in Kenya. This new policy put the CMS in London on high alert for more human rights 
abuses and they argued that in fact this meant that the government was perhaps not working quite 
as diligently as they had led Beecher to believe in stamping out problems in the detention 
centers. Thus the die was cast and the Home Office felt public action was necessary.  
 Because Bishop Beecher had warned home officials that the position of the CMS in 
Kenya might be harmed if he spoke out, Bewes and Warren decided on a compromise of sorts. 
They would publish a document, but claim that it was only for the education of Anglicans in 
England, not for those in Kenya. The idea was to keep a strict separation between the two, thus 
allowing the CMS to make the public statement it felt was necessary while not unduly angering 
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the colonial authorities, the white settler opinion, or Bishop Beecher. They also hoped to placate 
the Bishop by highlighting the recruitment angle of the pamphlet, but alas this compromise was 
to prove not very successful, at least from the Beecher standpoint.  
 Kenya: Time for Action was published soon thereafter along with a press release. It 
begins with an apology and a call to action,  
This pamphlet does not claim to present the whole of the truth about Kenya. What 
follows has largely been withheld from these publication—perhaps for too long. It comes 
to you with a constructive purpose—in the belief that we shall command widespread 
support for insisting that only the highest and best is good enough for Kenya—and that 
the future would be dark indeed if ever second-rate standards (or second-rate people) 
were allowed to take command of the situation. It is our hope that by the time you have 
read to the end you will be convinced that the need for high standards in Kenya cannot be 
separated from the need for high standards in this country beginning with—YOU.594 
After this rousing introduction the pamphlet begins with an overview of the situation on the 
ground in Kenya—the greatness of the Christian witness for those Kikuyu who are persecuted 
for their faith, coupled with the hard work of missionaries on the ground. As the bulletin argues, 
these witnesses are willing to suffer for their faith, but they struggle under the double of 
oppression of Mau Mau and what they call the “Government’s Mau Mau.”595 Rebels continually 
try to force them to oath, and the government automatically assumes they are Mau Mau because 
they are Kikuyu, leaving them with nowhere safe to turn.  
 After this introduction, Time for Action segued into a discussion of Colonel Young’s hard 
work in trying to clean up the police force in Kenya and how his resignation has left many 
people very worried for the future, particularly since “at the time of writing [this pamphlet] no 
adequate official statement has been made of his reasons for doing so.” Thus all people are left 
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with are rumors concerning the widespread nature of human rights abuses in the colony, and the 
government’s “reluctance”  to prosecute those who perpetrated the worst of the abuse. The 
pamphlet goes on to say that the true number of criminals may never be known, and that they 
agree with Rev. Steel’s sermon that Kenya has taken the first steps on the road towards 
tyranny.596 With this introduction Warren and Bewes have positioned the CMS carefully—they 
are supportive of the British imperial project and the idea of the civilizing mission, but not of 
being the puppets of a government that seeks to contravene that higher calling to a Christian 
civilizing mission. Thus, the civilizing mission is good, but only a Christian version of that 
mission. 
 But Bewes and Warren do not want to simply inform the public, they wanted to provide a 
call to action, thus the second section of Time to Action entitled, What Can You Do?. They 
argued that condemnation is not enough, good Christians must take action or stand condemned 
themselves. They laid out a four step plan—pray and confess your sins, while also praying for 
the people of Kenya, write to your MP and tell him you are concerned about “certain aspects of 
the situation” and would like a full statement concerning the resignation of Colonel Young from 
the government.597 Within this letter you should also call for an “immediate review of the mass 
of emergency laws and regulations in Kenya, and for searching inquiry into the adequacy or 
otherwise of present resources of manpower and money to deal with the Colony’s current 
problems.”598  
                                                           
596 Ibid.  
597 Ibid.  
598 Ibid.  
230 
 
For the truly convicted, the pamphlet then calls for recruits to travel to Kenya to work on 
rehabilitation plans at detention camps and in protected villages. In April of the previous year, 
the Bishop of Mombasa traveled to England to recruit workers but the number who volunteered 
for this was very low, and now this pamphlet is calling on you to do God’s work in Kenya for the 
government. Warren is quoted saying:  
The Government is encouraging missionary societies and the C.C.K. (Christian Council 
of Kenya) to appoint as many Christian people as possible to the staffs of camps and 
prisons, but as you will know at Salisbury Square the response of the Christian churches 
to these appeals has been most pitiable. I (Warren) do not think that is too strong a word. 
If, therefore, Christian churches in England, having so feebly responded to the desperate 
need, consider themselves the watch-dogs of right and justice, and must else besides, not 
so much from the comfort and security of a chair by an England fireside, as in the heat 
and sweat of the struggle in Kenya for the hearts and minds of the bewildered Kikuyu 
people.599 
 
If that was too much for the pamphlet’s audience, step lowers responsibility considerably, merely 
requesting that the reader provide offerings to their local church and to the CMS.  
 Kenya: Time for Action started with a bang and ended with a whimper, but the response 
by Bishop Beecher and the British government was all bang. The pamphlet was moderately 
successful, as evidenced by its relatively brisk sales numbers, and coverage in the British press, 
but it was not the clarion call Warren and Bewes hoped it would be. The CMS would continue to 
struggle for recruits and resources throughout the rest of the Emergency and would eventually be 
pushed into allowing greater African leadership with the CMS hierarchy in Kenya. But for the 
British government and Leonard Beecher, this pamphlet would in fact be a call to action. Soon 
after its publication, the Colonial Secretary decided it would be a good plan to have regular 
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meetings with top CMS officials and the pamphlet was briskly debated in Parliament.600 The 
Archbishop of Canterbury tried to moderate the heavy charge of a double Mau Mau, by stressing 
the government’s good intentions in trying to suppress Mau Mau. He began with an apology of 
sorts,” [i]f I go on in some sense to criticise the Government, I do it not in the least to reproach 
them but to encourage them to do better what I know is their fundamental principle and 
purpose.”601 However, in the middle of his speech he slipped in a more serious attack on the 
government’s efforts by laying out clearly that, “what alarms us and the Christian leaders out 
there is that apparently the Government's efforts have been comparatively unsuccessful. The 
results remain disturbing up to this present time.”602 His speech concluded with a promise that 
the Church stood willing to help: 
That work will cost the Christian Churches a great deal, and doubtless there will, in time, 
be an appeal to the Christian people of this country to enable that work to be done. But 
perhaps even more necessary will be the supply from this country to the Government and 
to the Churches of men and women who can bring with them the healing and constructive 
spirit without which there can be no future at all for Kenya.603 
Unfortunately these men and women never appeared and the Church was left with nothing to 
offer the government.  
 While those in London focused on maintaining a conciliatory tone in their dealings with 
the government and press in the aftermath of Time for Action, the Bishop of Mombasa took no 
such care. On January 28th, he sent a letter to the CMS Information Officer, BD Nicholls saying,  
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I am deeply distressed by the action which has been taken in publishing a document 
which seems to me to be an injudicious mixture of quotation from a sermon of a very 
doubtful good taste by the Moderator of the Church of Scotland and of rumour, which 
seems to me to betray the confidences which Colonel Young reposed in the Society when 
he came to call on you.604  
Beecher was not done there, he went to detail the letters he had already written to the East Africa 
Standard and the Times. In these letters he stated that was “bewildered and embarrassed” by the 
pamphlet and wants to assure people that there are no divisions between church and state in 
Kenya. After discussing these letters, Beecher then threatened to resign from the CMS. 
 After dropping this bombshell, Beecher continued to berate Nicholls and the team 
responsible for the pamphlet for not highlighting the positives in Kenya, namely the 9,500 
detainees who have been released and the work of the government to make conditions better for 
detainees.605 His secretary, Willoughby Carey, also weighed in on the pamphlet, saying that it 
will ruin delicate negotiations between the church and government in Kenya.606 Both men are 
extremely upset that the pamphlet was not officially approved by missionaries on the ground in 
Kenya, namely themselves, before being widely published in England. Thus the Warren and 
Bewes plan for compromise—namely this is presented as a document for an English only 
audience, therefore no mission input from Kenya is needed, backfired spectacularly. 
 It was the responsibility of Canon Bewes and B.D. Nicholls to smooth ruffled feathers 
and bring the two sides back together, however the breech between Beecher and the CMS home 
office never really healed. In the end Beecher did not resign, but the relationship between home 
and field office remained straitened for quite some time afterwards as evidenced by the CMS 
response to both men. Nicholls response to Beecher was equally fiery—the Bishop threatened to 
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resign; Nicholls did not accept that resignation but he laid bare Beecher’s inability to make 
positive progress with the government. Beecher had been working with the government, making 
private pleas for the government to get a handle on the human rights abuses happening in Kenya, 
but despite repeated reassurances, Beecher’s work had a seemingly negligible impact on the 
malpractices. Therefore the time had come for the CMS to take a stronger, more public stance 
back in the UK. Nicholls also shot down Beecher’s claim that he had not had time to properly 
review the bulletin. Nicholls claimed that not only did he send a special advance copy of Time 
for Action, he had done all “he can within the limits of human endurance and time” to keep 
Beecher informed of every action on the homefront.607 Despite Nicholl’s hard work, it was clear 
that events on the ground on Kenya were moving too quickly for the old system of memos and 
personal letters that had to be filtered through multiple levels of employees before making their 
way up the chain to Archbishop Beecher or General Secretary Warren.  
Added to these problems were the difficulties of recruiting—as Carey noted in another 
letter to Nicholls in February, this conflict might have been avoided altogether had the CMS 
been able to provide enough recruits for the Government’s call for men and women to work on 
Kikuyu rehabilitation. Had that been successful these recruits could have curbed the worst of the 
abuses and Time for Action would not have been written. 
Thus the divisions between CMS in Kenya and London were not just superficial—this 
was not just a personality clash. The conflict concerning Time for Action hinted at many of the 
deeper cleavages within the Anglican missional community. These problems were emblematic of 
an organization attempting to carry on with nineteenth century ideals and practices in a twentieth 
                                                           
607 UBL, CMS/B/OMS/G3/A5/7A/5/50a, Letter Nicholls to Beecher, 29 January 1955. 
234 
 
century empire. Archbishop Beecher would see himself more and more as a white African, as 
opposed to a British missionary working within a colonial context and Time for Action only 
encouraged him to cleave more closely to the colonial government.608 The British Empire was 
beginning to fade away, and with it went the old style missional relationships. Into the breach 
came a multitude of African church leaders, called up when Beecher could no longer find 
English recruits to spread theology, education, and health care.609 Although the pamphlet was a 
relatively minor conflict considering the totality of events of Mau Mau and eventual Kenyan 
independence, nevertheless it did highlight some of the key conflicts and anxieties that will both 
hamper the CMS and push forward the creation of the Church of East Africa during the chaotic 
period of decolonization in Kenya.  
 The CMS attempted to slowly heal their wounds in the aftermath of Time for Action but 
the pamphlet proved to be a double whammy. Their breach with Bishop Beecher never fully 
healed, and worse it failed to galvanize the British public into action. Recruits and funds 
remained difficult to come by and thus the CMS continued its round robin of debate concerning 
how closely they should associate themselves with the colonial authorities. Beecher lamented 
that he was pushed out of official circles, and Baring would no longer meet with him. Naturally 
he blamed the bulletin for this ostracizing.610 He did not formally with Baring until May, and 
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even then he had to deal with the provoking presence of Reverend Steel.611 Baring continued to 
carry on with his work but the breach between the two sides never fully healed.  
 The CMS was left with only one leg to stand on, but alas that leg turned out to be quite 
unstable. Throughout the summer and fall of 1955, the CMS worked to fill posts in detention 
camps and protected villages, but they never quite managed to entice young British men and 
women down to the colony. Individual workers continued to soldier on, despite lack of financial 
or personnel support from the missionary society, but no long term, sustainable options appeared. 
In June Colonel Grimshaw wrote to Max Warren in his capacity as the East Africa Regional 
Secretary to highlight the recruitment needs of Kenya. In order to meet their responsibilities, the 
CMS needed, two administrative missionaries, five female workers, five educational 
missionaries, an unspecified number of medical workers, at least on agricultural teacher, a staff 
member for the urban area of Pumwani, three missionary advisors, and several men to drive 
mobile vans around the countryside.612 Privately, Grimshaw seemed well aware that these needs 
would not be met, but wanted Warren to have the list anyway. The only bright light for the CMS 
in the midst of this downturn was the increasing number of African workers creeping into the 
reports. Although officials never commented on this proliferation of new workers, it was clear 
that they had become an important stop gap measure in the work done by missionaries for the 
colonial government. In August, the CCK head a conference for rehabilitation workers and two 
African clergymen were present, Rev. Canon Elijah Gacanja and Rev. Geoffrey Ngare.613 These 
men worked for the CCK, but similar shifts occurred within the ranks of the CMS at this time. 
The CMS Home Office remained relatively quiet on the issue of African lay and clerical 
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workers, but that does not mean that these changes were not important. Men such as Ngare, 
along with men like Festo Olang and Obadiah Karuiki would provide a hastily built foundation 
for the emergence of the Anglican Church of East Africa.  
 It was not until the end of 1955 that the CMS realized that Kenya was on the verge of 
independence. In November Max Warren and Bishop Beecher met when Warren traveled to 
Kenya on a short trip. The voyage was meant to heal the breech between Salisbury Square and 
Mombasa, but was only moderately successful. Warren apologized for publishing Time for 
Action without consulting Beecher, and he promised “not to trespass on the Kenya situation 
again without the fullest prior discussion with him.”614 Beecher expressed his fear that the CMS 
was too anti-white, but each man agreed to cooperate more fully in the future to avoid any public 
fallout.615 While they parted as friends of a sort, it seems clear that the meeting never really 
solved any problems for the CMS. It did not cure the disease, it merely placed a friendly Band-
Aid over the most visible wound. Neither Warren nor Beecher emerged from the meeting with a 
better sense of how the CMS and diocese could work together more fruitfully, nor did it address 
the myriad of intellectual and philosophical differences between the two men. Instead each made 
vague promises to be more communicative and Warren expressed his belief that missionaries 
could be loyal to both diocese and CMS.616 But there were no concrete decisions regarding the 
future of Anglicanism in Kenya, nor were there any conversations about where the lay and 
pastoral staff would be found to staff such an enterprise.  
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 The only real progress made in the meeting was the creation of a memo entitled “Last 
Chance in Kenya,” which frankly acknowledged the lack of clear direction for the CMS. The 
future was uncertain, but the CMS did understand finally that they could not solely rely on their 
connection to the government in order to maintain their position in the colony. As the memo 
stated,  
The urgency of all this for the church is that there is a very real risk that in the minds of 
the Africans in Kenya and in East African generally the Church, still led by Europeans, 
will come to be viewed as an annexe to Government House. Increasingly this will lead to 
the discrediting of the Church and to the extreme likelihood of rapid proliferation of sects 
whose driving force will be African nationalism.617 
For the first time the CMS has admitted that independence is on the horizon and changes must be 
made in order to survive into the next decade. No doubt Bishop Beecher was unhappy by this 
verbiage, but it was clear that business as usual was no longer a functioning model for the CMS. 
What would constitute the new CMS template remained uncertain in the eyes of the 
organization’s leadership. It was a brave new world for the CMS and they were almost wholly 
unprepared for it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
617
 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/7A/11, Last Chance for Kenya, 24 November 1955. 
238 
 
Conclusion  
 In the midst of World War II, AJ Dawe wrote of the need to “bind these people to us in 
such a way that their moral and material sources of strength will continue to be ranged on the 
side of Great Britain.”618 The Church Missionary Society desperately wanted to be the 
organization that would provide that binding agent. They hoped that by supplying the moral 
foundation for the colonies of the British Empire, they could maintain their function and status in 
colonial society. Unfortunately they could not do so. In the 1920s the Archbishop of Canterbury 
saw them as the lynchpin of empire, but by the end of 1955 it was clear that they were merely a 
sideshow in the grand scheme of independence.  Perhaps even more damningly, the CMS did not 
realize that independence was upon them until the last moment. The Colonial Office began 
prepping and planning for a world in which the sun did set on the British Empire, but CMS 
officials did not. Even as late as 1954, they eagerly envisioned a future in which they would 
march alongside government officials to usher in new eras of peace, prosperity, and progress. 
Never mind that these marches would need to push through a civil war and fight for 
independence in Kenya. The violence of Mau Mau, rather than destroying Christianity, would 
provide a cleansing force for Kikuyu society. Missionaries could separate the true believers from 
those who merely wanted material benefits, and if the CMS could protect loyal African 
Christians from guerilla fighters and the colonial state, they could secure their future in the 
colony. Unfortunately missionaries proved unable to rise to the task in each occasion. In the end 
they realized that many of their converts only returned to the church when it seemed that Mau 
Mau had lost the fight, and their grand test to winnow out the true believers became unreliable. 
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Worse still, missionaries were unable to protect their followers from Mau Mau violence or abuse 
from the state.  
Each of these failures created much consternation within CMS circles, but the watershed 
moment came in early 1955 with the publication of Time for Action. CMS officials in London 
worried that the double amnesty program announced by the state would expose their lack of 
action in regards to state sponsored abuses, and thus rushed out the publication of a pamphlet 
which was regrettably too little too late for the British public. Time for Action did not inspire 
recruits to come and work for rehabilitation in Kenya; in fact there was no record of any recruit 
coming forward because of the pamphlet. Although it did briefly bring the government to 
attention, their consideration was short lived, and those relationships slipped back into old 
patterns of neglect very quickly. In the aftermath of publication, the Bishop of Mombasa, 
Leonard Beecher threatened to resign from the CMS and lamented his loss of influence with the 
colonial government. Beecher’s relationship with both Governor Baring the CMS never fully 
recovered from this breach, as evidenced by their strained communication for the remainder of 
the year. However, each of these failures paved the way for future success in the era of 
independence. In the face of colonial neglect and lack of personnel, the CMS was compelled to 
make greater use of African lay and pastoral workers. Decolonization was a messy, abrupt 
process for the CMS, but in the midst of disorder they found the path to success. It was not 
through their traditional channels of protection for Africans while benefiting the colonial 
authorities but instead by utilizing the skills and talents of the Africans who had been right in 
front of them all along. 
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Epilogue—A New Life? 
The relationships of the West to Asia and Africa have changed out of all recognition and 
the pattern of those relationships involves a new alignment of resources. These facts, 
quite apart from the economic situation in Britain and its effect on a Missionary Society, 
means that a Missionary Society today must increasingly see its own role as being [a] 
more limited one that was formerly the case, and also a much more specialized one.619 
 
 In May 1955 the Archbishop of Canterbury took his fateful trip to Kenya to consecrate 
the new church at Fort Hall. His visit was meant to soothe troubled African souls while also 
placating Bishop Beecher in the aftermath of the publication of Time for Action. In many ways 
this visit remains a mystery. Archbishop Fisher’s details of th 
e trip focus on the mundane rather than the noteworthy, and few historians have included the trip 
into their historical narratives. The trip garnered little attention, and focus primarily centered on 
the creation of the new church and memorial hall, however another aspect of his trip ultimately 
the biggest impact. While in Kenya, Fisher consecrated the Rt. Rev. Obadiah Kariuki as 
Assistant Bishop for the Diocese of Mombasa.620 At the same ceremony Festo Olang’ was also 
consecrated as an Assistant Bishop for western Kenya.621  These two men were the first in a long 
                                                           
619 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/2B, Letter from Warren to Beecher, 11 August 1958. 
620 There is little in the historical record about this appointment. In late 1953/early 1954 Warren 
and Beecher exchanged a few letters about the potential for appointing an African Assistant 
Bishop. At that time Kariuki seemed like a good choice, excepting his political connections. 
However in their second letter on the subject Beecher stated that Governor Baring was pleased 
with the idea, and thus a year and half later Kariuki was installed. There are no letters about this 
appointment in the official CMS correspondence, but there are pictures of the ceremony. For 
more see: UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/2B, Letter from Beecher to Warren, 30 October 1953; 
UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/2B, Letter from Warren to Beecher, 20 May 1954; University of 
Cambridge Library, GBR/0115/CMS/12/2/34.  
621 In the only batch of letters regarding this appointment, Beecher worried that Olang’ was “not 
sufficiently mature” for the appointment, but seemed to have changed his mind by 1955. For 
more information on Olang’’s career see: Festo Olang’, Festo Olang’: An Autobiography 
(Nairobi: Uzima Press, 1991).  
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line of new African leadership within the Anglican Church in Kenya. While Africans had served 
as padres since the 1920s, this was the first time they were given high level church positions. 
Their appointment also highlights several important ideas concerning the CMS and 
decolonization. While their selection was a momentous occasion for church members in Kenya, 
it created only the tiniest of ripples for CMS officials back in London and the colonial 
authorities. The fallout of Time for Action still reverberated across the distance between London 
and Mombasa and nothing would ever fully heal the breach. 
Not only was the Home Office quiet, colonial officials also remained silent on the issue. 
Baring approved of Kariuki’s work in 1953, but said nothing regarding the appointment of 
Olang’. Traditionally colonial officials had little direct input on the appointment of church 
officials, but the two positions traditionally worked together closely. For example when Beecher 
himself was selected as Bishop of Mombasa in 1950 he had just finished work on the Beecher 
Report on Education for the government.622 Kariuki’s connections were quite different from the 
British-bred Beecher. However, his background worked strongly in his favor in the aftermath of 
independence. During the Mau Mau conflict Kariuki visited Jomo Kenyatta in prison and the two 
were related thanks to Kenyatta’s marriage to Ngina Kenyatta.623 In addition to political and 
personal linkages that would serve him well in an independent Kenya, Kariuki was also a 
Revivalist.624 This particular strain of theology has become increasingly entrenched within 
                                                           
622 For more on Beecher’s work see Chapter 4.  
623 Ben Knighton, Religion and Politics in Kenya: Essays in Honor of a Meddlesome Priest 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 72; Philip Boobbyer, “Moral Re-Armament in Africa in 
the Era of Decolonization,” in Missions, Nationalism, and the End of Empire Brian Stanley, ed., 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003), 226.  
624 The East African Revivalist movement first emerged in Uganda in the 1920s. It focused 
heavily on the idea of conversion, public confession, and an evangelical style of faith. African 
leaders within the CMS tended to be Revivalists, but it was an African led movement and many 
missionaries felt uncomfortable with its tenets. For more on the history of the Revivalist 
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Anglican theology since independence in 1963, and Kariuki was at the forefront of that 
movement.625 Kariuki is an excellent example of the shifts that had taken place within the CMS 
and its relationship with the colonial state. When Beecher was appointed as Bishop of Mombasa 
his links to the state and to elites within white settler society, i.e. his marriage to Gladys Leakey, 
helped pave the way for his promotion. Kariuki had few connections to the colonial state or 
white settler society, but he did have many influential friends in both the Loyalist and nationalist 
camps. Throughout the war, he preached in detention camps, but his relationship with Kenyatta 
placed him in a uniquely privileged position in 1963.626 
Both Kariuki and Olang’ traveled to the United Kingdom in the aftermath of their 
promotions, Kariuki in 1956 and Olang’ in 1958. Unlike Kariuki’s visit, Olang’ drew little 
fanfare from CMS officials when he landed in the UK.627 Despite the lack of attention paid to 
Olang’, his trip highlighted another important aspect of shifting nature of CMS work in Kenya. 
When the society published Time for Action they wanted to call attention to government abuses 
but they also wanted to recruit British men and women to work for the state as part of the 
rehabilitation efforts. Their siren call proved less than effective however, as they drew in zero 
new recruits in the months following the pamphlet’s publication. Part of the problem for the 
CMS was not merely their silence in the face of human rights abuses but also the increasingly 
                                                           
movement see: Kevin Ward and Emma Wild-Wood, eds., The East African Revival: History and 
Legacy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2012); Emmanuel Twesigye, Religion, Politics, 
and Cults in East Africa: God’s Warriors and Mary’s Saints (New York: Peter Lang, 2010); J.E. 
Church, Quest for the Highest: An Autobiographical Account of the East African Revival 
(Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1981).  
625 Galia Sabar, Church, State, and Society in Kenya: From Mediation to Opposition (London: 
Frank Cass, 2002), 155. 
626 Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 173. 
627 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/2B, Letter from Warren to K.E. Stovold, 11 March 1958. 
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secular nature of life in the United Kingdom.628 Although remnants of Anglican life remain 
important markers in British society, Christian rituals such as weekly church attendance and 
baptisms are much less common than they were before the war.629 Despite the gloomy outlook of 
the church in 1945, Arthur Marwick argues that in fact a type of “secular Anglicanism” still 
exists in England today. Rather than focus on Christological or theological issues, English men 
and women coalesce around ideas of tolerance and common courtesy still present in English 
identity thanks to Anglican influence.630 Whatever faint traces of Anglicanism were left on the 
English psyche, it did not stir them to join the CMS in Kenya. In the short term this created many 
problems for the Home Office as they struggled to replenish posts left vacant by retiring or dying 
missionaries. It also meant that they could not fulfill their promise to the colonial state regarding 
manpower for rehabilitation, but these failures did pave the way for more Africans to stake their 
claim in the ranks of Anglican leadership.  
The one missionary who had taken up the call for work in the detention camp was 
Howard Church. In the fall of 1953, Church took up his post at the Athi River camp and worked 
with the Moral Re-armament program to cleanse Kikuyu men and make them fit for release back 
into society. Initially the CMS was quite excited about this appointment, but Church’s MRA 
                                                           
628 David Edwards calls England in the post-war period one of the most secular countries in the 
world, “almost a Western China.” David Edwards, “Zeal for Reform as Numbers Slide,” in Not 
Angels But Anglicans: A History of Christianity in the British Isles Henry Chadwick, ed., 
(Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2000), 263. David Bebbington and David Ceri Jones collection of 
works provides some much needed examination of the ways in which religion changed 
throughout the United Kingdom in the twentieth century, not just England. David Bebbington 
and David Ceri Jones, (eds.), Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism in the United Kingdom 
During the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
629 William Safran, The Secular and the Sacred: Nationalism, Religion, and Politics (London: 
Frank Cass, 2003), 82—3. 
630 Arthur Marwick, British Society Since 1945: The Penguin Social History of Britain (London: 
Penguin, 1982), xi, 120—21. How much ‘secular Anglicanism’ carries over into British rather 
than English identity and society is a question Marwick leaves unanswered.  
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leanings worried them. The Home Office needed men who would prove to the state that they 
were necessary to the reestablishment of civilized life in Kenya, not men who would prove that 
any program with a Christian sheen could successfully transform devilish Mau Mau detainees 
back into angels. Throughout the Emergency the Colonial Office sporadically gave lip service to 
the idea that the Christian churches in Kenya provided valuable services in terms of 
rehabilitation. For example in late 1955 a Colonial Office report stated,  
The Churches are making a major contribution to the rehabilitation of both convicts and 
detainees. Where camps are situated near Missions the missionaries visit them to arrange 
services and Christian teaching. In more remote camps resident chaplains are often 
appointed. The Government gives financial assistance to Missions to enable them to meet 
travelling expenses and employ chaplains. In some champs churches have been built and 
it is intended that such shall be provided in all camps as soon as possible. A considerable 
response has been apparent among convicts and detainees as a result of the work of the 
Churches.631 
While statements such as this may have cheered CMS staff, they were too few and far between to 
be of real use. A better example of the type of rehabilitation document created by the Colonial 
Office is a family tree sorts, created to show the various programs at work in the detention 
camps. On this tree, missions are nowhere to be found.632 Indeed as the decades progressed, 
mission and church activities increasingly faded into the background of the official mind.633 The 
CMS had hoped that Howard Church might be an important step in the reversal of this process 
but that proved not to be the case.  
 By late 1955 Church and the MRA were both under intense scrutiny by the state for their 
activities in Athi River and various other detention camps. There was worry in official circles 
that the MRA was anti-imperialist and too accepting of the idea that many Mau Mau fighters had 
                                                           
631 TNA, CO 822/794, Rehabilitation of Mau Mau adherents in Kenya. 
632 TNA, CO 822/703, Mau Mau Adherents Rehabilitation. 
633 This is seen throughout this dissertation, as citations from the official archives at Kew 
decrease in number throughout each chapter.  
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legitimate grievances against the British state. Howard Church was deeply imbricated in these 
controversies, particularly in regards to the plays and skits performed by detainees and camp 
officials. In one such play, Church’s wife played the role of abusive white settler.634 After 
hearing distressing reports concerning these dramas, Thomas Askwith, the Commissioner of 
Community Development, launched an investigation into the methods and philosophies used at 
Athi River.635 As a result of his investigation the Athi River Camp was shut down, and Howard 
Church was reassigned. The Colonial Office described his work as: 
Liaison Officer with the Protestant Missions and given a roving commission to visit all 
the detention camps to see local African padres and to take services for the detainees. He 
began his work in May, 1956, and immediately complaints were made from different 
sources about the unorthodox methods he used (e.g. it was claimed that he was abusing 
his privilege by conducting direct M.R.A. propaganda.636  
Due to his continued reliance on MRA tactics and rhetoric, the authorities fired him in July of 
1956. Before informing Church, someone from the Community Development office noticed the 
Bishop of Mombasa, who wholeheartedly supported Church’s termination.637 Apparently the 
Right Reverend Church was a thorn in my many sides. Despite the fact Leonard Beecher knew 
of Church’s termination, no notice was sent to the Home Office in London. Indeed after the early 
days of his appointment, Church was only mentioned twice in CMS official correspondence once 
                                                           
634 Boobbyer, 225—26.  
635 While Boobbyer argues that these skits pushed Askwith to launch his investigation, Robert 
Edgerton contends that in fact it was the presence of MRA sanctioned prostitutes to service the 
Home Guard and tempt the detainees that caused Askwith to begin examining MRA methods 
more closely. Robert Edgerton, Mau Mau: An African Crucible (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1989), 193—94. 
636 TNA, CO 533/738, Reorganization of Education Department. 
637 Ibid.  
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in a public statement made in the summer of 1956 and again with the notice of his final 
retirement from CMS service in 1958.638 
 Officially Church’s dismissal stemmed from his continued adherence to MRA tactics 
despite state and religious disapproval. The Colonial Office claims that several Presbyterian 
missionaries and Anglican padres complained about him, as did Leonard Beecher, who claimed 
that MRA teachings were a “Pelagian heresy.”639 If the official record in Britain was clear about 
Church’s activities, Caroline Elkins argues that the situation in Kenya is quite different. She 
contends that Church’s sacking was a direct response to his protests regarding the treatment of 
Mau Mau detainees in the Pipeline, and fears among Colonial Office officials that Church would 
go public with his damning insights into camp life.640 This was a concern for both the Colonial 
Office and the CMS, due in part to the public debate sweeping over Britain in the summer of 
1956, right in the midst of Church’s dismissal. In May a former rehabilitation worker, Eileen 
Fletcher published a three part series in a Quaker periodical entitled, “Kenya’s Concentration 
Camps.” Her accusations damned every aspect of the Pipeline and rehabilitation in the colony 
and immediately created a firestorm of debate both publically and politically in Britain.641 
Colonial officials worried that Howard Church would add fuel to the fire after his dismissal, 
however that threat never materialized.  
                                                           
638 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G3/A5/2/1958, CMS Executive Board of the Kenya Mission notes, 25—
28 October 1958; UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/7A/7, Press Release, Statement of Church Leaders 
in Kenya, 8 July 1956. 
639 TNA, CO 533/738. Pelagians believe that humanity is basically good, and deny the concept of 
original sin.  
640 Imperial Reckoning, 296.  
641 Ibid, 287—88.  
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 CMS officials worried less about Howard Church because they were focused on Eileen 
Fletcher’s accusations. Generally speaking Home Office officials paid little heed to the 
disturbing details of her report because they were more concerned with the political implications 
of her debate.642 In Kenya an interdenominational collection of church leaders released a public 
statement concerning Fletcher’s allegations. While they do acknowledge that abuses happened, 
they agree with S.A. Morrison that her concerns were outdated and no longer relevant in the 
colony.643 This document highlighted the good work being done by the churches in Kenya, as 
well as church state relations in the colony. Additionally, the statement commended the state for 
its support, “in all this the government has given every facility, in some cases has given generous 
financial assistance and has asked for more help than it has been possible for us to offer.”644 
Because the document’s creation by committee origins it is clear that sections which highlight 
the good relationship between the two were authored by Leonard Beecher, while statements such 
as, “in some cases progress has been slow, and the Government has not always agreed to our 
suggestions to the degree we would have wished,” were crafted by David Steel, Beecher’s old 
nemesis.645 Perhaps its origins are what led the Archbishop of Canterbury to personally intervene 
and forbid any CMS official to speak out regarding the public statement; they could only 
generally support the idea of a delegation.646 The CMS Executive Committee did pass a 
resolution supporting the statement, but that seemed to be the end of the matter on their end.647 
                                                           
642 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/Y/A5/7A/7, Memo from BD Nicholls about Miss Fletcher, undated. 
643 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/7A/7, Minutes of lunch between BD Nicholls and S.A. Morrison, 
13 June 1956. Morrison was the leader of the Christian Council of Kenya. 
644 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/7A/7, Statement by Church Leaders in Kenya, 8 July 1956.  
645 Ibid.  
646 Ibid.  
647 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G3/A5/6/1/1956, CMS Executive Committee Press Release, 12 July 
1956. 
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However Beecher could not stand another affront from the Presbyterian Steel. He wrote an angry 
missive to Max Warren, the General Secretary of the CMS, proposing to release his own public 
statement, disavowing his support of the press release due to the changes made by Steel. Warren 
advised him to behave more cautiously and privately. Beecher should lay his case before the 
Colonial Secretary and be honest about the friction between himself and Steel. But to publicly air 
grievances would only benefit “the Devil and the Roman Catholic Church.”648 Beecher agreed to 
Warren’s plan, and the whole situation died down in a few weeks.649 
 Indeed, most CMS activities slowly died over the remaining years of empire in Kenya. In 
a long letter to Beecher, Warren laid out his vision for the CMS’ future. He concluded,  
The relationships of the West to Asia and Africa have changed out of all recognition and 
the pattern of those relationships involves a new alignment of resources. These facts, 
quite apart from the economic situation in Britain and its effect on a Missionary Society, 
means that a Missionary Society today must increasingly see its own role as being more 
limited one than was formerly the case, and also a much more specialized one.650 
Leadership in both London and Mombasa seemed to agree for the first time since 1954. The 
scope of missions needed to change in order for any semblance of CMS work to continue in the 
newly independent countries of Africa. In May of 1960 the East Africa synod promoted Beecher 
from Bishop of Mombasa to Archbishop of Mombasa, as part of a reorganization and expansion 
of dioceses in Kenya.651 Several months later the Archbishop of Canterbury traveled to Kenya to 
officially install Beecher into his new post. Before he left, Fisher gave a quote to The Times 
regarding the work of the church against the “colour bar” in Africa. His response was,  
                                                           
648 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/2B, Letter Warren to Beecher, 14 July 1956. 
649 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/Y/A5/2A. 
650 UBL CMS/B/OMS/G59/A5/2A, Letter Warren to Beecher, 11 August 1958. 
651 The Times, “Ecclesiastical News,” 5 May 1960. 
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It is not making sufficient headway anywhere because this is a very bad world and the 
counter forces are strong, but it is doing its job and it is up to the world to decide whether 
or not it will fall in line.652 
This is a far cry from the statement made by then Archbishop Randall Davidson in 1920 when he 
positioned the CMS at the center of a moral compass for the British Empire, which in turn 
provided leadership and progress for the world.653 Clearly much had changed in the intervening 
forty years for both the church and the empire. Despite the morose attitude presented by Fisher, 
the setbacks suffered by the CMS paved the way for the success of the Anglican Church of 
Kenya. Decolonization was a messy, chaotic affair for the CMS; the first mention of an 
independent Kenya came in a speech given by the new Archbishop of Mombasa in June of 1960. 
In this speech Beecher reassured whites and blacks in Kenya that although independence was on 
the horizon and even though, “the age of the missionary society in the old sense is now past; an 
indigenous church is now in being with African nationals sharing in the government and ministry 
of that church at the highest levels.”654 For once, Beecher was correct in his assessment of the 
state of Christianity and empire. In the end, decolonization and the creation of the Anglican 
Church of Kenya was a failure, right up until it became a success.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
652 The Times, “Dr. Fisher Leaves for East Africa,” 22 July 1960. 
653
 Parliamentary Debate (Hansard), House of Lords, “East Africa: Status of Indians and Native 
Labour,” 14 July 1920, Volume, 41, column, 132—33. 
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